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Introduction to the series 
By 
Niels Henrik Gregersen: 
The Human Project in Science & Religion is the first volume in a new 
series of Copenhagen University Discussions in Science and Religion. 
Copenhagen is often associated with two major figures in theology and 
science: Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855), the forerunner of philosophical 
existentialism, and the physicist Niels Bohr (1885-1962). By happenstance 
this publication antedates the jubilee year of 2013, when Copenhagen 
University wi l l celebrate the bicentennial of Kierkegaard's birth as well as 
the centennial of Niels Bohr's famous atomic model of 1913. Here, Bohr 
introduced the theory that electrons travel in orbits around the nucleus of 
the atom. While Kierkegaard spoke of leaps of faith, Bohr referred to 
electronic jumps between the orbits; in both cases discontinuity prevails 
over continuity. 
Against this background, it is perhaps more than a coincidence that the 
Copenhagen discussions on science and religion since 2001 have taken 
place under the name Forum of Existence and Science1- a somewhat 
unusual title, perhaps, but a very apt one in a Danish context. In general, 
Nordic philosophers, theologians and scientists tend to be sceptical about 
too high a claim for a unified world-view amalgamating science and 
religion. Existential first-hand perspectives cannot very easily be 
accommodated within a scientific third-person perspective. Thus, either 
models of complementarity (in the wake of Niels Bohr) or models of a 
discipline-based dialogue are preferred over and against more extravagant 
claims of grand-scale metaphysical synthesis in our Forum of Existence 
and Science. We prefer to speak about interdisciplinary inquiry than about 
trans-disciplinary unification. 
Since 2005, the Forum became part of the Copenhagen University Network 
of Science and Religion in collaboration with the Department of Systematic 
Theology and the Centre for Naturalism and Christian Semantics. This 
move was facilitated by two generous grants from the Metanexus Institute 
1 www, forumforeksistensogv idenskab.dk 
and the John Templeton Foundation. We are grateful to these institutions 
for supporting our research as well as for giving us the opportunity to be a 
part of the Global Local Societies Initiative. We also thank Teol. Dr. Anne 
L . C . Runehov, who in 2008 took over the leadership of the Network. 
Without her commitment this series would not have been initiated. 
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Science and Theology as an Instance of Reflection 
Introduction by Lluis Oviedo 
Introduction 
What does science have to do with theology and vice versa? Why would the 
one care about the other? Furthermore, why would science care about 
religion? Apparently different branches of the natural sciences are concerned 
with religion. One reason is perhaps that religion belongs to the faculty of 
being human which has provided the most interest for scientific investigation. 
Due to today's advanced equipment, scientists are now able to study subject 
matter such as consciousness and emotions. Previously, these subjects 
remained the domain of the philosophers. Religion offers a wide range of 
interesting features to study: higher states of consciousness; rituals; religious 
experiences; religious emotions; religious cognition; religious behaviour, etc. 
These topics are of interest for different branches of the natural sciences: 
neuroscience; cognitive science; behavioural psychology and evolutionary 
psychology to name only a few. Reflecting Willem B. Drees' words, due to 
the successful progress of the scientific enterprise in providing reliable 
knowledge of the universe and its content, theologians have felt the need to 
consider these findings but also to reconsider their theology. Scientists and 
scholars taking the debate seriously face the following questions. Firstly, the 
question of how to relate scientific theories and findings to questions of faith, 
meaning and purpose as raised by theology. Secondly, the question of how to 
relate empirical questions and answers to ethical and existential questions and 
answers. On the one hand there is the scientific quest for reliable knowledge 
that is not dependent on cultural constraints and subjective preferences (even 
though one may ask i f this is entirely possible) and on the other hand there is 
the religious quest, which concerns meaning and orientation in our lives but is 
a quest that is to a larger extent dependent on cultural constraints and 
subjective existence. 
These questions and reflections and the quest for finding adequate 
understanding of the world that does justice to what it is to be a human being 
embedded in oneself, the world, and for many, in God, led to a new discipline 
being born: Science and Theology. As the name suggests, academics working 
in this field are interested in both science and religion in one way or another. 
They may belong to the academic field of the natural sciences, the social 
sciences, the human sciences, theology or religious studies. It was during the 
1960s that major developments in the philosophy of science and the 
philosophy of religion, new theories and discoveries in the natural sciences, as 
well as complex shifts in the theological landscape, made possible 
constructive interaction between often separate or even hostile intellectual 
communities (Russel and Wegter-McNelly 2003, 746). 
One could perhaps say that it was Ian Barbour with Issues in Science and 
Religion who built the first bridge between the two fields (Barbour, 1996). He 
accounted for the mutual aspects he found in the methodology, linguistics and 
epistemology of the two disciplines of science and theology, namely "[b]oth 
made cognitive claims about the world expressed through metaphors and 
models, and both employed a hypothetic-deductive method within a 
revisionist, contextualised, and historicist framework" (Russel and Wegter-
McNelly, 2003, 746). Thus Barbour maintained that what both disciplines 
have in common is that they need to work with hypotheses, metaphors or other 
figurative language, explanatory models, etc. to construct theories about our 
world. 
However, some esteemed voices are concerned about some of the recent 
developments in this new discipline. There is some unease about the 
consequences of an excess of specialisation, which would render this new 
field too "professional" and too far removed from the traditional interests and 
methods of scientific as well as theological communities. 
These opponents argue that the disciplines of science and theology 
remain distinct. One reason for the concern that the disciplines distance 
themselves from their traditional interests might be that the academic 
programme of Science and Theology is confused with the programme called 
Theology of Science on the one hand and the programme of Scientific Studies 
of Religion on the other. Science and Theology is ideally an intellectual 
venture that aims at informing scientists about the theological relevance of 
their work as well as informing theologians about the meaning and impact of 
scientific progress for their religious hermeneutics. 
Seen as such, a specialisation of the academic field of Science and 
Theology seems unavoidable. Hence, to put it in the words of Willem B . 
Drees, "there is not only a need for serious study of 'Religion and Science', as 
an object to be studied [by theologians], but also for serious reflection in 
'Religion and Science"' (2010, 150). This, however, does not prevent the 
programme of Science and Theology from comprising several dimensions. We 
can mention at least four. (1) A dimension concerned with establishing the 
Theology of Science. (2) A scientific dimension concerned with Studies 
of Religion. (3) A professional interdisciplinary dimension of Science and 
Religion concerned with studying specific topics of religion from an 
interdisciplinary point of view. This dimension is more reflective and 
ambitious, and reflects true academic specialisation. (4) A dialogic dimension 
of Science and Religion, which is more dialogic, which renders science 
understandable for theologians and theology for scientists but has the ambition 
of deepening the debate between science and theology by an emphasis on 
religion. 
The present collection of essays is the result of several lectures organised 
by the Copenhagen University Network for Science and Religion during 2008. 
In my opinion, the lectures especially mirror the third and fourth dimensions 
of Science and Theology mentioned above. The present collection of studies 
represents a professional level of analysis that aims at accounting for some of 
the current questions arising in the interface of science and theology. In my 
opinion, the most interesting point in these essays is that they clearly show 
how one of the ambitions of Science and Theology is to raise the standard of 
debate thereby supplying a meta-platform for discussion. Obviously this 
ensemble of intellectual reflections mirrors the reflective dimension of 
Science and Theology: when both fields come into contact, a second or third 
order of reflection is required to deal with the impending challenges. 
Presentation of the Chapters 
Let us now look at the main essays and the responses which resulted in fruitful 
discussions. A l l the authors are well known specialists in the field of Science 
and Theology, with highly acclaimed publications and careers in attempts at 
bridging both sides of the perceived divide. The idea of organising this project 
is really interesting and appears promising, since the respondents to the main 
essays manage to develop the reflection still further, showing the relevance 
and limits of the proposed points. If at least one aspect of scientific progress is 
measured by the level of discussion reached here, then these essays wil l 
clearly contribute to the advancement of the field, prompting further 
development. 
In chapter one the well known English Theologian, Alister McGrath, 
pleads for the revival of Natural Theology, after a cosmetic operation pointing 
to a change of identity and mission. Indeed, part of the essay aims at 
reviewing the history, achievements and flaws of that theological project, and 
proposes a new kind of natural theology more in keeping with the current 
conditions. The flaws are located in modern times: the bad influence of the 
Enlightenment, which settled a wrong agenda; the destructive criticism of Karl 
Barth of the entire project; and the inability to deliver what was promised: 
rational access to the divine. The alternative connects in some way with the 
medieval tradition of universals and with Trinitarian theology. Natural 
theology would become a more confessional programme of how believers see 
and feel the natural world, including - beyond the cognitive dimension of 
truth - the other two less empirical aspects left somewhat behind: beauty and 
goodness. The narrative appears plausible, even i f this history has been told 
before: Enlightenment has ruined the theological tradition, and looking at 
more remote sources of inspiration, in the great Christian tradition, it is 
probable that better ways can be found to revitalize the prospect of theology 
engaging with nature. 
In the second chapter, Anne Runehov shows that she has done her 
homework well as respondent, and has applied her analytical skills to better 
frame McGrath's proposal. In her view, the new project is clearly distinct and 
distant both from its medieval and modern versions. Then she engages in the 
thorny issue of nature and our experience of it, which admits several 
approaches, social construction being just one of them. As a result of the 
critical revision, Runehov proposes to call McGrath's project a Theology of 
Nature and the Natural, instead of a Natural Theology. Following the criteria 
of McFague, a similar programme finds great plausibility and actuality, as it is 
able to connect Christian revelation with the scientific and ecological 
sensitivity of our time. In my view this is more than a semantic question: how 
to deal theologically with nature and its scientific and technological 
management. This becomes a big challenge for a more engaged theology. 
Medieval inspiration seems inadequate for the job. 
It would be extremely useful to continue the dialogue in order to 
ascertain which would constitute the best theological programme both for 
making space for the recent developments of science, and for keeping the 
provision of hope, truth and love revealed in the Christian tradition. What 
seems clear is that things cannot continue in the same vein and that even at the 
curricular level, a new model of the Theology of nature and creation needs to 
be developed to keep pace with the events of our time. If a more reflective 
theology needs to have an impact, a good case is found here. The efforts of 
trying to renew the theological understanding of the natural world - which is 
more than just our environment, since we are embedded in it - should point to 
a renewed teaching programme in our faculties. 
Chapter three presents the criticism that Mikael Stenmark raises 
regarding scientism in its epistemological version. The topic is very much 
related to the close programmes of naturalism and reductionism. It is obvious 
that these questions are at the centre of the basic agenda of Science and 
Theology. Indeed i f the method assumed by scientism or naturalism is 
accepted, any engagement between science and theology will suffer 
immensely. It is a priority of the current programme of the sub-discipline to 
dismantle every attempt to reduce our theological knowledge of the real to 
what can be obtained only through scientific scrutiny, a strategy that 
automatically dismisses the methods of theology as an invalid form of 
understanding. Stenmark manages in a magisterial way to do the job, and 
provides convincing arguments to refute the epistemological reductionism 
linked to that version of scientism. The self-referential paradoxes of that 
programme are well exposed, even in their weaker versions. Furthermore the 
evidence points to a set of ideas that are obtained outside of the scientific 
realm, to the specificity of intentional conscious knowledge, and to its social 
forms, transcending scientific patterns. No privilege can be conceded to the 
purely scientific approach when a phenomenology of real life is taken into 
account. 
In chapter four Niels Gregersen builds on further distinctions regarding 
the programme of scientism, this time between a worldview and a precept. 
The result is called preferential scientism, a programme at work inside the 
sciences as well, in the form of "minimalism" or what others have called 
"reductionism". However, the results delivered seem more "science fiction" 
than real science; more an aspiration than true achievements. There is surely 
all the realm of human behaviour requiring a more hermeneutical approach, 
beyond sheer scientific treatment. Nevertheless the dreams of scientism could 
push some research programmes towards useful results. 
The issues being put forward in this discussion are far reaching, and 
allow me to think about the consequences of scientism for the study of 
religion. On one hand, several of these studies provide useful insights, 
allowing for a better understanding of religious phenomena. But on the other 
hand, their extreme reductionist positions appear as a blow for traditional 
wisdom, including theology. The challenge presented lies in the capacity to 
integrate both approaches, which could be mutually enriching. Furthermore, 
some theologians presuppose some items of preferential scientism in their aim 
to conduct a more scientifically informed theology that reaches beyond 
rhetorical excess and aprioristic impasses. They have learned from the 
scientific ideals of tangibility, conciseness, and verification how to better 
focus theological points. In my opinion, it is not impossible to pursue an even 
more "experimental theology" i f one were to follow the path of the similar 
programme of "experimental philosophy". The field of theological 
anthropology offers many possibilities in which to explore this method. I 
assume that some degree of scientism may be healthy, even for theology, once 
the excesses have been avoided. 
The issue under examination in chapter five corresponds to "meaning" 
and how it is built into Science and Religion. The author, John Teske, 
develops an interesting line of argument showing how meaning requires 
patterns and that these are often built in a narrative form. This essay makes a 
good case for the narrative form of self identity. It borrows from several 
scientific and philosophical areas as well as from neuroscience and the past 
decade's long discussion on personal identity. The author clearly limits his 
scope, aware of how broad and onerous is the issue of identity, focusing on the 
role played by memory and its narrative patterning. More interesting is the 
way in which myths and religions re-enter this schema, as meta-narratives able 
to frame life events and provide new meaning. The point is that these broad 
narratives are complementary to science and fill some areas out of the reach of 
more methodological approaches. They clearly provide an imaginative 
incentive to moral commitment and offer to enlighten our understanding of the 
eschatological future. 
In chapter six, René Rosfort opens three critical fronts: first against too 
sharp a separation between scientific accounts and the narrative form, both for 
science, and in the formation of meaning; second, the revision of the narrative 
pattern as the origin of consciousness on the base of phenomenological 
reflection and psychopathological evidence; and third, the normative doubts 
concerning the reliability of narrative versions of self and others. Curiously, 
Rosfort's claim identifies the weakness of narrative reconstruction of self in 
two opposite forms: the inability to express some affective dimensions; and 
the need to complement a more scientific explanation. 
Reflecting on some of the important questions raised in this collection of 
essays, it appears that the centre of the discussion on science and religion 
clearly turns on anthropology. I mean by this that the issue of personal identity 
and consciousness, being one of the most discussed in the cognitive sciences 
and philosophy of mind, points inevitably to the centrality of human beings 
and the difficulties in rendering a complete account of this most mysterious 
dimension. Such a perception clearly calls for theology to be able to say how a 
radical reflection on human identity ultimately leads to theological topics, in a 
free and almost fictive version of the ontological argument. 
The subject matter of inquiry of chapter seven appears less immediately 
theological, but nevertheless highly relevant: the role of understanding. It 
clearly brings to the fore the old discussion between explaining and 
understanding, as a way of specifying the roles of science and human 
hermeneutic disciplines, including theology. Peter Gärdenfors rightly 
identifies understanding as seeing a pattern. He develops a model started in 
Gestalt psychology, identifying patterns of causality as the way the human 
mind works. The "intentional stance" of Dennett comes to mind too. This 
drive makes us apt to read others' minds and to identify agents behind every 
event. The approach also finds clear applications in education and science, 
where understanding follows the same schema of identifying patterns. We 
miss, amongst the several possible applications, the religious field in which 
this strategy could offer interesting insights. 
In chapter eight, Christine Tind Johannessen-Henry tries to fill the gap, 
and offers valuable comments on how theology can be inserted into this 
cognitive programme. She wisely poses the question on the existence of maxi-
patterns which are able to include in a holistic way most of reality and human 
experience. Drawing on Pannenberg's suggestions, the respondent reminds us 
about the given nature of some fundamental patterns, which are not the result 
of subjective activity, but are rather acquired through some form of learning. 
This model fits better with the theological approach, which appears as 
complementary to the scientific one, as the first evokes some form of 
transcendence. 
These last essays and the discussion they promote are highly inspiring, 
and - together with the two preceding ones - have the merit of returning to 
old-fashioned issues in theology and philosophy of religion, such as the 
question of meaning and purpose in life, which are constitutive elements of 
personal identity. The striking point is that this exercise on updating old topics 
can be perceived as the result of the recent interaction with science and the 
scientific treatment of some cognitive and anthropological activities. This 
seems encouraging, since it contends that transcendental approaches, too 
characteristic of former seasons of theological discussion, are returning to 
centre stage at the hand of an unexpected protagonist, one that seemed rather 
to question traditional theological views. As has been said many times: 
science apparently closes some doors, but unexpectedly opens other doors and 
windows to theology, offering surprising views of new landscapes, helping us 
to think more deeply about our long term ideas on the human condition, our 
future, and the future of the entire world. 
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Truth, Beauty and Goodness. A New Vision for 
Natural Theology 
Alisier E. McGrath 
Abstract 
The increasingly influential dialogue between natural sciences and religion 
has led many natural scientists to become interested in the traditional theo-
logical discipline of "natural theology". Yet many theologians, especially 
within Protestantism, now regard natural theology as outdated and discredited. 
This paper considers three main factors which appear to have contributed to 
the crystallization of this negative perception: a growing awareness of the 
extent to which modern approaches to natural theology have been shaped by 
the agendas of the Enlightenment; the severe criticisms directed against natu-
ral theology by the leading Protestant dogmatician Kar l Barth; and a lack of 
persuasive outcomes concerning natural theology's alleged capacity to 
"prove" the existence of God. An alternative approach to natural theology is 
proposed, which involves both its dogmatic relocation and its conceptual ex-
pansion. It is argued that these adjustments give natural theology both intellec-
tual integrity and a new lease of life. Natural theology is to be seen as the 
Christian way of "seeing" nature, which involves more than the mere "making 
sense" of nature. Rather, natural theology is to be considered as the affirma-
tion and exploration of the truth, beauty and goodness of the natural world, 
when seen through the interpretative framework of a Trinitarian vision of God. 
This does not "prove" the existence of God, but nevertheless points to the 
capacity of the Christian faith to provide a satisfactory account of the human 
experience of nature. 
Keywords: Natural theology; Karl Barth; William Paley; Nature; Science and 
Religion; Proofs for God's existence; Enlightenment; Philosophical Theology; 
Beauty. 
Introduction 
One of the most intriguing aspects of the burgeoning interest in the relation-
ship of science and religion has been the recent emergence of a new interest 
on the part of many natural scientists in what is traditionally termed "natural 
theology" (Wilkinson 1990; Polkinghorne 2006; Vidal and Kleeberg 2007). 
Yet paradoxically, natural theology seems to be experiencing something of a 
crisis within its traditional theological homelands. That, it seems, is the domi-
nant - though not the universal - opinion within much of western theology, 
particularly within Protestantism (Kock 2001; Swinburne 2004). There seems 
to be no consensus within Protestantism over the past merits or possible future 
of natural theology (Fischer 1983; Westermann 1987; Kapper 1995; Kock 
2001,295-390). 
Yet obituaries of natural theology within the theological community are de-
cidedly premature. In this paper, we shall argue that the project of natural 
theology is open to dogmatic relocation and conceptual expansion, opening up 
new ways of understanding and undertaking the theological engagement with 
the natural world. This project, of considerable theological importance in its 
own right, has been given new importance in recent years on account of the 
growing interest in the relationship of Christian theology and the natural sci-
ences, which has led many to want to reopen the entire question of the status 
and potential of natural theology. This paper is written in the conviction that 
there is a real case to be made for the renewal and reorientation of natural 
theology, involving both its dogmatic relocation and conceptual expansion. 
But first, it wi l l be helpful to review some of the reasons why natural theol-
ogy, traditionally understood as "the enterprise of providing support for reli-
gious beliefs by starting from premises that neither are nor presuppose any 
religious beliefs" (Alston 1991, 289), has encountered such difficulties in 
recent years. Without wishing to suggest that these exhaust the issues, I be-
lieve that three principal factors have led to the intellectual impoverishment 
and theological marginalization of natural theology in some theological cir-
cles: 
(1) Recent forms of "natural theology" have often been heavily influ-
enced by the agenda of the Enlightenment, which is increasingly seen 
as a past memory rather than as a present reality; 
(2) Karl Barth's critique of natural theology has proved influential, lead-
ing some to conclude that the revival of Trinitarianism entails the re-
jection of natural theology; 
(3) Traditional approaches to natural theology are widely believed to 
have failed to provide reliable foundations for belief in God. 
We shall consider each of these concerns briefly, before moving on to con-
sider how natural theology might be given a new lease of life through its 
reconceptualization and redirection. 
Natural Theology and the Enlightenment 
Western theology has been deeply shaped by the ideas of the Enlightenment -
both its positive emphasis upon the competency of reason and the possibility 
of objectivity of judgement, and its negative critiques of both the coherence of 
the concept of divine revelation, and the capacity of Scripture to disclose 
truths that allegedly lie beyond human reason (Harrison 1990; Beiser 1996). In 
recent years, critical scholarship has demonstrated that the term "Enlighten-
ment" needs to be used with some caution, in that this movement in western 
thought is better conceived as a "family of Enlightenments", sharing a com-
mon commitment to a core of ideas and values, yet demonstrating variegation 
at other points (Schmidt 1998; Umbach 2000,25-78). 
Despite this diversity, however, a number of shared concerns are generally 
agreed to lie at the heart of the Enlightenment. Perhaps one of the most sig-
nificant of these was a quest for a public, invariant, and reliable foundation of 
knowledge. While recent critics of the Enlightenment project have questioned 
whether such elevated norms of objectivity can actually be sustained, whether 
theoretically or practically (Schmidt and Wartenberg 1996; Gutting 1999; 
Pinkard 2003), there can be little doubt of the commitment of the "Age of 
Reason" to such a belief, and its defining influence on western culture. 
A primary motivation for this search for objectivity of judgement was 
growing pessimism about the capacity of religion or prevailing cultural norms 
to provide a secure, universal basis for knowledge. Growing suspicion of both 
the intellectual foundations and ethical consequences of religious belief led 
many to establish truth on the basis of an appeal to pure human reason, un-
tainted by the foibles of outdated traditions, arbitrary prejudice, or cultural and 
historical location. Reason was held to transcend all human boundaries, offer-
ing the only secure foundation for valid human beliefs and values (Gellner 
1992). 
Given this climate of growing confidence in the capacity of reason to un-
cover the deeper structures of reality on the one hand, and growing suspicion 
of leading theological resources of the Christian churches on the other, the 
churches' public defence of the existence of God on the basis of an appeal to 
doctrinal tradition or the Bible became increasingly problematic. The emer-
gence of biblical criticism eroded confidence in the text of Scripture, the 
growing influence of "doctrinal criticism" challenged its traditional interpreta-
tions, and the rise of rationalism called the need for divine revelation into 
question (Reventlow 1980). One apologetic strategy to emerge from this situa-
tion was the development of arguments for the Christian faith based purely 
upon reason. Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz thus all developed approaches to 
natural theology which were ultimately based on a priori concepts of divine 
perfection (Webb 1989; Ribas 2003). 
Yet there was another possible approach, which gained increasing plausibil-
ity through Newton's demonstration of the intrinsic regularity and rationality 
of the natural world - to make an appeal to nature itself. This development 
took place primarily within England during the late seventeenth century, and 
proved to be particularly influential subsequently in France and Germany 
(Harrison 2006). Writers such as John Ray (1627-1705) and William Derham 
(1657-1735) developed an extensive and sophisticated defense of belief in 
God through an appeal to the order and apparent design of the natural world. 
These approaches stressed the importance of the providential ordering of na-
ture and the consequent lawful operation of the universe as evidence of divine 
creation and superintendence of the natural order (Gillespie 1987; Zeitz 1994; 
Mandelbrote 2007). This development can be seen as marking a decisive shift 
towards envisaging natural theology as an empirical, rather than a theoretical, 
undertaking. Reason now reflected on the structures of the external world, not 
its own internal deliberations. 
The primary motivation for undertaking natural theology within English 
Christianity during the late seventeenth and eighteenth century was thus in no 
small part due to apologetic concerns. The church itself did not reject revela-
tion; it realized that it needed to relate the gospel to a culture which no longer 
felt inclined to accept this notion. The church, realizing that it was increas-
ingly difficult to base a dialogue with English academic thought upon the 
Bible, sought an alternative common ground for its apologetic discourse - and 
found it in an empirical engagement the realm of nature (Byrne 1999). Nature 
was a public resource, open to all, which was held to point reliably to the exis-
tence of a wise and good creator God. Natural theology thus rapidly became 
an apologetic tool of no small importance. 
By the early nineteenth century, the concept of "natural theology" was 
firmly established within English religious culture as a way of demonstrating 
God's existence without recourse to any religious beliefs or presuppositions 
(Gascoigne, 1988). This represented an adaptation of the concept to the reali-
ties of the English religious situation, primarily in response to the agenda of 
the Enlightenment. Yet the constant inhabitation of this way of thinking over 
an extended period of time led to the formation of certain habits of thought, 
which came to be see as self-evidently true. The abiding influence of the 
Enlightenment's agenda upon western theology until relatively recently led to 
this situation-specific understanding of "natural theology" being assumed to 
be normative. In fact, it is only one possibility - and one heavily shaped by 
modernist assumptions, now increasingly being called into question. It is open 
to revision, and it needs to be revised. 
Karl Barth's Critique of Natural Theology 
The influence of Karl Barth (1886-1968) upon the shaping of the modern 
Protestant mind is widely conceded. It is often argued that an integral part of 
Barth's theological programme is the subversion of any notion of natural the-
ology (Prenter 1952; Torrance 1970; Kock 2001, 23-102). The situation is 
slightly more complex than this, as natural theology represents one specific 
instantiation - but by no means the only one - of the human tendency to con-
struct anthropologically-shaped and notions of God (Macken 1990; Gundlach 
1992). Barth's formal critique of natural theology dates from the 1930s, and is 
not strictly speaking part of his explicit agenda in his Romans commentary or 
earlier writings (Szekeres 1966). In the second edition of his Romans com-
mentary (1922), the polemic which Barth would later direct against natural 
theology is directed against the slightly different category of "religion," which 
Barth critiques as a human construction erected in opposition to God (Barth 
1922). In 1927 Barth declared that the target of his criticisms was fundamen-
tally "Schleiermacher's conversion of theology into anthropology" (Barth 
1927, 82-7). Yet natural theology is still not identified as the enemy of Barth's 
theological programme. It may be true to suggest that "Karl Barth's battle 
against natural theology was in respect of content a conflict with the theology 
of the nineteenth century" (Berkhof and Kraus 1978, 39); yet this specific 
manner of conceptualising this conflict does not appear to have crystallized in 
Barth's writings until around 1929-20. 
While a critique of natural theology is at least implicit in the development 
of Barth's early dialectical theology, it is not until Church Dogmatics II/ l §26 
that Barth offers an extended, systematic and explicit critique of natural theol-
ogy, which he defined as a theology "which comes to humanity from nature" 
and which expresses humanity's "self-preservation and self-affirmation" in the 
face of God. Natural theology now becomes the paradigmatic instantiation of 
the human longing for self-justification, with the appearance of a controlling 
dialectic between a true theology based upon revelation and human self-
justification based upon anthropology. 
Barth's mature hostility towards natural theology thus rests on his funda-
mental belief that it undermines the necessity and uniqueness of God's self-
revelation. If knowledge of God can be achieved independently of God's self-
revelation in Christ, then it follows that in principle humanity can dictate the 
place, time and means of its knowledge of God. Natural theology, for Barth, 
represents an attempt on the part of humanity to understand itself apart from 
and in isolation from revelation, amounting to a deliberate refusal to accept 
the necessity and consequences of revelation. One of Barth's central concerns 
is to expose the myth of human autonomy, and identify its consequences for 
theology and ethics. The human desire to assert itself and take control over 
things is seen by Barth as one of the most fundamental sources of error in 
theology, leading to the erection of theological towers of Babel - purely hu-
man constructions, erected in the face of God. 
Barth's critique is, however, actually directed against a specific understand-
ing of natural theology - the attempt to prove God's existence or gain access 
to knowledge of God under conditions of humanity's choosing. But what i f 
natural theology is understood as the attitude to nature that is mandated and 
facilitated by the Christian revelation? What i f natural theology is itself seen 
as a subordinate aspect of revealed theology, legitimated by that revealed 
theology rather than by natural presuppositions or insights? What i f the le-
gitimation of natural theology is understood, not to lie in its own intrinsic 
structures nor in an autonomous act of human self-justification, but in divine 
revelation itself. On this approach theologia revelata both legitimates theolo-
gia naturalis and defines its scope. This points to the possibility of a concep-
tual relocation of natural theology, with important implications for an under-
standing of its foundations and its scope. 
The Perceived Failure of Natural Theology 
To "prove" the existence of God. 
It is widely agreed that the public credibility of natural theology - understood 
specifically as the attempt to provide a reliable basis for belief in God -
reached its zenith in late eighteenth century England. The Boyle lectures, 
delivered over the period 1692-1732, are widely regarded as the most 
significant public demonstration of the "reasonableness" of Christianity in the 
early modern period, characterized by that era's growing emphasis upon 
rationalism and its increasing suspicion of ecclesiastical authority (Dahm 
1970). English natural theology was given new intellectual energy through 
William Paley's Natural Theology (1802), which rapidly became the most 
influential defence of the existence of God from the natural world (Brooke 
1989; Fyfe 1997). For Paley, nature showed obvious signs of having been 
designed and constructed by God, who could be conceived as the 
cosmological watchmaker. 
Yet by about 1860, English natural theology was in crisis, for two main 
reasons. First, it was widely agreed that the approach seemed to lead to 
decidedly deficient, i f not downright heterodox, notions of God, rather than 
the triune God of the Christian faith (Brooke and Maclean 2005). This 
approach to natural theology led to a form of Christianity which seriously 
distorted the traditional orthodox understanding of the nature of God, and 
especially the critical issue of God's continuing involvement in the world - in 
other words, the concept of providence. Natural theology came to be 
associated with a mechanistic worldview and a significantly reduced 
conception of God, in which "providence" is evacuated of much, i f not all, of 
its traditional meaning. 
Second, and perhaps more significantly for our purposes, the intellectual 
case for God associated with natural theology seemed increasingly vulnerable 
and flimsy as time progressed. The credibility of Paley's natural theology 
depended heavily on the natural world having been fixed in its present form 
by an act of special divine creation. The rise of Darwinism destroyed the 
credibility of Paley's approach, and plunged this form of natural theology into 
a crisis from which it has never fully recovered (Dawkins 1986). It is therefore 
entirely understandable that some have recently suggested that we ought to 
speak of a "natural atheology", in that contemporary interpretations of 
Darwinism seem to point to atheism rather than to belief in God (Lustig 2004). 
Nature, once seen as a pointer towards God, is now held by many to point in a 
diametrically opposed direction. 
These three representative considerations we have explored thus far, to 
which others might be added, would seem to lead to the conclusion that 
natural theology has had its day, and must now be recognized as a theological 
enterprise of purely historical or academic interest. Yet there is a growing 
view that natural theology can be given a new and productive lease of life 
(McGrath 2008 and 2009). This involves two reconceptualizing strategies. 
First, the dogmatic location of natural theology needs to be shifted from 
outside the domain of theologia revelata to within it. In other words, natural 
theology is to be seen as an essentially Christian way of envisaging the world, 
grounded in and informed by a Trinitarian vision of reality. And second, the 
conceptual content of natural theology needs to be extended beyond the 
domain of the purely rational, to embrace the categories of beauty and 
goodness, rather than merely truth. We shall explore these two important 
points further in the remainder of this essay. 
The Dogmatic Repositioning of Natural Theology 
We have already argued that Barth's critique of natural theology is actually 
directed against a specific understanding of natural theology - namely, the 
attempt to prove God's existence or gain access to knowledge of God under 
conditions of humanity's choosing. But what i f natural theology is understood 
as the attitude to nature that is mandated and facilitated by the Christian 
revelation? What i f natural theology is itself seen as a subordinate aspect of 
revealed theology, legitimated by that revealed theology rather than by natural 
presuppositions or insights? What i f the legitimation of natural theology is 
understood, not to lie in its own intrinsic structures nor in an autonomous act 
of human self-justification, but in divine revelation itself? If this were so, 
theologia revelata would both legitimate theologia naturalis and define its 
scope. The authorization for natural theology would then lie not in its own 
intrinsic structures, but in divine revelation itself. This points to the possibility 
of a conceptual relocation of natural theology, with important implications for 
an understanding of its foundations and its scope. 
The traditionally received notion of "natural theology" as an apologetic 
strategy which proved God's existence from nature crystallized into its present 
form in the eighteenth century, initially in England, and subsequently in 
Germany. In response to the agenda of the Enlightenment, many turned to 
nature as an autonomous source of knowledge of God. The rise of Deism in 
England during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century reflects a 
certain degree of discomfort with traditional orthodox Christian notions of 
divine revelation, which led it to seek alternative routes to the transcendent 
which were independent of the institution of the church, the clergy, and the 
Bible. As we have seen, the historical influence of these approaches to natural 
theology was so great that they have come to be seen as determinative of the 
genre as a whole. This specific approach to natural theology, heavily shaped 
by modernist assumptions, has thus come to be seen as definitive. Where once 
this would have been regarded as one specific approach to natural theology, an 
essentially Darwinian process of selection and elimination has led to its 
alternatives being marginalized or treated as if they were extinct. 
The outcome of this has been that the neutral term "natural theology" has 
come to be freighted with unhelpful undertones and associations reflecting the 
agendas of the Enlightenment project, introducing themes which were quite 
absent from earlier approaches (such as those found in writers such as Gregory 
of Nyssa or Thomas Aquinas). For Karl Barth, as we have seen, the most 
objectionable of these was that "natural theology" - that is to say, the specific 
approach to natural theology associated with the Enlightenment - was 
ultimately an assertion of the ability of humanity to encounter the divine under 
conditions of their own choosing and making, thereby subverting the role of 
divine revelation. 
The need for the recalibration of the conceptual possibilities of natural 
theology is further emphasised by the growing realization that "nature" is a 
socially constructed notion, rather than being an autonomous intellectual 
entity in its own right. In part, the cultural triumph of the Deist approach to 
natural theology in the eighteenth century rested on a general inherited 
consensus that "nature" designated a reasonably well-defined entity, capable 
of buttressing philosophical and theological reflection without being 
dependent on any preconceived or privileged religious ideas. The somewhat 
generic notions of "natural religion" or "religion of nature", which became 
significant around this time, are themselves grounded in the notion of a 
universal, objective natural realm, open to public scrutiny and interpretation. 
Yet it is now widely realized that "nature" and "the natural", far from 
being objective, autonomous entities, are conceptually malleable notions, open 
to multiple interpretations - none of which are self-evidently correct. The 
category of the "natural" is essentially a socially constructed concept. 
Concepts of nature and the natural - note the deliberate use of the plural - are 
themselves the outcome of a process of interpretation and evaluation, 
reflecting the social situation, vested interests, and agendas of those with 
power and status (Eder 1988; Evernden 1992; Cronon 1995). It is not a piece 
of "raw data," but something which we choose to view in certain ways. 
For these and other reasons, there is a need to reconceive natural 
theology, liberating it from its imprisonment to the agenda of the 
Enlightenment. To use the traditional language of systematic theology, these 
considerations point to the need for the dogmatic location of the concept of 
natural theology to be transferred from the realm of "the natural" to "the 
revealed". In other words, nature is to be interpreted from the standpoint of an 
incarnational, Trinitarian vision of a self-disclosing God. 
Traditionally, theologia naturalis has been seen as independent of 
theologia revelata, suggesting that it is intended to subvert or displace divine 
self-revelation as a source of reliable knowledge of God. A reconceived 
natural theology is firmly located within the ambit of revealed theology, which 
both offers an explanation of the capacity of nature to disclose the divine, 
while at the same time defining its limits of operation and conditions of 
viability. The deistic concept of God associated with traditional approaches to 
natural theology is replaced with a distinctively Christian vision of God, with 
particular reference to the doctrine of the incarnation. Natural theology is to be 
undertaken on the basis of a specifically Christian notion of God. Yet this 
specific notion of God creates conceptual space for the form of natural 
theology associated with the Enlightenment, while at the same time 
determining its focus and identifying its limits and liabilities. 
On this approach, natural theology is to be conceived and interpreted 
within the context of God's revelation, as one of its aspects and not as its 
potential rival. Natural theology presupposes certain core elements of the 
Christian revelation, which it reinforces and illuminates, but does not itself 
establish. Far from being an alternative to divine revelation, natural theology 
is its consequence - an example of the general principle articulated by Thomas 
Aquinas, to the effect that grace does not destroy nature but perfects and 
fulfils it (Stoeckle 1962). God's self-revelation thus brings into full light the 
significance of the creation. 
It might therefore be objected that what has just been described is not 
natural theology, i f this is understood, following Alston, to refer to "the 
enterprise of providing support for religious beliefs by starting from premises 
that neither are nor presuppose any religious beliefs" (Alston 1991, 289). It is 
certainly true that this is what natural theology became in response to the 
agenda of the Enlightenment, especially during the eighteenth century. 
Historically, however, it is not what natural theology always has been; 
theologically, it is not necessarily what it should be. A n approach to nature 
that was once theologically legitimate and conceptually productive came to be 
overemphasized and distorted as a result of the agenda of the Enlightenment 
(Dupré 1993). 
A Christian natural theology is thus undertaken on the basis of a 
Trinitarian vision of God and nature, which are in turn focused on the person 
of Christ. This approach to natural theology allows nature to be "seen" in the 
light of the Christian tradition. That tradition raises certain significant 
questions concerning both the observer, and what is being observed. What i f 
nature is fallen, so that its capacity to disclose God is diminished or distorted? 
What if human observers and interpreters of nature share its fallenness, 
entailing a double diminution of the glory of God? This point cannot be 
evaded by a selective reading of nature, which accentuates its beauty and 
orderedness, while disregarding its more ugly, chaotic aspects, particularly as 
seen in natural evil and suffering. A robust theological framework is thus 
essential i f nature is to be engaged with coherently as an entirety, rather than 
adopting a highly eclectic, piecemeal approach to its interpretation. 
The Christian faith makes possible a particular way of "seeing" the 
world, which allows the world to be seen as a created reflection of divine 
glory and wisdom. The matrix of interconnecting ideas that make up the web 
of Christian doctrine provide an intellectual framework that legitimates the 
enterprise of natural theology, not as an autonomous entity, capable of 
discovering God under terms and conditions of its own choosing, but as a 
derivative entity, deriving both its intellectual legitimization and its 
explanatory success from within the context of the Christian tradition. A n 
authentically Christian approach to natural theology, which is both mandated 
and legitimated by divine revelation, holds that nature possesses a derivative 
capacity to disclose something of God's wisdom, whether in an apologetic or 
dogmatic manner, without undermining or displacing divine revelation itself. 
A commitment to Trinitarianism does not entail the rejection of natural 
theology, which can be reconceived in a Trinitarian manner. 
The Conceptual Expansion of Natural Theology 
As we have seen, the grand themes of the Christian faith provide an 
interpretative framework by which nature may be seen, allowing it to be 
viewed and read in profound and significant ways. Christian theology is the 
elixir, the philosopher's stone, which turns the mundane into the epiphanic, 
the world of nature into the realm of God's creation. Like a lens bringing a 
vast landscape into sharp focus, or a map helping us grasp the features of the 
terrain around us, Christian doctrine offers a new way of understanding, 
imagining, and behaving. It invites us to see the natural order, and ourselves 
within it, in a special way - a way that might be hinted at, but cannot be 
confirmed by, the natural order itself. Nature is "seen" as God's creation; the 
"book of nature" is read as God's story - and ours. It is as i f a veil has been 
lifted, or a bright sun has illuminated a mental landscape. As C. S. Lewis put it 
so well: "I believe in Christianity as I believe that the Sun has risen - not only 
because I see it, but because by it, I see everything else" (Lewis 2000, 21). 
A Christian natural theology thus provides an intellectual and 
imaginative framework by which nature can be seen as true, beautiful and 
good. Although this framework is intimated by nature itself, it is more fully 
and robustly articulated within the context of an incarnational, Trinitarian 
faith. Natural theology is therefore understood to embrace the traditional 
Platonic triad of truth, beauty and goodness. When properly understood, a 
renewed natural theology represents a distinctively Christian way of 
beholding, envisaging, and above all appreciating the natural order, capable of 
sustaining a broader engagement with the fundamental themes of human 
culture in general. While never losing sight of its moorings within the 
Christian theological tradition, natural theology both informs and transforms 
the human search for the transcendent, and provides a framework for 
understanding and advancing the age-old human quest for the good, the true 
and the beautiful. 
Neither the capacity of nature to disclose God, nor the capacity of the 
divine self-disclosure to illuminate nature, is to be understood simply in terms 
of a rational making sense of things, as i f the appeal of the Christian faith were 
limited to human reason. The implicit assumption of the primacy of the 
cognitive unquestionably serves to increase the alienation of theology from 
spirituality, driving a wedge between a "discipleship of the mind" and an 
equally important "discipleship of the imagination". Where and how can 
conceptual space be created for the "natural theology of the imagination" so 
vigorously pursued by J. R. R. Tolkien and others, which has immense 
potential as an apologetic device - not to mention its capacity to stimulate 
conversations across traditional disciplinary boundaries? A broader vision of a 
natural theology, going beyond the realms of systematic theology, is clearly 
required, enabling an engagement of both the mind and the imagination. 
One of the weaknesses of recent approaches to natural theology is that it 
has been seen almost exclusively as an enterprise of sense-making, having 
been placed within a rationalist straightjacket as a result of the intellectual 
agendas of both the Enlightenment and its critics. The waning of modernity 
allows the discipline to be liberated from this debilitating conceptual 
imprisonment, so that its deep intrinsic appeal to the human imagination may 
be reclaimed. Natural theology is to be understood to include the totality of the 
human engagement with the natural world, embracing the human quest for 
truth, beauty and goodness (McGrath 2008, 221-313). 
The created capacity of nature to point to God is therefore not limited to 
its rationality, but extends to its beauty and goodness. The conceptual 
interlocking of these notions was a commonplace in the theology and 
philosophy of the high Middle-Ages, which saw such notions as "intelligible 
beauty" as grounded in a Christian vision of reality. A Trinitarian theology of 
creation laid the foundations of a "pancalistic vision of the cosmos", grounded 
in a "feeling for intelligible beauty" characteristic of this formative age (Eco 
2002, 4-5 and 17-19). Rationality, beauty and goodness were each facets of 
the same creator, reflected in the divine creation, and discerned, i f at times 
dimly, by humanity, who had been created in the image of that same God. 
Yet it is not merely that a feeling for the rationality, beauty or goodness 
of the cosmos has the potential to elicit the quest for the divine, or intimate the 
nature of God. It is that a robustly Trinitarian theology has the potential to 
sustain and inform these notions, which otherwise run the risk of becoming 
subjective notions, determined by human convention. Such a theological 
framework provides conceptual stability to these notions, partly by grounding 
them in something still more fundamental - the nature of God - and partly by 
insisting that the human capacity to recognize and respond to them is 
grounded in humanity possessing the image of God, even i f in a weakened and 
attenuated form. Within such a theological framework, accommodation can be 
made for both the apparent partial irrationality, ugliness, and evil of the world, 
and the human failure to respond appropriately to what can be known of the 
rationality, beauty and goodness of the world. 
The linking together of the true, the beautiful, and the good has been a 
commonplace since the late eighteenth century. This three-fold concatenation 
of ideals, like a secularised trinity, has often been used to discuss the manner 
in which the transcendent is encountered, and the nature of its impact upon 
human perception, cognition, and action. Why is it so important to reconceive 
natural theology in terms of the quest for beauty, truth and goodness? In part, 
this is necessary to correct an unhelpful development which took place on 
account of the Enlightenment's emphasis upon rationality, which led to the 
impoverishment of the theological engagement with the natural realm through 
an excessive preoccupation with the capacity of the human mind to make 
sense of things. 
This extension of the notion of natural theology to embrace a wider 
vision of the human encounter with nature does not deny the importance of 
making sense of things, but refuses to limit the enterprise of natural theology 
to rational reflection (Torrance 1993). It is clear, for example, that a 
recognition of the beauty of nature is common insight of humanity (Carroll 
1993), which must be incorporated into any attempt to formulate a 
comprehensive natural theology. It is one of the more significant 
achievements of Hans Urs von Balthasar to have demonstrated that a natural 
theology can be extended far beyond an encounter with the purely natural 
world to embrace the world of human culture, focussed on the notion of 
"beauty" (O'Donaghue 1986). As Richard Viladescu has rightly pointed out, 
the beauty of the world cannot be finally satisfying in itself, but calls for 
completion in some deeper manner and mode. This natural theology of beauty 
can be extended to affirm the capacity of both art and music to point to, or 
create a longing for, the transcendent, which has important apologetic 
implications (Viladescu 1988; Viladescu 1999, 148-77). 
Furthermore, the notion of "beauty" can be extended theologically to 
cope with the aesthetic variegation of the natural world. How can a natural 
theology accommodate the ugliness of much of nature, and reconcile this with 
nature's more beautiful side on the one hand, and the idea of a good and wise 
creator on the other? At this point, we can begin to appreciate how a 
Trinitarian natural theology has a greater explanatory capacity than its deist 
alternatives. For a Trinitarian approach to the "economy of salvation" allows 
us to see nature as created yet fallen, retaining something of its pristine 
integrity yet at the same time being damaged or wounded by sin. As both 
Eberhard Jüngel and Hans Urs von Balthasar have pointed out, a true natural 
theology must be shaped by the cross of Christ, allowing its notion of beauty 
to be modulated and informed by this central image of the Christian faith 
(Jüngel 1977; Fields 2007). While much more needs to be done to explore this 
approach, it is clear that it opens up some promising and potentially 
productive lines of inquiry (McGrath 2007, 261-90). 
Conclusion 
This paper has set out a revisionary agenda for natural theology, arguing that 
the styles of natural theology which emerged during the Enlightenment have 
led to its conceptual impoverishment and intellectual destabilization. It is 
clearly now appropriate to call into question the continuing hegemony of such 
approaches, giving the waning of rationalism and a growing appreciation of 
the multi-levelled human response to nature. The rise of postmodernism has 
led to erosion of the cultural plausibility of certain core assumptions of the 
Enlightenment, which had become embedded in such approaches to natural 
theology. Natural theology has had a long and distinguished history in the 
past; once it has been liberated from the intellectual straitjacket into which it 
was forced in response to the Enlightenment, it could also have a significant 
and fruitful future. 
So might the renewal of a Christian natural theology lead to an enriched 
and deepened engagement between the natural sciences and Christian faith? It 
is my belief that a renewed natural theology has the potential to be an 
important, productive and intellectually rigorous interface between Christian 
theology and the natural sciences. Where some see boundaries as barriers, I 
see them as places of dialogue and exploration. This essay is offered as a 
small contribution to this dialogue, which has already achieved much - but 
which can surely achieve still more in the future. 
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Natural Theology or Theology of Nature and 
the Natural? 
AnneL.C. Runehov 
I have never looked upon ease and happiness as ends in them-
selves - such an ethical basis I call more proper for a herd of swine. 
The ideals that have lighted my way, and time after time have given 
me new courage to face life cheerfully, have been Truth, Goodness 
and Beauty (Albert Einstein [1931] 2006, 4). 
Introduction 
Based on arguments from applied mathematics, Albert Einstein also 
emphasized the 'marvellous structure of reality' and the 'reason that 
manifests itself in nature" (2006, 5). Also the philosopher Iris Murdoch 
writes in The Sovereignty of Good, that for some reason, we (believers 
and non-believers) are convinced that 'there is a "true direction" towards 
better conduct, that goodness "really matters", and does certainty about a 
standard not suggest an idea of permanence which cannot be reduced to 
psychological or any other set of empirical terms?' She continues that a 
higher, inviolable perfect and absolute beautiful form 'must' exist (1970, 
60). Beauty, truth and goodness are also concepts frequently used in 
mystical writings and narratives of advanced meditators who have 
experienced Ultimate Reality across religions and throughout history. To 
Alister McGrath, beauty, truth and goodness are divine realities revealed 
through nature and his theological exploration is to find a way to reopen 
the 'entire question of the status and potential of [Christian] natural 
theology'. By natural theology he intends the 'Christian way of "seeing" 
nature, which involves more than the mere "making sense" of nature.' 
His approach differs entirely from the previous ones; to him it is a matter 
of beginning all over again. McGrath's natural theology is the theological 
enterprise of viewing the world through 'the spectacles provided by 
Christian theology as a whole' (Barrett 2011). 
One concern is though that, renewing natural theology implies 
pulling a heavy historical load up a hill. For Anselm of Canterbury (11 t h 
century) natural theology implied finding convincing arguments for the 
existence of God by way of deductive a priori ontological reasoning. 
The same reason can be found behind Thomas Aquinas' (13 t h century) 
natural theological endeavours. He, however, chose to explore the issue 
by way of deductive a posteriori ontological reasoning on cosmological 
and teleological grounds. During the 17 th and 18 t h centuries and due to 
the prosperity of the natural sciences, a new method for doing natural 
theology was employed, namely inductive reasoning based on arguments 
from design. For instance, perhaps the best known advocate of such 
thinking, Will iam Paley, argued that God's design of the whole of 
creation could be seen in the general happiness, or well-being, that was 
evident in the physical and social order of thing (Barrett 2011). However, 
Paley's analogy of the watchmaker, 1802 would receive a severe counter-
argument in the work of Charles Robert Darwin in 1859. 
Natural Theology from Within 
In the 20 t h century, protestant theologian Karl Barth criticized the 
apologetic endeavour to prove the existence of God. Barth opposed the 
Enlightenment-related understanding of natural theology which 
proclaimed that human beings are able to encounter the divine 'under 
conditions of their own choosing and making' (as quoted by McGrath). 
This line of theological thinking undermines the role of the divine. It is 
against this background that McGrath invites us to see natural theology 
as an "essential Christian way of envisaging the world, grounded in and 
informed by a Trinitarian vision of reality". In other words, we are 
invited to see natural theology as a revealed theology. However, we need 
to see this not from the perspective of the outside but from the 
perspective of within. If, he argues, the legitimation of natural theology 
lies in divine revelation itself, 'theologia revelata would both legitimate 
theologia naturalis and define its scope'. Nature reveals God but does 
not enclose God, God and nature are not the same, God 'perfects and 
fulfils it' by God's grace.1 This implies that the categories of divine 
rationality (or wisdom), beauty and goodness are revealed in nature. In 
McGrath's own words, such a comprehension of natural theology 'holds 
that nature possesses a derivative capacity to disclose something of 
God's wisdom, whether in an apologetic or dogmatic manner, without 
undermining or displacing divine revelation itself. According to 
McGrath, nature and the natural are socially constructed concepts rather 
than objective, autonomous entities. Nature, he maintains, is not 'a piece 
of "raw data", but something which we choose to view in certain ways' . 2 
Nature is God's creation and therefore the 'book of nature' is a book 
about God and us. Reading this book is seeing nature in a Christian way. 
A Christian Trinitarian understanding of natural theology embraces the 
human search for transcendence, goodness, beauty and truth. It combines 
the rational with the capacity of imagination. Rationality, beauty and 
goodness are all aspects of the same creator. These divine traits are 
reflected in the divine creation, and are able, although imperfectly, to be 
mirrored in the imago Dei (human beings). In answer to the question of 
how a view of a good, wise and beautiful creator, creating a good, wise 
and beautiful world, can be consistent with misery, poverty, ugliness, 
wickedness, etc., he responds that such a view allows us to see nature as 
created (wise and good and beautiful) but yet fallen. Nature is 'wounded 
by sin'. Hence, the doctrine of the 'cross of Christ' becomes essential to 
McGrath's version of natural theology. To summarize: 
(1) Nature is divine revelation. 
(2) God (the divine) is wise (rational) beautiful and good. 
(3) Hence, nature discloses something of God's goodness, wisdom 
(rationality) and beauty. 
1 Which I believe is a panentheistic view of the relationship between God and the 
universe. 
2 By 'choose', McGrath means that we can choose to see the world through different 
spectacles belonging to different world-views. 
(4) Human beings are part of nature and created as Imago Dei. 
(5) Hence, humans reflect (though imperfectly) divine wisdom 
(rationality), beauty and goodness 
(6) Nature has fallen, nature is wounded by sin. 
(7) Therefore, there is evil in nature. 
(8) Therefore, the doctrine of the Cross of Christ is essential. 
Since I do not possess the theological background I would need to be 
able to address the doctrines of Christian theology properly, my 
reflection wil l be of an analytic philosophical nature. Hence I wil l 
analyse the concepts of nature and the natural and evaluate whether 
McGrath's theology is a type of natural theology or whether it should be 
understood as a theology of nature and/or of the natural. 
Comparing Versions of Natural Theology 
It is clear that McGrath's version of natural theology differs considerably 
from the versions put forward by Anselm of Canterbury and Thomas of 
Aquinas. Three major differences are: (1) McGrath does not use the 
principle of analogy; (2) he does not apply a deductive method and (3) 
his aim is not to prove the existence of God. Indeed, concerning the latter 
he writes that his version of natural theology does 'not "prove" the 
existence of God, but nevertheless points to the capacity of the Christian 
faith to provide a satisfactory account of the human experience of 
nature.' Furthermore, from his own writings we know that he wants to 
depart from Karl Barth's modernised or protestant natural theology. 
However, one could still argue that his natural theology still follows 
William Paley's line of thinking, because McGrath's version of natural 
theology is, after all, a theology of divine revelation through nature. The 
difference is that McGrath's view of divine revelation through nature is 
to be understood from the inside rather than from the outside as Paley's 
version clearly advocates and this implies that McGrath's arguments do 
not derive from design. Indeed, to see nature from the inside is more than 
merely making sense of it. Furthermore, as mentioned above, McGrath 
does not apply the principle of analogy while Paley does, as evidenced in 
the watchmaker analogy. This analogy clearly reflects the mechanical 
worldview of the period of the Enlightenment. The argument goes as 
follows. 
The complex inner workings of a watch necessitate an intelligent 
designer (a watchmaker). In analogy, the complexity of C (be it the brain, 
a particular organism or the entire universe) necessitates a designer D. 
Hence, as soon as we observe something that is rather complex, be it 
constructed as a watch or naturally shaped as snowflakes, we realize that 
someone must have designed it. This is again not what McGrath intends. 
Rather, his concern is to see God's revelation in nature, which is not the 
same as inferring a divine design in nature. Nevertheless, both Paley and 
McGrath have a pragmatic rather than theoretical interpretation of natural 
theology. Both apply the method of induction based on human 
experiences of nature, whether experiences from the outside (Paley) or 
experiences from the inside (McGrath). Still the difference between these 
two views is crucial. While Paley's pragmatic natural theology is about 
measuring or observing natural phenomena in order to understand how 
these are constructed in order to see the design or designer behind it, 
McGrath's version is considerably more refined and complex. As a 
matter of philosophical inquiry, the question is whether his theological 
reflection fits into the realm of natural theology or a theology of nature 
and/or of the natural? 
Nature and the Natural 
Before analysing this further we need to take a closer look at how 
McGrath understands nature and the natural, i . e . as social constructs, not 
mere data. I agree with McGrath that how we come to apprehend nature 
and the natural is to some extent a social enterprise. Nevertheless, what is 
not socially constructed is that '"a thing [a process or event] is what it is 
and not another thing", however it may have been produced' (Lamprecht 
1944, 19). Sterling Lamprecht must have been inspired by Aristotle who, 
in his Metaphysics, argued that 'for any entity to be is for it to be what it 
is' (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). Hence i f we follow this line 
of argument, it is the names, categorisations etc. that human beings have 
given to things that are the social constructs. Furthermore, these social 
constructs seem to be universal. For example, a flower (une fleur, en 
blomma, etc.) is what it is, namely that which we have called a flower, 
une fleur or en blomma and nothing else. It is the same for the process of 
gravity or the event of a thunderstorm. But also the mind is what it is and 
nothing else. 
This line of thought has its advantages. The first advantage is that, at 
the level of being everything is what it is, regardless of whether it is 
mental or physical. Lamprecht continues 'we empirically find both mind 
and matter, both ideas and things, both reflections and blind impulse; but 
the world still remains an interrelated whole without intrusions from 
some other "realm" or bifurcations or ontological gulfs' (Lamprecht 
1994, 20). This means that even i f things are what they are, they are not 
their own. In Sallie McFague's words, '[t]he evolutionary, ecological 
perspective insists that we are, in the most profound way, "not our own": 
we belong, from the cells of our bodies to the finest creations of our 
minds, to the intricate, ever-changing cosmos'. Moreover and 
importantly, this line of thought does not exclude God, because firstly, in 
analogy, also God would be what God is and nothing else and secondly, 
also God would be part of an interrelated whole. The second advantage is 
that in this view, the exact cause of things (events and processes) is not 
what is essential, which gives room for both religious and non-religious 
understandings of the world. In McGrath's words, it is possible to see the 
world through Christian spectacles. 
Nevertheless, one of my concerns here is whether it is plausible to 
equate nature and the natural. From a scientific point of view, that what 
belongs to nature can be measured or observed by way of scientific 
methods, even though one of the fathers of Quantum Physics, Werner 
Heisenberg, has made it clear that our measurements do not provide a 
complete explanation. On a micro-level, and according to Heisenberg, 
when we measure a particle, the more precisely the position of a particle 
is given, the less precisely can one say what its momentum is and vice 
versa.3 However, as first argued by Heisenberg in 1927, 'the fact that 
J His view has been disputed. Indeed, some argue that what he intends is not an 
uncertainty of measurement but an unpredictability. The counter argument rests upon 
the fact that past measurements are known but future ones are not. Heisenberg does 
not dispute this but argues, in line with Niels Bohr, that nothing is known unless 
observed. Heisenberg's uncertainty principle is one of the cornerstones of the Copen-
quantum states do not admit simultaneously precise values of conjugate 
observables, such as position and momentum, does not necessarily imply 
an incompleteness of the theory, but rather is consistent with not being 
able to simultaneously determine such observables experimentally to an 
arbitrary accuracy' (Hall and Reginatto 2002, 3289).4 Hence, at the 
micro-level, the result of a measurement (observation) is directly linked 
to the observer. Obviously, an observer cannot observe everything 
simultaneously.5 
On a macro level, the situation is not that much different. 
Neuroscientists, thanks to the advanced equipment they have at their 
disposal today, are able to measure the neural correlates of different 
experiences (including religious ones); they are able to measure the 
neural correlates of empathic action between beings; psychologists can 
measure dream states and, by way of gene technology, it is possible to 
draw a genetic map of a person. However, what is not possible to 
measure by scientific means is what exactly we are experiencing or 
dreaming. Neither is it possible to account for what it is to be a human 
person embedded, not only in biology and neurology, but also in the 
subjective self, environment, culture and religion. Scientists cannot 
hagen Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. There is unfortunately no space to dig 
deeper into this interesting discussion. 
4 The paper by Heisenberg referred to here concerns the uncertainty principle and 
was first published in Zeitschrift für Physik 43:172-198, 1927. 
5 However and importantly, there are several interpretations of Quantum Theory: the 
micro-macro interpretation along the Bohr line, better known as the Copenhagen 
Interpretation; the mind-body interpretation along the Wigner and Wheeler line, also 
known as the Princeton interpretation; The Many Worlds interpretation of Everett III 
and the Many Minds interpretation by Albert & Loewer and, later, David Deutsch; 
furthermore there is the interpretation by Penrose taking gravitation as the cause of 
the collapse; and there is the Pilote Wave interpretation along the de Broglie-Bohm 
line. Furthermore, there are the more recent interpretations, for example the modal 
interpretation and the interpretation based on decoherence. It is also important to note 
that concept collapse was mostly used by von Neumann (1995). Neither Bohr nor 
Heisenberg used the term collapse. Von Neumann had a more realistic view on the 
wave function. Criticism of the measurement problem concerned von Neumann. Bohr 
and Heisenberg avoided the measurement problem by having a non-realistic view of 
the wave function which made it possible to avoid the collapse. It is important to 
notice the distinction between the von Neumann view and the Bohr/Heisenberg view. 
measure what it feels like to be a human person, what a flower smells 
like or how frightening a thunderstorm is. To put it in Thomas Nagel's 
famous words, science cannot measure 'what it is like to be a bat' (Nagel 
1974, 436). 
Hence, while photons and neurons belong to nature, the experience 
of observing photons and neurons at work does not belong to nature but 
rather to the natural. It is natural for an apple tree to produce apples in 
autumn, but the tree and the apples are tokens of nature. Similarly it is 
natural for human beings to imagine things, to dream, to laugh and cry, to 
observe and measure and to interpret things (processes, events and 
behaviours, etc) in a certain way. 6 Briefly, nature could be described as 
that which we can grasp while the natural would be that through which 
we grasp nature. Lamprecht's thesis still stands, a thing is what it is, a 
dream is what it is, namely a dream, regardless of its cause, but they are 
not social constructs. As such, things do not have intentions or meaning. 
Meaning and intentions come about because it is natural for human 
beings to attribute meaning and intentions to things, a process that is, at 
least partly, socially constructed. To put it differently, it is natural for 
human beings to attribute meaning etc. to the world and anything in it. 
However these human traits are not socially constructed. What is socially 
constructed however is the way in which the meaning etc. is interpreted. 
Theology of Nature 
Can we answer the question raised above of whether McGrath's theology 
is a natural theology? The versions of natural theology stated in the 
introduction clearly show that natural theology is a theology that is done 
from the outside. The notion of God is presupposed but the existence of 
God needs to be proven. To achieve this, as is most obvious in Paley's 
version, scientific discoveries are used alongside human reasoning and 
analogy. God is seen as the designer, amongst other things, of evolution. 
However it is not at all clear whether God is involved in the process of 
evolution in any way. In other words, it is not clear whether God acts in 
0 In a previous article I argued that being an experiencer is the essence of human 
existence (Runehov 2010, 160). 
creation or has left creation to itself. Indeed, it is not clear whether 
natural theology is deistic, a position that leaves no room for sacred 
revelation. If I have understood McGrath correctly, this is not what he 
intends. The focus of his theology lies more on the natural (interpreted 
experiences of revelation through nature) than on nature itself (as 
observed by science and the object of rational thought). Perhaps 
McGrath's theology is more in line with the theological position termed 
the theology of nature. Theology of nature accepts the truth of the Bible 
and Christian revelation. However, the way those truths are explained 
depends on scientific discoveries, which makes the theology of nature a 
dynamic line of theological thought. The idea is that the universe is not 
created perfect, static and eternal; rather, in line with scientific 
discoveries, the universe is changing, something God revealed to us 
through grace. Hence, there is a common platform for scientists and 
theologians. David Tracy and Nicholas Lash viewed this platform as a 
possibility in order to 'establish plausible "mutually critical correlations" 
not only to interpret the world but to help change i f (Tracy and Lash 
1983, 91). Hence, it is not a matter of inferring God by analogy of nature. 
As Salie McFague writes, 'there is a focus on the cosmos with the intent 
both to understand it better ~ and to orient our praxis within it more 
appropriately ~ [this]is one collaborative effort for science and theology 
in our time' (McFague 1990). 
What are the criteria for a theology of nature? According to 
McFague four criteria are essential. Firstly, a theology of nature needs to 
correspond to contemporary scientific understandings of nature. 
Secondly, human beings should not be seen as separated from the rest of 
creation but deeply integrated with it. Thirdly, it has to be creation 
centred and focus on the incarnational presence of God in the world. 
Fourthly, it needs to 'acknowledge and press the interconnectedness of 
peace, justice, and ecological issues, aware that there can be no peace or 
justice unless the fabric of our ecosystem is intact' (McFague 1990). This 
means that we need to take responsibility for the world that is revealed to 
us. This also means that we need to see God's intention in God's 
revelations. Indeed, revelation only makes sense when it is intentional. 
Hence, it needs to be received by agents capable of capturing the 
intention of what is revealed to them. Imagine you are watching a 
beautiful sunset, or a young person helping an old person to cross the 
street, or an ant-hill. These are examples of beauty, goodness and 
rationality in nature. However, in order to understand these experiences 
of nature as God's intention to reveal Godself to us (or God's intention to 
awaken our capacity of empathy, for example), something more is 
needed. Firstly, we need to believe in at least the possibility of God and, 
secondly, we need to believe in our belief that God has intentions. The 
latter is so because we can only really know our own intentions. 
Nevertheless, due to our capacity of theory of mind we can believe that 
another agent has such and such an intention. When it comes to natural 
agents, and provided the neurocorrelations of the capacity of theory of 
mind are intact, there is no problem. However, when the agent is God, we 
need to imagine God's relationship with the world and hence God's 
intention in God's revelations through the world. However, that is not to 
say that our belief of the intention of God cannot be justified. 
Such a theology could be called heuristic theology, because, similar 
to scientific endeavours, as Arthur Peacocke argues, 
[t]here is increasing awareness not only among theologians, but 
even more among ordinary believers that, if God is in fact the all-
encompassing Reality that Christian faith proclaims, then that Real-
ity is to be experienced in and through our actual lives as biological 
organisms who are persons, part of nature and living in society 
(Peacocke, 1979,16-17; 1987,1-11). 
According to McFague, such a heuristic theology, like science, performs 
experiments; it puts itself in an as-if thinking mode; it is not afraid to 
imagine new possibilities and new angles of reasoning; it is creative and 
dares to think differently. Hence, heuristic theology or a theology of 
nature is not fixed by religious or scientific authorities, but it is 
constrained to find convincing and persuasive models for understanding 
the Christian faith in the age of science. It is through revelation that we 
are able to see meaning and intention in nature; that there is room for 
hope, goodness, beauty and wisdom. As the Russian theologians 
Vladimir Solovyov and Nikolai Lossky argue, evolution is 'a gradual 
revelation of the interrelated ontological principles of truth, goodness and 
beauty' (Sládek 2010, 14). According to them, it is divine wisdom that 
reveals this integral and universal truth about creation. 
Conclusion 
Perhaps it is plausible to see McGrath's theology as a theology of nature 
rather than as natural theology. Furthermore, taking into account the 
distinction that rules between nature and the natural and the importance 
McGrath puts on the role of the imago Dei, his theology is also a 
theology of the natural. In my opinion, we are relieved of the 
unavoidable historical burden, which allows us to better understand the 
novelty in McGrath's theology. We can better understand the premises 
that God reveals Godself in the world and, since God is wise, beautiful 
and good, the world discloses something of these divine traits. While 
entirely interrelated with the world, humans are also created as imago 
Dei, which implies that they mirror (though imperfectly) divine wisdom 
or rationality, beauty and goodness. However, the world, including 
humans, is also ugly and wicked. According to the Christian faith, 
ugliness and wickedness came about through sin but the Christian 
doctrine of the cross also tells us that there is a solution. The solution is 
to take up our cross, i.e. to see God's intentions revealed through the 
process of evolution (which includes ourselves) and to take responsibility 
as imago Dei for and in that evolution. Being imago Dei means that 
human beings are 'creative creatures, beings who creatively act in 
creation' (Drees 2010, 123). The more we develop our creativity and 
surpass our limits, the more God becomes God. As Willem Drees argues, 
human created technology is a tool to manifest the central themes of 
theology, justice and love, e.g. to 'feed the hungry, to clothe the naked, to 
care for the sick', to the world (2010, 119). Seen from within the 
framework of McGrath's theology, one could say that technology is not 
about playing God but rather about obeying God's intentions revealed in 
nature, using the capacities that come naturally to us. 
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The best remedy for those who are afraid, lonely or 
unhappy is to go outside, somewhere where they can 
be quiet, alone with the heavens, nature and God. 
Because only then does one feel that all is as it should 
be. 
Anne Frank 
In Science (Alone) We Trust? 
Mikael Stenmark 
Abstract 
Some people have an almost unlimited confidence in science and about 
what can be achieved in the name of science. The term "scientism" is 
frequently used to cover such a viewpoint. In this essay, different forms 
of scientism are identified, distinguished and analyzed. The particular 
focus is on epistemic scientism, which states that science sets the 
boundaries for what we human beings can ever know about reality. It is 
argued that epistemic scientism is a problematic position to take, one that 
in the end ought to be rejected. There are good reasons to believe that the 
world is bigger than the world of science and that we can obtain 
knowledge about this bigger world that cannot be reduced to scientific 
knowledge. We must, in fact, know many things before we are able to 
undertake any scientific endeavour or obtain scientific knowledge, 
because scientific knowledge actually depends on other sources of 
knowledge. 
Keywords: Atkins, Dawkins, Dennett, knowledge, rationality, religion, 
science, scientism, Wilson. 
Introduction 
Some people seem to think that there are no real limits to the competence 
of science; no limits to what can be achieved in the name of science. 
There is no area of human life to which science cannot successfully be 
applied. A scientific account of anything and everything constitutes the 
full story of the universe and its inhabitants. Or, i f there are limits to the 
scientific enterprise, the idea is that, at least, science sets the boundaries 
for what we human beings can ever know about reality. This is the view 
of scientism. 
From a historical perspective, perhaps the most well-known 
proponent of scientism is the French social philosopher Auguste Comte, 
with his attempt to create a religion based on science—the "Religion of 
Humanity" (Comte 1988). Another interesting and far-reaching attempt 
to have science take over many of the functions of religion, and thus 
itself become a religion, was undertaken by the German chemist and 
Nobel prize-winner Wilhelm Ostwald. He argued for science as an 
"Ersatzreligion"—a substitute religion (Ostwald 1912).7 Yet, many 
different forms of scientism have emerged over the last three centuries, 
and during the most recent decades a number of distinguished natural 
scientists, for instance Peter Atkins, Richard Dawkins, Carl Sagan and 
Edward O. Wilson, as well as philosophers such as Daniel C. Dennett 
and Patricia Churchland, have advocated scientism in one form or 
another. 
In this essay I shall provide an overview of some forms of 
scientism, but in particular I want to focus on one version of it: the idea 
that only science can give us knowledge about reality. I shall discuss 
whether this is a reasonable position to adopt, or whether we should think 
that there are other forms of knowledge that human beings can attain, 
aside from scientific knowledge. Are there aspects of human life that are 
beyond the competence of science, but which nevertheless are aspects of 
life about which we might still obtain genuine knowledge? Is science 
more competent to deal with some things than others? Or, is science 
omniscient? 
Different Forms of Scientism 
Let me give some recent examples of spokespersons for scientism. 
Daniel C. Dennett writes that Darwin's "dangerous idea" (that is, 
evolution by natural selection) bears "an unmistakable likeness to 
universal acid: it eats through just about every traditional concept, and 
leaves in its wake a revolutionized world-view, with most of the old 
landmarks still recognizable, but transformed in fundamental ways" 
(Dennett 1995, 63). Dennett believes that "Darwin's dangerous idea is 
reductionism incarnate, promising to unite and explain just about 
everything in one magnificent vision" (Dennett 1995, 82). 
See Hakfoort (1992) for an excellent presentation of Ostwald's theories and ideas. 
Richard Alexander talks about the most recent discoveries in 
evolutionary biology as being "the greatest intellectual revolution of the 
twentieth century." He claims (just as Dennett does) that these insights 
will have a profound impact on our self-view, to such an extent that "we 
will have to start all over again to describe and understand ourselves, in 
terms alien to our intuitions" (Alexander 1987, 3). Richard Dawkins is 
equally optimistic, i f not even more so, when it comes to what modern 
biology can deliver. He claims that we have "no longer ... to resort to 
superstition when faced with the deep problems: Is there a meaning to 
life? What are we for? What is man?" (Dawkins 1989, 1). In his view, 
science, and in particular biology, is capable of dealing successfully with 
all these questions. 
In his essay, "The Limitless Power of Science," Peter Atkins 
advocates the "omnicompetence of science" and believes that "science, 
with its currently successful pursuit of universal competence ... should 
be acknowledged king" (Atkins 1995, 132). Finally, Patricia Churchland 
writes: "In the idealized long run, the completed science is a true 
description of reality, there is no other Truth and no other Reality" 
(Churchland 1986, 249). 
For a philosopher of religion, the view of science as a "universal 
acid," eating through just about everything, as a complete explanation, as 
an answer to our existential questions, or even as the king of all, is very 
fascinating. These ideas are fascinating because here the traditional 
borderline between science and religion is now erased. The scientific 
project becomes a religious or a world-view project. The claim is that 
what can help humanity solve its besetting problems and sorrows is 
science. Let us put our trust in science because it can save us from evil. 
But what, more precisely, is scientism? Though it is not at all easy 
to define, we might say that someone is a proponent of scientism i f he or 
she believes that everything (or at least as much as possible) could and 
should be understood in terms of science. Be aware here that I am citing 
the notion of science in the restricted way that is common in English 
usage, though not in the German or Swedish tradition. Thus, the term 
covers only the natural sciences and those areas of the social sciences 
that are highly similar in methodology to the natural sciences. In 
scientism, it is assumed that there is something problematic, inferior or 
even irrational about any activities or enterprises that could not be 
understood in such a way. In a demon-haunted world, science is the 
candle in the dark. To spread the light of science to the "unenlightened" 
is therefore a part of the mission of the scientistic faith. Another concept 
that could be invoked in this context is "scientific expansionism," and 
this explains quite well what the project is all about. Namely this: the 
proponents believe that the boundaries of science (that is, of the natural 
sciences) can and should be expanded in such a way that what has not 
previously been understood as amenable to scientific methodology can 
now be brought within the scope of science. Science can answer many 
more questions than we have previously thought possible. 
In its most ambitious form, scientism can be defined as the view that 
science has no real boundaries; that is to say, eventually it wil l answer all 
empirical, theoretical, practical, moral and existential questions. Science 
wi l l in due time solve all genuine problems that humankind encounters. 
How, exactly, the boundaries of science should be expanded and what, 
more precisely, it is that is to be included within science, are issues on 
which there is disagreement. Some proponents of scientism are more 
ambitious than others in their extension of the boundaries of science. 
That is to say, they are all scientific expansionists, but in different ways 
and to different extents. 
I sometimes refer to advocates of scientism as "science believers." 
The reason for this is not that I want to make a contrast between what we 
believe and what we know, indicating that these people only believe 
these things, and they do not really know them. Rather, my reason is that 
I want to highlight the "believe in" rather than the "believe that" aspect 
of belief. The point is that these advocates put their faith in science; they 
put their trust in science; they rely on science. Science is, in Paul 
Tillich's terminology, their "ultimate concern" (Tillich 1951, 11-12). 
Some of the proponents of scientism even explicitly claim that science 
could and should replace traditional religions. I have called this form of 
scientism existential scientism or, sometimes, "scientistic faith." 
Perhaps the best-known advocate of this view is Edward O. Wilson. 
According to Wilson, traditional religions are so full of falsehoods and 
superstition that they have to go, but the mental processes of religious 
belief represent programmed predispositions whose components have 
been incorporated into the neural apparatus of the brain through 
thousands of generations of genetic evolution. As such, they are 
powerful, ineradicable, and at the centre of human social life. Therefore 
we have to find a substitute for religion. Wilson writes: 
We are obliged by the deepest drives of the human spirit to make 
ourselves more than animated dust, and we must have a story to 
tell about where we came from, and why we are here. Could Holy 
Writ be just the first literate attempt to explain the universe and 
make ourselves significant within it? Perhaps science is a continua-
tion on new and better-tested ground to attain the same end. If so, 
then in that sense science is religion liberated and writ large. 
(Wilson 1999, 6) 
One problem is that science lacks the primal source of power that 
religion, for genetic reasons, is hooked into. This is partly because the 
evolutionary epic denies immortality to the individual and divine 
privilege to society. Moreover, scientific naturalism (which is what 
Wilson calls the alternative to traditional religions) will "never enjoy the 
hot pleasures of spiritual conversion and self-surrender; scientists cannot 
in all honesty serve as priests" (Wilson 1978, 193). But, nevertheless, 
Wilson believes that a way exists to divert the power of religion into the 
service of science, even i f it wil l be for the future to tell us how, exactly, 
this might be done. He believes that the evolutionary epic is probably the 
best myth (in the religious or "noble" sense as he calls it) that we shall 
ever have. 
Existential scientism is a very interesting form of scientism, but my 
focus wi l l be on another form, epistemic scientism. However, advocates 
of existential scientism (or scientistic faith) typically also accept 
epistemic scientism and further use it as an argument for why we should 
accept existential scientism. So the two are interconnected. 
Perhaps the most well-known form of scientism, epistemic 
scientism expresses a particular idea about the boundaries of knowledge, 
saying that the only genuine knowledge about reality is to be found 
through science and science alone. The only kind of knowledge we can 
have is scientific knowledge. Everything outside of science is taken as a 
matter of mere belief and subjective opinion. Consequently, the agenda is 
to strive to incorporate as many other areas of human life as possible 
within the sciences, so that rational consideration and acquisition of 
knowledge can be made possible in these fields as well. If one holds this 
epistemological view, then it is of course not difficult to understand that 
one would believe that everything (or at least as much as possible) could 
and should be understood in terms of science—because what we cannot 
understand and explain in terms of science is something that we cannot 
know anything about at all. This is not the view that (a) science is the 
paradigm example of knowledge or rationality, but the view that (b) the 
only genuine knowledge about reality is to be found through science and 
science alone. 
Churchland, as we have already noted, maintains that "In the 
idealized long run, the completed science is a true description of reality, 
there is no other Truth and no other Reality" (Churchland 1986, 249). A 
more classic statement of epistemic scientism comes from Bertrand 
Russell: "Whatever knowledge is attainable must be attained by scientific 
methods; and what science cannot discover, mankind cannot know" 
(Russell 1978, 243). Other examples of statements of this view are these: 
Science is the only way to understand the real world. (Dawkins 
2000) 
Yet for many people, including many religious believers, science is 
arguably the only form of intellectual endeavour which can produce 
something worthy of the term "knowledge", even i f it is not guaranteed 
to do so. (Baxter 2007, 3) 
We take science to be the only good way to arrive at reasonable 
beliefs about what is true, at least in the realm of the purely factual. 
Hence, we defer to science. (Boghossian 2006,4) 
Lastly, Atkins, in his argument for the limitless power of science, 
claims that: 
There is no reason to suppose that science cannot deal with every 
aspect of existence. Only the religious—among whom I include not 
merely the prejudiced but also the underinformed—hope that 
there is a dark corner of the physical Universe, or of the universe of 
experience, that science can never hope to illuminate. (Atkins 
1995,125) 
The Traditional Theory of Knowledge 
Before assessing these claims, let me break for a while and ask: what is 
knowledge? Though there are a number of different theories of 
knowledge in contemporary epistemology, I shall take as my starting 
point the traditional understanding of knowledge: the justified true belief 
account of knowledge (the "JTB account"): 
Someone S knows something p ("Dinosaurs once roamed the earth") i f 
and only i f 
(1) This person S believes p 
(2) This person S is justified in believing p 
(3) p is true. (It is a fact that "Dinosaurs once roamed the earth".) 
If these three conditions are satisfied then this person knows that 
dinosaurs once roamed the earth. 
Our early ancestors believed that the earth was flat (thereby 
satisfying condition 1). They also thought they knew that the earth was 
flat. But even i f their belief about the earth had been justified (that is, it 
satisfied condition 2), it was false. Now, i f a belief is to count as 
knowledge it must not only be justified, it must also be true (that is, it 
must satisfy condition 3). And it was not a fact in the past, any more than 
it is today, that the earth was flat. So, our ancestors' belief in this regard 
did not constitute knowledge. On the other hand, nor is it sufficient 
merely to believe that the earth is round, even though this is the factual 
case; something more is needed. Imagine one of our early ancestors 
saying to the others seated around the fire that he believes that the earth 
is round. When the others ask why he believes this, he answers: "I just 
believe this—for no particular reason." Out of sheer luck he happens to 
have stumbled upon the truth. But, according the JTB account, he did not 
know that the earth was round, because condition 2 was not satisfied in 
his case. 
What, more exactly, does it mean to be "justified" in believing pi 
According to evidentialism, a belief is justified only when there are good 
reasons or sufficient evidence to think that it is true. Perhaps W. K . 
Clifford's claim that "it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to 
believe anything upon insufficient evidence," is the best-known 
statement of evidentialism (Clifford 1877/1947, 77). On this account, 
"justified bel ief simply means, "belief for which one has good reasons." 
According to evidentialists, the second condition should be explicated as 
follows: 
(2') This person S is justified in believing p, that is, he or she has 
sufficient evidence or good reasons to believe p. 
Some people do not make a distinction between knowledge and 
rationality. Perhaps they think that it is rational to believe only what one 
knows to be true. However, there appear to be many things that we do 
not know, but which we are still perfectly rational in believing. I believe 
that my wife is home right now because she told me that she would be 
there. But maybe she has changed her mind and gone to visit some 
friends instead. Would I not in these circumstances be rational in 
believing that she is home, although this turns out to be wrong? Or, 
consider our early ancestors again. They believed that the earth was flat. I 
would say that, although they were wrong, they were rational in believing 
what they did believe. 
The evidentialist theory of rationality takes this into account by 
simply dropping the third condition and then saying: 
Someone S is rational in believing something p i f and only i f 
(1) This person S believes p 
(2) This person S is justified in believing p. 
Truth ("p being true") is then not a necessary condition for rationality; it 
is only a necessary condition for knowledge. So one could be rational in 
believing something which is, or turns out to be, false. 
If we explicate epistemic scientism in terms of the JTB account of 
knowledge, we arrive at: 
Someone S knows something p i f and only i f 
(1) This person S believes p 
(2") This person S is scientifically justified in believing p 
(3)p is true. 
Science provides the only path to knowledge. One could similarly hold a 
scientistic view when it comes to rationality. I have called this view ra-
tionalistic scientism. To adopt this view is to maintain that one is only 
being rational i f one holds only beliefs that are scientifically justified. It 
is irrational for anyone to hold any belief that cannot be supported by 
good scientific evidence. 
Problematic Implications of Scientism 
Let us focus on epistemic scientism and discuss some of the problems it 
faces. First, what is seriously problematic about the epistemological form 
of scientism is that it is self-refuting (that is, it undermines itself) or is 
self-referentially incoherent (that is, when it is applied to itself it 
generates a contradiction). 
Epistemic scientism states that all genuine knowledge is scientific 
knowledge. But what is the status of this proposed claim about 
knowledge? In fact, it follows from this claim itself that we cannot know 
that scientific knowledge is the only mode of knowledge unless we are 
able to determine that this is so by scientific means. This is the case 
because, according to this epistemology, science is the only source of 
knowledge that we have. The belief that "all genuine knowledge is 
scientific knowledge" is, according to the theory itself, a justifiably true 
belief i f and only i f it is scientifically verifiable. Hence, in accord with 
the JTB theory, these conditions must be satisfied: 
(4) Someone S believes p, namely that all genuine knowledge is 
scientific knowledge 
(5) This person S is scientifically justified in believing p, namely that 
all genuine knowledge is scientific knowledge 
(6) p is true. 
But what scientific methods, for instance in biology or physics, are 
suitable for the task, demanded by the condition (2" r ) , of providing 
scientific justification for the belief that the only genuine kind of 
knowledge is scientific knowledge? Well, hardly those methods that 
make it possible for scientists to discover and explain electrons, protons, 
genes, survival mechanisms and natural selection. The reason is not that 
the content of this belief is too small, too distant or too far in the past for 
science to determine its truth-value (or probability), rather, it is that 
beliefs of this sort are not subject to scientific investigation. 
The belief that only science can give us knowledge about reality is a 
view in the theory of knowledge and is, therefore, an issue for philosophy 
and not a matter for science. But further, epistemic scientism is self-
refuting, undermining itself. This is so because, i f the belief that only 
science can give us knowledge about reality is a philosophical standpoint, 
then it follows that we can never know that it is true because the belief 
itself says that the only kind of knowledge we can have is scientific 
knowledge! If all this is correct, it is absolutely devastating for epistemic 
scientism. However, the only people who seem to pursue this line of 
thought are philosophers or, to be more precise, only analytical 
philosophers. But this is as bad as it could get, because it entails that 
what one believes cannot even possibly be established as the truth: it is 
necessarily false. It is just as problematic as it would be for someone to 
be taller than he is, to become a father of his own parents, or to be a 
married bachelor. 
The only way around this problem is to try to reformulate the 
scientistic stance. But is this possible? The answer is yes, and I think 
Atkins proposes such a form of scientism. He writes that the "attitude 
that I advocate is that the omnicompetence of science, and in particular 
the simplicity its reductionist insight reveals, should be accepted as a 
working hypothesis until, i f ever, it is proved inadequate" (Atkins, 1995, 
132). But why should we accept this as our working hypothesis? The 
answer that Atkins hints at is that science has been tremendously 
successful; it has given us insights about nature that could only have been 
dreamt of a couple of centuries ago. It is the success story of science that 
justifies the scientistic attitude: that the working hypothesis should be 
that everything could and should be understood in terms of science. 
Even though we cannot prove that all genuine knowledge is 
scientific knowledge, we can and should take this as our working 
hypothesis because of the successes of science. Other kinds of knowledge 
might therefore exist. This "softcore scientism," as I shall call it, does 
not, in contrast to the previous "hardcore scientism," deny that other 
kinds of knowledge might exist. Rather, it wants to place the burden of 
proof on to those who claim that there do exist other kinds of knowledge 
than scientific knowledge. The advocates of soft-core scientism merely 
maintain that we should be suspicious of all human knowledge claims 
that are not scientific and which apparently cannot be reduced to 
scientific knowledge. This form of scientism appears not to be self-
refuting. It does not entail that we know that all genuine knowledge is 
scientific knowledge and thus face the impossible task of explaining how 
this knowledge could be obtained by scientific means. Its advocates 
would, rather, maintain that this is a rational belief or a justified working 
hypothesis; it is rational or justified because of the success story of 
science. Hence the idea is that it is rational to believe (or to accept as a 
working hypothesis) that the only kind of knowledge we have is 
scientific knowledge, as long as there are no good reasons to believe 
otherwise. 
A second problem that scientism faces is that science did not 
develop until around the seventeenth century. It is hard to say when 
exactly it began to emerge in its modern form, but science is certainly a 
newcomer in human history. So then, what about the people who lived 
before the development of the scientific method and the knowledge that 
this method (or rather cluster of methods) has generated since the 
seventeenth century? Did they not know anything at all? Scientism seems 
to entail that there would not have been any knowledge available before 
the dawn of science. Not until the discovery of the scientific method can 
human beings have known anything about themselves or the world 
around them. But is this standpoint a reasonable one? 
I would maintain, to the contrary, that people living say 10 000 
years ago did know quite a lot about many things. Imagine a group of 
people sitting around the fire all those years ago in what we today call 
Africa. They knew that they had to eat to survive, that John (or whatever 
his name) was in love with Maria, that John's parents were dead and that 
there were, in the bushes nearby, dangerous animals that they should be 
careful to avoid. John knew that he was thinking about B i l l , his brother, 
who was out hunting. They knew that you could trust some people but 
not others. They surely knew a lot of other things as well. It is true that, 
since the development of science, we know more than these earlier 
people did about the physical world, but my point is this: before the 
development of science there was human knowledge available, and that 
therefore there is no good reason to believe that only science can give us 
knowledge. It also follows that, even i f the scientific project had never 
got underway, we would still know many things. 
Yet a third problem is that an acceptance of epistemic scientism 
entails that we have no knowledge in the field of humanities, because the 
disciplines within the humanities are not part of the sciences. But, do we 
not know many things, within the humanities, about art, language, 
literature, and human history? 
Inferential and Non-Inferential Knowledge 
So far I have pointed out three problematic consequences that follow 
from the adoption of scientism. M y next point is that there are many 
things that we must know before we are able to conduct any science or 
are able to derive any scientific knowledge. This is because scientific 
knowledge depends upon other sources of knowledge. 
Let us start with things that look most obviously like scientific 
beliefs, for example the beliefs that there is a tree outside my window 
and that people are walking down the street. These are just two examples 
of the kind of observational or perceptual knowledge we acquire every 
day, and my claim is that we must have this kind of knowledge before we 
can obtain scientific knowledge. A possible objection might be that 
observational knowledge is scientific knowledge. However, one 
difficulty with classifying observational knowledge as scientific 
knowledge is that it would mean that we all are scientists and, further, 
that "science" has existed long before the development of science, as we 
now understand it. We all (or almost all of us, since some people are 
blind) would be scientists, since we all have the means of acquiring these 
beliefs without seeking expert advice or undertaking scientific 
experimentation, that is, we must all be scientists because, by perception 
alone we can come to know that "There is a tree outside my window" 
and that "People are walking down the street." 
Compare these beliefs with what I would readily classify as 
scientific beliefs, such as "Genes are segments of chromosomes," 
"Chromosomes are composed of D N A , " "Nuclear fusion causes the sun's 
energy," or " A l l particles of light travel with a velocity of 300 000 
km/sec." These beliefs, in contrast to observational beliefs, are obtained 
by means of scientific inquiry and experimentation. Scientific knowledge 
presupposes the development of methods and empirical techniques; and 
we are not all scientists, since most of us do not master such methods and 
techniques. Thus, science aims to give us knowledge about what the 
physical world is like in the realms that are too small, too distant or too 
far in the past to be directly experienced. This is done by developing 
theories about, for instance, the transmission of diseases, the motions of 
planets and stars, the succession of fossils and the similarities among 
organisms. 
This also means that scientific knowledge is a different species of 
knowledge from observational or perceptual knowledge. Scientific 
knowledge is typically an inferential form of knowledge, whereas 
perceptual knowledge is a non-inferential form of knowledge. Let me try 
to explain, by means of an example, the difference between these two 
forms of knowledge. Some years ago, I received a letter from Professor 
Lewis Wolpert and I had previously seen one of the books he had 
written. On the basis of this evidence I knew that he existed, but my 
justified true belief in his existence was a form of inferential knowledge. 
In April 2008,1 met him at a conference in Sigtuna and we both took part 
in a panel discussion about the limits of scientific knowledge. From that 
day on, I had non-inferential knowledge about the existence of Lewis 
Wolpert. That is to say, I no longer had to believe in the truth of his 
existence on the basis of other things that I know and which constitutes 
evidence for his existence. I now know that he exists because I have seen 
and talked to him personally. These days, my knowledge of him is a 
species of non-inferential knowledge. 
Inferential knowledge is, then, knowledge that we have which is 
based on (inferred from) other things we know that constitute evidence 
for it. For instance, there are footsteps in the snow outside my window, 
and I therefore know, inferentially, that a person has passed by outside 
my window. Non-inferential knowledge is, in contrast, knowledge that is 
not reliant on other things, which we know and need to take as evidence. 
If, instead, I had actually seen a person passing by outside my window in 
the snow, my knowledge of this would be an example of non-inferential 
knowledge. 
Phrased differently, in the first case the assumption that a person has 
passed by my window provides the best explanation of the evidence, that 
is, of the footprints. In the second case, however, I simply see a person 
passing by. I neither need to see something else (the footprints) from 
which I infer this person, nor need I offer a best explanation of what is 
seen. This also explains why we find it inappropriate or puzzling to talk 
about theories or hypotheses when dealing with perceptual beliefs or 
observations that we have made. But it is, of course, neither inappropriate 
nor puzzling to talk about theories or hypotheses in science. This is so, 
simply because scientific knowledge is characteristically a species of 
inferential knowledge. Thus, perceptual knowledge is not scientific 
knowledge. Observational beliefs and knowledge are, rather, things that 
science typically takes for granted. Science starts from these things. 
Consequently, i f scientific knowledge is the only sort of knowledge we 
can have, as scientism would have it, then science itself seems to be 
based on blind faith or superstition. 
What about memorial knowledge, does not science depend on this 
kind of knowledge too? Beliefs of memory are those beliefs that are 
about things we have previously experienced or thought about. For 
instance, I remember that I am married to Anna and fell in love with her 
in 1986, and that I have been writing about scientism today. Furthermore, 
I do not merely believe these things I also reckon that I know these 
things. 
But I do not think that the beliefs of memory can be scientifically 
established. Rather, to be able to develop and test a scientific hypothesis 
against a certain range of data, scientists have to be able to remember, for 
instance, the content of the hypothesis, the previous test results and, more 
fundamentally, they are scientists and where their laboratories are 
located. Their knowledge presupposes memory. The truth is that, unless 
we could trust our memories (and obtain knowledge), we could never 
reason at all or do any science whatsoever, because in any inference we 
must remember our premises on our way to the conclusion. A l l activities 
we are engaged in therefore presuppose memory knowledge. 
Accordingly, science does not merely take observational knowledge and 
self-reflective knowledge for granted, it also presupposes the possibility 
and reliability of knowledge based upon memory. But i f scientific 
knowledge is the only sort of knowledge we can have, then we cannot 
know that we know this, because such knowledge requires memorial 
knowledge. 
Notice that memorial knowledge could be either non-inferential or 
inferential knowledge. I know, for instance, that I had breakfast this 
morning. This knowledge is non-inferential: it is not based on other 
things that constitute evidence for it and from which my belief is 
inferred. But consider instead the question: "Mikael, do you know 
whether you had dinner with your grandparents on Saturday, 10th May?" 
To this question my answer would go something like: "Well, let's see. 
They came back from Spain on Wednesday. Jacob played a game of 
football on Saturday, so we arrived back later than we had expected that 
evening. Because of this, they had eaten before we got back from the 
game. No, I did not have dinner with them that night; I know that." In 
this case, unlike in the former example, my memorial knowledge uses a 
species of inferential knowledge. 
The fact that we have non-inferential knowledge does, apparently, 
undermine the JTB account of knowledge, at least when it is explicated 
in terms of evidentialism, as it typically is. But this wil l have to be a topic 
for another essay. If this is the case, then the JTB account could perhaps 
be a good approximation of scientific knowledge, but not of all forms of 
knowledge. 
Introspective, Linguistic and Intentional Knowledge 
Let us move on. Let us ask, what about my claims that, "I know that I am 
now thinking about scientism," "I know that there is a slight pain in my 
stomach" and "I know that I am in love." Are these scientifically 
knowable? And i f they are not, cannot I (or people who have experienced 
similar things) have knowledge about these things? 
To be honest, I cannot see how any of these beliefs could constitute 
scientific knowledge. By using scientific methods (say by measuring my 
brainwaves), scientists can perhaps determine whether or not I am 
thinking, but they cannot discover what I am thinking about, the content 
of my thoughts. In my view at least, introspective knowledge is necessary 
for us to be able to do science, or, at least, good science. To be 
successful, I think, scientists must be able to reflect about their own ideas 
and to know that they have these ideas, to be able to develop sound 
theories and to test them in a satisfactory way. 
I also know that I am impatient and that I am not as careful as I 
should be. Knowledge about one's own character and temperament is 
also important i f one is to be a successful scientist. It is a form of 
knowledge that science cannot give us, but which good science depends 
on. 
Now, to ask it crudely, can science read books or, for simplicity, the 
two sentences "The only kind of knowledge we can have is scientific 
knowledge" and "Drink Coca-Cola," and thus obtain linguistic 
knowledge? More precisely, the question is whether, for example, the 
biologist qua biologist or the physicist qua physicist can read these texts? 
Can they as scientists discover (or come to know) the meaning of these 
sentences by applying solely the methods of biology or physics? Well , 
scientists can, of course, analyze the chemical laws that allow ink to bond 
with paper and the other things that make it possible to write these 
sentences. But can scientists, using such empirical methods, come to 
know the information contained in these sentences? I must admit that I 
cannot even imagine what such experimentation would look like. The 
crux of the matter is that it is not even possible to become a scientist 
without first being a "hermeneutic creature," that is, a being who can 
understand and interpret meaningful phenomena (that is, things which 
express a meaning), such as languages. Again, people could read before 
the development of science, and science depends on linguistic knowledge 
to be able to produce scientific knowledge. 
We are not only able to know the meaning of the sentence "Drink 
Coca-Cola" written on a lighted billboard, but we are also able to know 
that someone put it there with the intention of persuading us to buy this 
particular product. There is a reason for its being there and we can know 
this. Thus, we have not merely linguistic knowledge but also intentional 
knowledge (that is, knowledge about people's intentions or purposes), or 
so it seems. 
A scientist can, of course, explain the lighted billboard in terms of 
the strength of the steel posts that support the sign, the current of 
electricity that causes the lights to glow, and so forth. But meaningful 
phenomena such as intentions are clearly nothing that scientist can obtain 
knowledge about by merely applying the methods and instruments of 
physics or biology, or any other natural science for that matter. The 
advocates of scientism are therefore forced to deny that there are such 
things as intentions or purposes and, consequently, must maintain that 
our purported knowledge about them is merely an illusion. In this 
particular case, they have to deny that the billboard contains a dimension 
of reality that is undetectable by their scientific methods, namely, that the 
sign expresses an intention to persuade us to buy a particular product and, 
furthermore, that we can obtain reliable knowledge about this. 
But is it really reasonable to deny that intentions exist and that we 
can have intentional knowledge and, more importantly, can they as 
scientists deny this? Can we even understand science i f we deny the 
possibility of intentional knowledge and thus intentional or teleological 
explanations? If, in trying to explain why Darwin developed the theory of 
evolution, for instance, we were merely to refer to the molecular 
movements in his brain or the propagation of D N A , would we have fully 
understood his behaviour? The answer, it seems, must be no. No 
satisfactory account of Darwin's behaviour can avoid referring to 
Darwin's intention to explain the diversity of living things and trace the 
patterns in that diversity, and his belief that his theory would offer the 
best explanation of these phenomena. Darwin's intention to explain the 
diversity of living things is obviously not the same event as some nerve 
impulse firing in the brain. More importantly, the content of his thoughts 
(including his intentions) cannot be discovered by scientifically 
examining some neurone firing in his brain. Nor, for that matter, can the 
content of the theory of evolution be discovered in such a way. 
Knowledge about Social Reality 
I shall further argue that knowledge about social reality is something that 
science cannot give us, and it is a kind of knowledge few of us would on 
reflection deny that we have. 
Let me give you an example of what I mean by knowledge of the 
social world. I am not talking about the social sciences, but merely about 
commonsense knowledge or everyday life knowledge. Suppose I go into 
a café in Stockholm and sit down on a chair at a table. The waiter comes 
and I utter a fragment of a sentence in Swedish. I say, "Kan jag få en öl, 
tack?" (Can I have a beer please?)The waiter brings the beer and I drink 
it. I read a book and notice a Coca-Cola sign on the wall and cars outside 
the window. I leave some money on the table and leave. This sounds 
simple, but as John Searle and others have pointed out, its metaphysical 
complexity is truly staggering (Searle 1995). Moreover, its significant 
features fall outside the scope of science. Notice that we cannot capture 
the features of the description I have just given in the language of physics 
and chemistry or any other of the natural sciences. 
There is no physical-chemical description adequate to define "café," 
"waiter," "sentence in Swedish," "money," or even "chair" and "table," 
even though cafés, waiters, money, chairs and tables are physical 
phenomena. Since no physical-chemical description can be given of these 
social phenomena, no scientific knowledge of the social world exists. But 
we do know these things; a large chunk of our knowledge is of the social 
world we inhabit! Where science only can see masses of metal in linear 
trajectories, we can see cars being driven along the road. Where science 
only can see cellulose fibres with green and grey stains, we can see dollar 
bills. 
Therefore, and contrary to what Atkins thinks, we have every reason 
to believe that (a) the world is bigger than the world of the natural 
sciences and that (b) we can obtain knowledge about this bigger world 
that cannot be reduced to scientific knowledge. 
The Privileged View of Science 
There is, however, a fall-back position that many people accept, even if 
they are not advocates of scientism. Let me therefore end by highlighting 
this view. Some people would say not that science alone can provide us 
with knowledge, but that science is the paradigm example of knowledge 
and rationality. Science provides us with the most reliable path to 
knowledge and rational belief. Every other intellectual or cognitive 
activity is in this sense inferior to science. Harold I. Brown, for instance, 
maintains "science provides our best example of a rational endeavour" 
(Brown 1988, vii). Roland Uhrberg, claims that the "best method for 
obtaining new knowledge is the scientific method, but that does not mean 
that one could obtain knowledge of all the mysteries of reality" (Uhrberg 
2008, 87, my translation). Science is the best way of understanding the 
world. 
But this cannot be true i f science is dependent on other forms of 
knowledge. Scientific knowledge can then be no stronger than these other 
forms of knowledge on which the science depends. But I would go 
further than this and claim that some of my non-scientific knowledge is 
more reliable than my scientific knowledge, and I am inclined to think 
that the same applies even for those who are themselves natural 
scientists. Take my belief that "I know that I am now thinking about 
scientism." It makes no sense to question my belief that I am now 
thinking about scientism by asking, "Mikael, are you certain about this? 
Is it not rather the case that you are thinking about dinner?" (This is so, 
unless, of course, you are questioning my truthfulness, thinking that I am 
trying to fool you.) But for any scientific theory developed one could 
reasonably ask of the scientists: "Are you certain about this, is it not 
rather that something else is the case?" Or think about this claim: 
I know that I had breakfast this morning. This knowledge claim of 
mine is better justified than any scientific belief or theory. I am more 
certain about it, and rightly so, than that the evolutionary theory is true, 
or that any other scientific theory is true. M y view would be that science 
provides us with a good and important way of obtaining knowledge about 
the world, but it is not the only way and not necessarily the best way of 
knowing the world. If you want to know what love is, it might be better 
to read novels than to take science classes.8 
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We need to find God, and he cannot be found in noise 
and restlessness. God is the friend of silence. See how 
nature - trees, flowers, grass- grows in silence; see 
the stars, the moon and the sun, how they move in 
silence... We need silence to be able to touch souls. 
Mother Teresa 
Preferential Scientism: A Useful Fiction 
Niels Henrik Gregersen 
Introduction 
Over the years I have admired Mikael Stenmark's work on the interface 
between science and religion. Not only has Stenmark offered helpful 
typologies of intellectual options, but his analytical approach invites his 
readers to think along with him. How, in the dialogue between the sci-
ences and the religions, can we avoid argumentative shortcuts, and how 
can we combine positions that are otherwise viewed as contrastive? In 
asking these kinds of questions, Stenmark consistently writes from a 
philosophical vantage point which is informed both by disciplined ra-
tional standards and by common sense judgments that remain close to the 
real-world situations, in which the practices of science and religion meet. 
Stenmark has used his philosophical acumen also on the curious 
phenomenon of scientism. He has helpfully mapped and discussed 
varieties of scientism in several of his publications, not only in his book 
Scientism: Science, Ethics, and Religion (Stenmark 2001), but also in his 
article "What is scientism?" (Stenmark 1997), and in his entry to the 
Encyclopedia of Science and Religion (Stenmark 2003). I find 
Stenmark's typologies convincing and do not feel a need to add new 
varieties of scientism to his analysis. However, I would like to highlight a 
distinction between scientism as a worldview about what is ultimately 
real and as a precept for applying methods from the natural sciences to 
areas that are usually approached only from the perspective of the human 
sciences, or from the viewpoint of phenomenology. In what follows I 
argue that what may be redeemable about scientism is its often criticized 
expansionism, in particular i f this scientific expansionism does not (as is 
usually the case) inflate into an exclusivism on the part of science. I take 
this idea of scientism as a precept as a friendly amendment to Stenmark's 
penetrating analyses, in so far as he himself has given examples of a 
"preferential scientism", as I am going to call it. 
Why Scientism is not a Tenable Philosophical Position 
Stenmark has given ample reasons why standard forms of scientism are 
philosophically untenable. Put bluntly, it is silly to think that the sciences 
can solve all genuine problems that humankind ever has and wi l l 
encounter - existential questions as well as ethical and aesthetic 
questions. Who could imagine a science for young people's identity 
formation, a science for choosing new governments, or a natural science 
for writing novels and painting pictures? Scientific background 
information may be important, but neither lives nor novels can be purely 
science-based. It also seems weird to subscribe to an epistemic scientism, 
according to which those kinds of knowledge, which already are or can 
be justified by science, are taken to be the only reliable kinds of 
knowledge at our disposal. What about the pre-theoretical knowledge, by 
which human beings for millennia have lived, thrived and survived? As 
pointed out by Stenmark and others, the ontological, epistemic and 
existential forms of scientism are not only unconvincing, but logically 
self-refuting, in so far as "scientism" is not itself a scientific position, but 
a metascientific position, that is, a philosophical position "about" the 
relation between scientific knowledge and all other forms of knowledge. 
Hence, even i f scientism happened to be the one and only true position 
amongst worldview contenders, it could not be so by being scientific. 
Moreover, the ontological and epistemological forms of scientism 
that seem to be the prevailing forms of scientism (rhetorically promoted 
by ardent proponents of the science-alone view), leave out, as a matter of 
fact, many forms of knowledge that are basic to the pragmatics of human 
life - and likewise to the pursuit of science itself. Stenmark points to 
forms of knowledge such as perceptual (non-inferential) knowledge. Can 
anyone do science without perceiving colours and identifying organisms, 
thereby using pre-scientific modes of human understanding? Or 
knowledge by memory - can anyone do science without remembering 
earlier steps in an experimental set-up? Or think of introspective 
knowledge - how can it be argued that a pain does not "really" exist, 
when patients report to the doctor about their pain (even in the extreme 
case of "phantom pains" where the pain is felt in limbs that have been 
amputated by surgery). Or intentional knowledge - how could any 
scientist know more than I do about what I momentarily desire or do not 
desire? Or semantic knowledge - which neuroscientist can identify the 
specific contents that I have in mind during a brain scan, for example a 
cat lying on the mat, to re-use an old argument of Hilary Putnam (1995)? 
Or think of knowledge of socially defined facts - does a scientist 
understand the meaning of a $ 1000 note better than a user within a fiscal 
system, say a beggar who unexpectedly receives a little green greasy 
piece of paper (1,2 grams, 5 x 1 0 cm) into his empty hands? 
Using the Principle of Charity 
On the Commitments of Scientism 
Due to the exaggerated claims raised by contemporary protagonists of 
scientism, most forms of scientism are not only unwarranted, but also 
utterly implausible. However, might there be something to rescue from 
scientism, not as a philosophy of life, but simply as an academic attitude, 
hence as an impetus for pursuing science? Let me here try to play the 
role, not of the devil's advocate, but of an angelic advocacy for a more 
modest scientism. I hereby make use of the well-known hermeneutic 
principle of charity that is, taking up a viewpoint in its best possible 
meaning, despite the untenable arguments and aggressive tone of 
scientistic protagonists. 
Let us imagine a more modest contender of scientism who is 
prepared to admit that scientism is an unviable proposition i f taken in the 
assertive mode ("all genuine knowledge is scientific in nature"), but who 
insists that scientism is quite a strong view i f used as a methodological 
prescript for any practising scientist: "Always look to science in order to 
uncover what is genuinely real". Hereby scientism is treated as a sort of a 
regulative principle. Let us furthermore imagine that our modest 
contender of scientism were to argue along the following lines: 
"Well , it is indeed correct that the ontological and epistemic 
versions of scientism, as usually expounded, are not only unwarranted 
but also prima facie implausible. However, the natural sciences still 
provide the best possible framework for obtaining reliable, long-term 
knowledge about the way the world is. Remember that the sciences have 
so far, in just 300 years of inquiry, offered the best prospects that we 
have concerning our understanding of reality. Therefore I feel, as a 
practising scientist, a sort of professional obligation to follow scientism 
as involving the following three precepts: (1) Always look to the best 
available and established sciences - and don't try to find interpretative 
loopholes to suit your extra-scientific interests, for example your 
religious outlook. (2) Always expand the scientific methodology to other 
territories of knowledge, even where your colleagues within the human 
sciences (not to mention theology!) claim their own territory. And finally 
(3) always think that scientific explanations of things exist, even where 
we have not yet reached such knowledge. For after all, the natural 
sciences offer us better and more reliable guidance to what is really true 
than any other form of knowledge that people have been used to taking 
for granted, as, for example, non-inferential perception, memory, 
introspection, and so on. Often enough, common sense views have 
proven to be wrong" 
Let me call this attitude a preferential scientism. This variety comes 
close to what Stenmark in his earlier work has called an "academic-
internal scientism". Stenmark's preliminary definition of this 
"methodological scientism" was as follows: 
"The attempt to extend the use of the methods of natural science to 
other academic disciplines" (Stenmark 1997, 17; cf. 2001, 2). 
I take this position to be sensible, and even defensible as an 
expression of a strategic preference for scientific images over against the 
manifest images of common sense and everyday language. Stenmark, 
however, thinks that such a view should not legitimately be called 
"scientistic". This may indeed be the case, given the more widespread 
use of ontologically stronger and more exclusivist claims among 
protagonists of scientism. Stenmark therefore proposes the following 
definition: 
"Methodological scientism is the attempt to extend the use of the 
methods of natural science to other academic disciplines in such way that 
they exclude (or marginalize) previously used methods considered 
central to those disciplines" (Stenmark 1997, 18; cf. 2001, 3). 
The point in this second rendering of methodological scientism is its 
more expansionist vision, and its more aggressive bite. This inner-
academic scientistic position is not only about applying approaches from 
the natural sciences to the human sciences, but about doing so in the 
expectation that the natural sciences are able to offer such self-sufficient 
explanations that explanations from first-hand experience or from the 
human sciences wi l l be superseded, either by exclusion or by 
marginalization. 
It seems to me that such an expansionist version of methodological 
scientism is not at all rare among practising scientists. However, while 
very few would argue that all other explanations can be excluded, more 
would hold the view that the human sciences could be swiftly 
marginalized due to future research. For example, religious studies may 
provide information about the concrete forms of religious life over the 
centuries, whereas cognitive science explains the general trends of 
religious evolution, or similar strategies (Gregersen 2010). 
Preferential Scientism Within the Sciences 
The Quest for Minimalism 
A preferential scientism usually involves a preference for minimalism, 
that is, for an explanation in terms of general features within which the 
particular features can be subsumed. Such preferences are actually at 
work within the sciences. Most physicists really wish to make biochemis-
try obsolete or marginalized by explaining the chemistry of living organ-
isms in terms of general physics and chemistry. Likewise some biochem-
ists, working within the domain of microbiology, claim to be able (at 
least in principle) to explain in a fully satisfactory manner the macrobiol-
ogy of evolutionary history and ecology. Methodological scientism is 
thus at work also within the natural sciences - as a constant precept, as a 
kind of inner-disciplinary regulative principle. 
O f course, neither the physicists nor the microbiologists have yet 
succeeded in their endeavours. Therefore biochemists argue that they are 
able to identify new causally relevant factors (e.g., genes) that require a 
fundamentally new vocabulary, as, for example, coded information in 
addition to flows of energy and physical stuff Hence biology can be 
claimed to be an autonomous science by being an information science, as 
recently stated by John Maynard Smith (2010). Likewise evolutionary 
biology and ecology argue that these disciplines, while presupposing the 
general explanations provided by physics and biochemistry, need to 
introduce new vocabularies (for example, epigenetic networks) and are 
able to identify new causally relevant channels (for example, 
geographical niches, historical coincidences, and prey-predator cycles), 
channels that are not fully explainable by reference to the coding 
capacities of genes. Taken together, it seems that in so far as the sciences 
are driven by the search for theoretical unification, a scientistic 
methodological minimalism is a useful fiction, situated at the heart of the 
grand scale research programmes of physics and chemistry. However, in 
so far as this methodological minimalism is not workable, the quest for 
unification remains a useful fiction. 
Something similar, I think, goes on between the natural and the 
human sciences. Built into the scientific project are varieties of a 
preferential scientism, as defined above. However, scientism remains a 
fiction, even a science fiction, in so far as our imagined spokesperson for 
a more modest variety of a methodological scientism resorts to future 
successes of future sciences, that is, to a Utopian science. Proponents of 
scientism are thus repeatedly driven to hypothetical arguments. In the 
1970's and 1980's the Utopia was about a future genetics, putatively 
capable of explaining human existence and coexistence by reference to 
genes. These were the heydays of sociobiology, as epitomized in the 
work of E.O. Wilson. Since the 1990's - the "decade of the brain" - the 
new Utopian science was neuroscience that would supposedly be capable 
of explaining human cognition, our emotional life, our economic 
exchange of goods and symbolic actions, so that the human sciences are 
predicted to become gradually superfluous, or at least marginalized as 
progress in the neurosciences continues. 
Conclusions 
The discussion today is not whether scientism has offered what it 
promised; it has not. But neither is the discussion today whether the 
natural sciences (especially evolutionary theory and the neurosciences) 
are explanatorily relevant for understanding the human person and the 
social behaviour of human beings; they indeed have proven themselves 
relevant. What, then, are the real questions today? As I see it, the real 
question is to what extent scientific explanation can explain human 
behaviour, and how the explanatory models from the natural sciences can 
be used in tandem with the understanding of human beings as perceptual 
and symbolic beings within the human sciences. It seems that new causal 
capacities are released when human communities are formed, in which 
words, gestures and self-reflection play a seminal role, a role not known 
in animal societies. It seems indeed hard to deny that the world has been 
changed by religious communities for millennia and by scientific 
communities for centuries. 
To sum up, science is not the only game in town when it comes to 
reliable knowledge about the world in which human beings live and 
thrive. Hence the standard varieties of ontological and epistemological 
scientism are anything but convincing. However, a preferential scientism 
may still be fertile as a precept for future research. As I have argued 
above, however, the basic problem is that even such a modest plea for 
scientism is bound to use hypothetical arguments by referring to 
scientific explanations that are not available. Thus also a preferential 
scientism relies on science fiction. Fictions, however, may still be useful 
in guiding scientific practice. Scientism, seen as a precept or a regulative 
idea, may (sometimes) be a useful fiction. 
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Stories, Myths, and Human Identity in 
Cognitive Neuroscience and Religion 
John A. Teske 
Abstract 
Scientific understanding is generally thought to be paradigmatic, a 
synchronic understanding via logical proof, empirical observation, and 
causal explanation. Religion is more characteristically thought to be 
narrative, involving a diachronic understanding via storied accounts of 
the "vicissitudes of human intentions" organized in time, explanations 
not being causal, but in terms of believable narratives of actors striving to 
do things over time. Nevertheless, in the historical sciences generally, in 
explaining the behavior of complex adaptive systems, and in the human 
sciences in particular, stories may well constitute the best scientific 
explanations. These are explanations in which causal relationships may 
be embedded within and expressions of higher-order constraints provided 
by complex system dynamics, best understood via the temporal 
organization of intentionalities which constitute narrative. Without 
narrative, personality traits and human actions are incomprehensible. 
Understanding that causality does not exhaust meaning suggests a 
relationship between religion and science, particularly human science, in 
which the logic of explanation involves an interpretive circle that runs 
between parts and wholes at different levels of explanation. 
I wi l l therefore sketch a synthetic integration of several levels of 
explanation in addressing how myths, narratives, and stories engage 
human beings, produce their sense of identity and self-understanding, and 
shape their intellectual, emotional, and embodied lives. I wil l try to 
suggest how a multi-leveled understanding of evolutionary biology, 
history, neuroscience, psychology, narrative, and mythology might 
actually form a coherent picture of the human spirit. Neuropsychological 
functions involved in constructing and responding to the narratives by 
which we form our identities and build meaningful lives include memory, 
attention, emotional marking, and temporal sequencing. It is the neural 
substrate, the emotional shaping, and the narrative structuring of higher 
cognitive function that provide the sine qua non for the construction of 
meaning, relationship, morality, and purpose that extend beyond our 
personal boundaries, both spatial and temporal. This includes a neural 
affect system shaped by our developmental dependency, the dynamic 
narratives of self formed in the development of identity, and 
reconstructed over the life-span, and the religious and mythological 
metanarratives within which individual stories make sense, and without 
which they cannot. There is a difference between narrative and historical 
truth, but we are also constituted by what we imagine ourselves to be, 
and the incompleteness of our stories, until they are no longer ours to tell. 
Keywords: causality, complex adaptive systems, context-sensitive 
constraint, development, embodiment, emotion, explanation, 
hermeneutic, history, intentionality, identity, meaning, memory, myth, 
narrative, neuropsychology, religious naturalism, social construction, 
spirituality. 
Neuromythology: Narratives and Meaning 
In Science and Religion 
One of the ways to distinguish between understanding in science and in 
religion is provided by Jerome Bruner's (1986, 1990) distinction between 
paradigmatic and narrative modes of understanding. The paradigmatic 
mode involves synchronic understanding via logical proof, empirical 
observation, and causal explanation, putatively more characteristic of 
science. The narrative mode involves diachronic understanding via 
storied accounts of the "vicissitudes of human intentions" organized in 
time, explanations not being causal, but in terms of believable narratives 
of actors striving to do things over time. The latter mode would be more 
characteristic of novelists or poets than of scientists or logicians, and 
arguably more characteristic of religion. That religion is about 
propositional beliefs is a canard regularly put forth by anti-religious 
polemicists attempting to cast religion as paradigmatically defective, 
such as Richard Dawkins (2006), Daniel Dennett (2006), Sam Harris 
(2004), and Christopher Hitchens (2007). 
That religion is not centrally about paradigmatic claims is an idea 
supported by theologians and religious scholars at least from Rudolf 
Bultmann (1958) and Reinhold Niebuhr (1949), including more popular 
recent accounts like that of Karen Armstrong (1993), but certainly even 
to contemporary Muslim scholars like Reza Asian (2006). The latter 
argues that factual questions are irrelevant, that no evangelist would have 
been at all concerned with recording objective observations of historical 
events. While it may be true that there are also principles, propositions 
about religious concepts, it is a mistake to pretend that religion provides 
an alternative explanatory account of the natural phenomena with which 
science concerns itself. The questions that matter are about what the 
stories of a religion mean. The meaning for human lives, even of the 
paradigmatic accounts of science itself, also require a wider framework 
of narrative meaning, in which those accounts can be said to have any 
meaning or sense for our lives. 
While science is necessarily inclusive of the paradigmatic, since 
attention to reasoned analyses and empirical observations are important 
to establishing causal explanations, the paradigmatic mode is ultimately 
insufficient for many explanatory scientific accounts to be rendered 
comprehensible even on scientific grounds. This is likely to be true in the 
historical sciences generally (which include evolutionary biology), in 
explaining the behavior of complex adaptive systems, and in the human 
sciences in particular, in which stories may well constitute the best 
scientific explanations. These are explanations in which causal 
relationships may be embedded within and expressions of higher-order 
systemic constraints provided by complex system dynamics, best 
understood via the temporal organization of intentionalities which 
constitute narrative. 
In the case of specifically human actions, our intentions, 
consciousness, and meaning are manifested by the brain's self-organizing 
dynamics, which initiate, control, and constrain the causalities of 
organismic behavior. Alicia Juarrero (1999: 8) provides an account of 
intentionality in which the brain's distributed dynamics "originate, 
regulate, and constrain skeleto-muscular processes, such that the 
resulting behavior 'satisfies the meaningful content' embodied in the 
complex dynamics from which it was issued...[providing] continuous, 
ongoing control and direction by modifying in real time the probability 
distributions of lower level neurological processes". Covering law 
models are inadequate, since the precise pathways which wil l be taken by 
complex adaptive systems will be ineradicably unpredictable. Such 
complex adaptive systems, out of which intentions emerge, have 
behavioral trajectories which are in principle unique, contingent, and 
nondeterministic even in stable states, and unpredictable across the 
bifurcations which can eventuate in phase transitions, or more 
catastrophic transformations (e.g. conversions, or other life-changing 
events). Given such unpredictability, the only explanation can be a 
historical, interpretive story which retrospectively retraces the actual 
changes in dynamics, including their embedding in an historical and 
structured environment (including external symbolic technologies, cf. 
Clark 2003, Donald 2002). In open systems, embedded by feedback in 
context and history, their distinctive character and behavior wil l embody 
the sedimentation of the contingencies and idiosyncrasies experienced 
over history and development. There is, of course, a difference between 
the story one might tell about the changes in dynamics of a complex 
adaptive system and the stories that human beings also, and of necessity, 
tell about themselves, which may play an integral role in the very 
constitution of meaningful lives through time. So we also must tell a 
story about the storytelling itself. 
According to Juarrero (1999), without narrative, personality traits 
and human actions are incomprehensible, so it becomes necessary to 
explain human actions using a hermeneutic, narrative model, much as is 
the case with other interpretive understandings. For example, the overall 
meaning of a text is constructed out of the interrelations between 
individual passages, as, in turn, the meaning of individual passages 
depends upon the larger text in which they are embedded. A 
nomological-deductive, covering law model may only be adequate for 
atemporal, acontextual, isolated, linear phenomena. For complex, 
dynamic phenomena, context-dependent constraints progressively 
individuate and mark them as historical, embodying within their structure 
the conditions under which they were created and by which they have 
been transformed. For such systems, sensitive to initial constraints, 
irregularities and fluctuations, and capable of dramatic divergences, 
interpretation is always required, and the meaning of events can be fully 
understood only in the context of the higher-level constraints that govern 
them. We can only understand human motoric behavior in the context of 
the intentions which they serve (or fail to serve). For phenomena that are 
essentially contextual and historical, the logic of explanation must be 
hermeneutic rather than deductive, involving an interpretive circle that 
runs from parts to wholes and back again, not a reduction of purposive 
acts to nonpurposive elements, of reasons to the causes which they 
constrain. Causality does not exhaust meaning. Neither are narratives an 
alternative opposed to scientific naturalism, but the context within which 
such accounts must be understood i f they are, finally, to make any sense, 
to have any meaning at all. 
What are the implications of this logic of explanation for the 
relationship between religion, ideology, mythology and science, 
particularly human science? We also ask larger questions of meaning in 
terms of broader agencies, be they human communities, or what we take 
to be sacred or divine. In some sense this is what we mean by meaning. 
This is not an account that is alternative or opposed to physicality or 
design, but is an additional requirement for comprehensibility, for 
meaningfulness. None of this is to say that our physicality, our evolution, 
our history, or our individual development does not help us to understand 
how it is that we come to be able to undertake intentional, meaningful 
action, but it does not exhaust that or how we do it. 
Neuromythology: An Overview 
What I want to do here, is to sketch a more comprehensive overview of 
how personal narratives, particularly the broader mythic and religious 
content of human stories, so deeply engage human beings. It is a fuller 
narrative of our lives, our own life story, which produces our sense of 
identity and self, our personal history, our wounds received and inflicted, 
our attempts to shape and be shaped by others spiritually, intellectually, 
and emotionally, down to our deeply embodied physical existence. I 
believe that the functions involved in constructing and in responding to 
stories: memory, attention, emotional marking, and temporal sequencing, 
and the neurological events that support them, the product of an 
evolutionary hypertrophy of the prefrontal cortex, are integrated and 
made coherent by the cultural invention of myth and story. The narrative 
structuring of higher cognitive functioning enables the construction of 
meaning, relationship, morality and a cognizance of the purposes which 
extend beyond individual boundaries. This shapes our neural affect 
system, and the dynamic narratives by which we construct selves and 
relationships (two sides of the same coin). O f necessity, and by 
socialization, the particular narrative forms and themes are drawn from 
culturally available myths and stories, our experience colored by the 
larger stories within which we try to interpret and make sense out of our 
lives. For Charles Taylor (1989), narrative constitutes our movement in a 
moral space, our striving after valued goals and ends, and the vicissitudes 
of the conflicts and struggles that we meet, and create, along the way. 
How might we form a more integrated sense of how a multi-leveled 
understanding of evolutionary biology, history, neuroscience, 
psychology, narrative, and mythology might actually form a coherent 
picture of the human spirit? Neuropsychological functions involved in 
constructing and responding to the narratives by which we form our 
identities and build meaningful lives include memory, attention, 
emotional marking, and temporal sequencing. It is the neural substrate, 
the emotional shaping, and the narrative structuring of higher cognitive 
function that provide the sine qua non for the construction of meaning, 
relationship, morality, and purpose that extend beyond our personal 
boundaries, both spatial and temporal. These provide a contingent 
solution to disunities of mind, the construction of self and identity, and 
the alienation and fragmentation of personhood, relationship, and 
community, but a solution that is likely only accomplished with widely 
varying degrees of success, and may include a range of fictionalization 
and self-deception in all of us. 
We wi l l look at the basic emotional components of our nervous 
systems, and how they might be shaped via socialization into complex 
human emotional and relational patterns. This includes the emergence of 
self and identity via these socialized emotional patterns, and the shaping 
of consciousness, memory, and identity by developing capacities for 
autobiographical narrative. Then we wi l l be ready to consider the 
symbioses of hybrid human minds with the historically and culturally 
available corpus of mythological forms, by looking at some of the themes 
of these mythological forms, and their impact on the processes by which 
we grasp the human experience, both our own and that of others, and the 
relationships and institutions with which we are interdependent, 
including the therapeutic, the moral, and the religious. Given time, we 
can conclude with some remarks about the relationship between narrative 
and historical truth. 
The Neural Substrate of Narrative Selves 
The contributions of neural components to our building representations 
of who we are and what we are up to, the stories we tell ourselves about 
ourselves, should be readily apparent. The input, the content of such 
stories and the reactivation, the simulation of experience that they 
provide, include: sensory-motor activity, our memories and images of 
perceptions and actions, our memories and anticipations of both internal 
and external events. They include the subcortical mediation of 
motivational and emotional experience which give the stories we tell 
ourselves and others their felt significance, that move us. The include the 
multitasking made possible by the dorsolateral components of working 
memory that allow us to hold some things in mind while operating on 
other contents. They include the ventromedial connections between high-
level executive function and the emotional systems by which we 
prioritize, evaluate, and mark somatic significance. They include the 
orbital prefrontal error-detection of mismatches with expectation that are 
essential to taking corrective action (and may signify the "trouble" so 
central to narrative plots), and the mediation of self-consciousness and 
internal focus via the cingulate gyrus. These provide the raw materials 
from which narrative is fashioned, and which narrative may provide the 
understood and experienced integration into meaningful, coherent, and 
comprehensible structures. However, not only must such narrative self-
representations be selected, and therefore be a limited sample; abstracted, 
and therefore be separated from the experienced particulars; but also 
constructed, and therefore perspectival, egocentric, and always in some 
sense fabricated (and potentially self-deceptive, even in motivated ways) 
(Teske 1996). 
Events certainly occur in our interactions with the world, and also 
with experiences generated from our interiors, and, while we certainly 
hear and recount these events in storied form (and in some sense need 
to), they do not occur, nor are they likely to be processed, at least in their 
early stages, in storied form; nor do these stories have any clear direct 
causal impact on governing our own subsequent behavior. Nevertheless, 
given the relationship between limbic system emotional mediation and 
arousal, and especially hippocampally generated "replay" of sequenced 
events, our formulation of events into narrative form may be an 
important part of not only our declarative memory for them, but any 
ability we might have of synthesizing them into more coherent 
diachronic representations, of self, of others, and of their relationships 
and interactions. While these pieces of a broader neuromythological 
account are of needs speculative, there is empirical evidence for (1) the 
construction of temporal orderings (cf. Dennett 1991 and Flanagan 1992 
for overviews), for (2) the reconstructive character of memory e.g. Loftus 
1979, Neisser 1981), for (3) the dissociation of inner speech from the 
executive functions of the prefrontal cortex (Baddeley 1993), and for (4) 
the constructed character of our experience of free-will, of the self-in 
control (Wegner 2002). 
This produces what Dennett (1991) calls a "multiple drafts" model 
of consciousness, in which we constitute our sense of ourselves through 
time via a regularly revised set of "drafts," organized from the more 
fragmentary information provided by simpler neural components. 
Nevertheless, it is this capacity to organize memory (and anticipation) 
into a serially ordered hierarchy of actions extending backward and 
forward in time, that also makes it possible to tell stories, organize more 
coherent and meaningful lives, connect our pasts with our futures, and, in 
all likelihood, draw on or integrate our own stories with the broader, 
perhaps more archetypal, ideological, and mythical narratives and 
metanarratives provided by our culture, our history, and our literature. 
It is also the case that the neural processes by which we constitute 
"what I meant," or "what I intended" are the processes which provide the 
material support for the constitution of any meaning at all. The narrative 
selves of our conscious experience may be better understood as 
émergents with higher order effects and with indirect rather than direct 
determination of actions. It remains the case that the structuring of our 
lives into meaningful experience, its ordering in time, and its connection 
to other people's stories and to culturally available narratives, is also 
likely to be learned and internalized from other human beings with whom 
we have close physical and emotional interdependency, whose lives have 
in turn been structured and ordered by particular historical and cultural 
practices and institutions. This will be especially true, even foundational, 
to the emotional forms which shape our personal myths of self, in the 
ontogenesis of these structuring capacities in the first place. Our 
consciousness and representations of ourselves are likely to depend 
heavily on the "somatic marking" (to use Damasio's 1995 apt phrase) of 
our self-representations (cf. also Metzinger's more sophisticated "self-
model theory of subjectivity" 2003) which emotionally prioritizes 
particular events and outcomes, itself scaffolded by our early life 
experiences with particular socializing agents (by whatever rearing 
practices, social rituals, or life-changing events). Our sense of both the 
meaning and moral significance of events depends on such neurally 
mediated emotional and narrative structuring. As Charles Taylor (1989) 
has indicated, connections between events, how they cohere and show 
continuity, and the integrity or disintegration of our lives through time, 
are constituted in narrative. Understanding oneself requires both an 
account of how one got here, and of where one is going, which provides 
a location in a "moral space." These accounts are, as we have seen, 
causally dependent on the neural structures and functions by which they 
are produced, the unpacking of which may not only give us a better 
understanding of that production, but of the dissociations between those 
accounts and our actions. 
The Development of Emotions, Scripts, and Life Stories 
While the emergence of storytelling and narrative form in human 
evolution and prehistory is beyond our present scope (cf. Deacon 1997, 
Donald 2002), the shaping of narrative content over the course of 
development is central to constructing a viable neuromythology, 
sufficient to account for our emotional engagement in narrative, our own 
development of a narrative self, and the embedding of human meaning 
and identity in broader narratives, and mythologies. Storytelling is 
learned early, and even children are aware that stories are about people 
(or people-like characters) trying to do things over time; that they have a 
beginning, a middle, and an end (a "how its going to turn out"); and that 
what makes it a story is some kind of narrative tension, a protagonist who 
could be defeated, or a conflict needing resolution. 
It is this narrative tension which I believe to be central to a narrative 
self, the understanding of which is likely to be crucial for a fully 
developed neuromythology. While the "story grammar" components are 
necessary (e.g. Mandler 1984), it is the tension/climax/denouement that 
makes a story compelling. (Why some childrens' movies tend to be 
unsatisfying for older children and adults is because, in the interest of 
protecting small children, narrative tension is sacrificed.).We all know 
moviemakers, and storytellers, that are good at setting up and 
maintaining suspense, curiosity, and tension, and those who do not do so 
well. Given phenomena like infantile amnesia (the difficulty of accessing 
pre-linguistic memory), the difficulty of remembering dreams that are not 
put into storied form, and the ease with which students remember a good 
illustrative story, I have a suspicion that we encode events into a story 
form in order to remember them. Indeed, given the evidence (1) of the 
role of long-term potentiation in the hippocampus and the reactivation of 
hippocampal ensembled memories during sleep (McNaughton, et al 
1994), (2) the relationship of arousal to memory (Dudai 1989), as well as 
(3) common experiences of rehearsals and retellings of stories over time 
(cf. Loftus 1981), it may well be that there are crucial dependencies of 
human memory (at least episodic memory) upon narrative form, 
particularly the arousal-producing qualities of narrative tension. Events in 
the world do not occur in storied form, and the same set of events can be 
put together into quite different stories, but it may be that the storied 
form not only provides a structure which aids memory, but the emotional 
activation that results in longer potentiation and deeper encoding. The 
difficulty of remembering dreams, unattended disjoint events, and even 
traumatic event sequences, may be that they have not been put in 
meaningful narrative structures, particularly structures that have plot 
sequences including tension, climax, and denouement, that involve end 
states, resolutions, the goals, meaning, and purposes around which our 
intentional lives are constructed. The relevance of these structures to the 
narratives of identity formation, including the identity "crisis" of conflict 
and choice (Marcia 1980), should be obvious. 
Out of what do we build the emotional sequences which are 
requisite to the dramatics of narrative? A neural affect system is shaped 
into emotional patterns by the social scripts laid down during our lengthy 
period of developmental dependency, including second-order emotions, 
the development of independence, autonomy, and relations of intimacy 
and power. Personal identity is made possible by the evolution of a 
human neuropsychology that requires social interdependency for its 
development. Our neuroplasticity requires shaping over a lifetime, 
socially scaffolding our neuroregulation, including emotional 
attachments and dynamics. The evolutionary hypertrophy of our 
prefrontal cortex leads to a colonization of brain function, making 
possible the social construction of virtual realities, novel forms of 
socially constituted experience, and the transforming effects of mythic, 
ideological, and religious systems (Teske 2001a). 
There are about ten primary human affects, rooted in biology and 
evolution, each of which are linked to particular facial expressions which 
are species-wide, and recognizable across quite disparate cultures 
(Ekman 1972, Izard 1977). Silvan Tomkins (1979) has elaborated a 
"Script Theory," further extended and elaborated by Donald Nathanson 
(1992) into a fuller theory of how the self emerges from the storied 
structure of affect and emotion. According to Tomkins, the role of 
primary affects is to provide the amplification that gives our basic 
biological drives their motivating power, their urgency. These are innate, 
biologically differentiated and specialized; each feels different by virtue 
of the varied biological systems involved, including their neural 
pathways, and by virtue of links to specific facial responses which 
provide both sensory feedback, as well as social information to others. 
Shame, guilt, and pride are generally thought to be emotions about other 
emotions, and involve experienced contractions and expansions of self-
boundaries respectively (e.g. "swelling with pride"). The basic affects are 
strictly biological equipment. These are organized by specific 
programming that can move from mild to intense levels (e.g., surprise-
startle, interest-excitement, shame-humiliation), the affect system 
producing urgency, a particular profile of response (e.g. the quickness of 
startle responses, the arousal of anger), but which provide no information 
about the environmental source (e.g. sobbing provides no clue as to 
whether it is produced by hunger or loneliness), and the affect can also 
produce alterations in other sensory reception (e.g. tumescent genitals 
expose more receptive surface). While the affect systems are strictly 
biological, feeling states involve an affect plus awareness of it, and 
emotions involve the combination of affect and feeling with remembered 
experiences which can trigger additional affect. 
It is the production of regular patterns of emotion, and their recall, 
which produce the organizing scenes and scripts that are the basis of our 
personal dramas. These patterns wi l l not only be heavily dependent upon 
the domestic or family dynamics of a particular moment in history and 
culture, but are likely to shape, and necessarily so, our extremely plastic 
and immature nervous systems during the course of development, in 
ways that may often be irrevocable, or difficult to counter-condition (e.g 
in the case of experiential preferences, basic amygdalic fear responses, or 
foundational emotional and relational scenarios upon which all 
subsequent ones wil l be built). A scene is the combination of at least one 
affect and one object, which may include persons, places, times, actions, 
or feelings. These are learned, formed from repeated experience, as 
affects themselves can come to be connected to variant objects and 
situations, depending on the patterns available, particularly in the early 
environment, given the long period of social dependency in human 
growth to adulthood. 
Scripts involve a learned set of rules for interpreting, creating, 
enhancing or defending against a family or grouping of particular scenes. 
The short term importance of a particular scene wi l l depend on the 
biological organization provided by the affect system, but its long-term 
importance in a life drama or narrative wi l l be a function of the 
psychological magnification produced by the similarities and differences 
between a scripted pattern of scenes and those which this pattern 
activates in memory. Similarities produce a magnification by analog, as a 
kind of "here we go again." Variations around a stable core tend to 
produce the magnification of novelty (curiosity, enjoyment, interest), 
with differences being magnified as "special." 
Tomkins (1979) begins with a distinction between two basic types 
of scripts: (1) A "commitment" script, resembling romantic or comedic 
narrative forms, includes a program or goal that anticipates positive 
affect, and a long-term investment in improvement. (2) A "nuclear" 
script, resembling tragic or ironic narrative forms, is marked by 
confusion or ambivalence about goals, the magnification by analogy to 
positive scenes that turned into negative affect. No claim is made that 
these forms cause a particular sequence of events to occur, only that 
these scripts and their accumulated magnifications have the effects of 
organizing scenes into coherent and meaningful stories. No doubt the 
formulation of such accounts can have self-fulfilling effects, but they can 
also produce motivational magnifications. 
Drawing on Erik Erikson's work on the modern western "identity 
crisis," Dan McAdams (1988) suggests that identity itself can be 
understood as a life story, initially composed in late adolescence and 
early adulthood, which connects remembered events, current 
circumstances, and future anticipations into an internalized, integrated 
personal myth. It may be that becoming an adult at this particular point of 
culture and history simply means being able to present ones accumulated 
actions according to certain "criteria of intelligibility" (Slugoski & 
Ginsburg 1989), that is, that they be accounted for in term of reasons 
rather than merely causes or simply in terms of their sequence or their 
outcomes. This means that the stories we tell ourselves (and others) about 
our lives are going to be told in terms of intents (and usually conscious 
ones, rather than the reasons and intents about which we can say "I didn't 
know it at the time, but here's what I was up to," although these would 
not be ruled out); this is part of what makes such accounts, and our 
actions, intelligible, regardless of when the intents were actually 
formulated, and irrespective of what role any consciousness of intents 
might actually have played in bringing about the relevant actions and 
decisions. What I would like to suggest is the possibility that the 
dynamics of narrative plotting, and our capacity to encode our 
experiences in memorable terms, also requires that events be framed as 
conflicts, crises, and climaxes in order for them be remembered at all (at 
least with any facility, or without extensive situational or mnemonic 
support). Thus some sort of storied or narrative form, regardless of its 
constructed character, would be a sine qua non of the memorability of 
events, imagined or otherwise. 
The life-story model of identity developed by Dan McAdams (1988) 
provides a detailed account of the origins of such stories, which a full 
neuromythology would both link to brain development and function, and 
to the broader mythological corpus available in any culture. In his model, 
narrative tone is tied to basic attachments of infancy, producing basic 
variations in security/insecurity. McAdams' model suggests that early 
childhood might include a stockpile of emotionally charged images from 
entertainment media, fairy tales, and even mythical and religious stories 
and iconography. The era of formal schooling may include the 
development of basic story thematics, goal oriented sequences modeled 
by socializing agents, composed of imagery as well as recurring 
motivational dispositions. McAdams elaborates basic thematic 
dimensions of agency (separation from and mastery of the environment) 
and communion (connections and intimacies in relationships and larger 
social projects) as central to narrative content. Basic life stories are likely 
to vary in complexity, but a central feature of identity for the adolescent 
includes the development of foundational beliefs and values, which are 
likely to be necessary prior to the construction of life narratives (though 
one can see potential plot crisis events in how these are established), and 
are not likely to change much after young adulthood. McAdams suggests 
that a life story is constructed out of crucial scenes, concrete events that 
either affirm central truths or represent episodes of change. 
I find McAdams' life-story model of identity to be an important 
contribution to linking several levels of explanation, as we move from 
the neuropsychology of emotion, to broader accounts of personality and 
life-story, especially in his understanding central conflicts in terms of 
conflicting and interacting imagoes, the organizing of a multiplicity of 
roles into a manageable cast of characters. Certainly the conflicts, crises, 
and climaxes necessary for the emotional anchoring of narrative which 
provides its memorability, and hence a narrative self, can be understood 
in terms of these kinds of interactions. What this wil l require is a focus 
on real transactions with the nexus of events and persons of which we are 
interdependent parts. I think the power of our stories have to do with the 
dramatics of these transactions. To put it in the terms of Kenneth Burke's 
(1945) Grammar of Motives, it is the action, not the agent or the patient, 
that provides the dramatics. As such, it might be necessary to develop a 
vocabulary of dramatic transaction to understand more fully how our 
identities are not only constituted by stories, but also within the larger 
stories of our history and culture, the only way by which our relationality 
can be more fully integrated into a broader context of human 
understanding. 
Transactional Dramatics, Healing, and Myth 
A broad theory of the effects of story and narrative is beyond our scope 
here. Nevertheless we need to at least provide some examples of the 
transactional dynamics that provide the engaging emotional power of 
stories, both in the formation of our identities and in the identifications 
with the available narratives of folk traditions, of literature, of history, 
and of mythology. In addition to a potential cast of imagoes which can be 
drawn from culturally available narratives, motivational themes of 
agency and communion, and broad plot classes such as those provided by 
scripts of commitment and nucleation, we can also point to a broad 
vocabulary of transactional dramatics. While as yet speculative and 
hypothetical, it is possible that we can best account for the engaging 
emotional power of narratives in terms of such dramatics. What remains 
to be done here is to suggest some broad examples of historically 
emergent and developmentally internalized transactional dramatics, and 
summarize some of the empirical research bearing on the primary 
psychological functions of integration and healing which stories can 
provide 
Joseph Campbell's (cf. Campbell 1988) classic work on mythology, 
The Hero with a Thousand Faces, captures at least one of the central 
dramatics of agency, that of the heroic. Myths and stories provide models 
of the accomplishment of valuable goals under duress and in the face of 
obstacles, and the heroic form both provides identifiable heroes, and 
provides a broad catalog of the form of their accomplishments, and the 
dynamics of their overcoming of obstacles can be used to metaphorically 
read our own actions in their emotional terms. There may be ways of 
taxonomizing such variations as those involving defeat and victory, 
contamination and redemption, exile and homecoming, which trace these 
variations all the way to the emotional substrate and neural events out of 
which our engagement is constructed, though that engagement be 
narratively constituted. 
A second crucial dramatic is certainly that of the romantic. Stephen 
Mitchell (2002) asserts that the account of our romantic life is central to 
the stories we tell to maintain a sense of ourselves, but that no romantic 
narrative is without pain, hurt, and loss (hence the popularity of the Blues 
as a musical genre). Mitchell points out that there are few better ways to 
determine one's identity, represent one's uniqueness, than to provide an 
account of our scars, old wounds, and damage we have sustained. He 
argues that such accounts fall along an axis of self-pity and guilt, of 
damage inflicted ("she done me wrong"), and of damage which one has 
brought upon oneself and others ("I was a fool"), and that it is this 
emotional content that organizes stories of past as well as present 
relationships. As with the heroic, so too there are romantic emotional 
variations in alienation and reunion, betrayal and forgiveness, or sacrifice 
and bliss, traceable to their neuropsychological components, although 
meaning still resides in the narrative context. 
On the individual level, the level of engagement with human 
neuropsychology that is central to a neuromythology, there is both 
clinical and empirical research evidence about the healing effects of 
narrative approaches to traumatic events. "Stories may bring our lives 
together when we feel shattered, mend us when we are broken, heal us 
when we are sick, help us cope with stress, and even move us toward 
psychological fulfillment and maturity" (McAdams 2001: 780). Jonathan 
Shay's (1994) Achilles in Vietnam suggests that it is only in the telling of 
stories of trauma to a receptive audience, the meaningful integrating of 
scattered, dissociated, painful, and uncontrolled images and emotional 
responses into a coherent story, that there can be any real healing of post-
traumatic stress in Vietnam veterans. Even in college students, James 
Pennebaker (1989, 1997) has shown that the narrative disclosure of 
trauma, where it combines facts and feeling, produces measurable 
improvements in physical health (down to the level of immunological 
functioning), which depend upon both the degree of emotion expressed 
and the extent to which it is a well-formed story. 
A n understanding of Joan Didion's (1979) claim that "We tell 
stories in order to live," can be obtained by looking carefully at the 
dynamic narratives of self developed in the formation i f identity, seeing 
how they are rooted in our neuropsychology, and how they draw from the 
available cultural corpus. There are cultural, social, and personal 
functions of myths, their role in understanding human crisis and 
transformation, in love, heroism, family life, and even the demonic. Our 
construction of ourselves via such mythic and storied forms, whether 
comedic, romantic, tragic, or even ironic, enables our participation in the 
historical moment, in epistemically objective, socioculturally constituted 
realities, our contribution to human history, and our attempts to 
apprehend the timeless and eternal. Finally, not only does narrative 
constitute our movement in moral space (Taylor 1989), but it may have 
the potential both for healing and for disruption, for us as individuals and 
as a species. 
Meaning, Narrative Truth, and Historical Truth 
Let us be clear. To the extent that religions try to make paradigmatic 
claims, they are either not likely to be testable, or, where they oppose 
naturalistic accounts provided by science, are likely to be wrong. In any 
case, it is the narrative, diachronic framework for such claims in which 
they have sense or meaning. To the extent that science provides us with a 
paradigmatic, synchronic description of objects or events, it does not 
provide meaning. It is the framework into which such descriptions are 
placed that does, frameworks which science itself does not provide, 
including the scientific faith that the world can be understood and made 
sense of at all. In the case of human beings (and other complex adaptive 
systems), the standard paradigmatic account may be insufficient even on 
a scientific basis, since a full understanding of such beings requires a 
diachronic, narrative account. These are not alternative to naturalistic 
accounts, but the narrative in which such accounts make sense. We can 
certainly study human beings, and even religions, as natural phenomena, 
but that wil l not exhaust what they are. This is not to posit some 
additional supernatural components, but only argues that standard 
paradigmatic, causal accounts of events do not exhaust their meaning. 
In living beings, narrative accounts are likely to be prospective as 
well as retrospective. While repeatable events enable predictive 
prospection, unrepeatable, novel, creative, "emergent" events do not; one 
of the limitations of the "human sciences," is that, as Maclntyre (1984) 
pointed out, they can finally only be about the past, one of the reasons 
they are notoriously poor at predicting novel historical events, from the 
fall of the Soviet Communism to the emergence of the World Wide Web. 
Hence the need for the understandings of history, philosophy, mythology, 
and theology to provide the prospective futures into which human beings 
can live. We must realize that our finitude, even as a species, always 
leaves us with unanswered mysteries, unpredictable futures, a natural 
world that is metaphysically ungrounded, and an inevitable horizon of 
subjectivity (cf. Rahner 1969) beyond which our understanding may only 
be apophatic or beatific. There may be unanswerable existential 
questions that need believable answers in order for us to live meaningful 
lives, and for there to be a human future at all. Hence, it may be that a 
broader theological and escatological framework becomes necessary for 
stories that extend prospectively into a future that is other than a 
repeatable past. Despite my own deep disbelief in the dogmatics of most 
of my own faith tradition, I confess an incapacity to understand my life 
without concepts like sin, grace, redemption, resurrection, sacrifice, 
compassion, and the acceptance of bodily and emotional suffering. 
To paraphrase Maclntyre (2006), it may only be in the light afforded 
by religious and theological doctrines concerning human nature and the 
human condition that we can really address the questions that ought to be 
central to us all, secular or not, not because of any particular answers that 
these doctrines provide, but in their way of addressing the questions. 
These are, finally, escatological questions about the ultimate meaning 
and fate of our lives, only faith providing the assurance that such 
meaning exists at all. 
Stories may play essential roles in memory, in consciousness, and in 
meaning, but they only really do so when we make them our own, or it is 
always someone else's meaning and not ours. As Antonio Damasio 
(1999) points out, consciousness may well begin with the power to tell a 
story with words, and taking the position of a narrator. That means 
identifying with characters, and taking our own unique perspectives as 
authors and sometimes agents in the stories that make up our lives. The 
complexities, the variations, the contingencies involved, to say nothing of 
the necessary substrate of our own feeling bodies, permit no other 
recourse. Religions require making stories our own, at greater "degrees 
of interiorization of the spiritual dynamics," as Wolfhart Pannenberg 
once put it (1982), the events of our lives making sense only within the 
moral landscape of stories within which the vicissitudes of our intentions 
play out. That they are from particular points of view is one of the central 
characteristics of story, and what is necessarily absent in nomological 
science. Nevertheless our own stories are understood by their place in 
larger and more inclusive stories, narratives being constituted of 
movement in moral space, particularly in stories of healing and 
redemption (McAdams 2005). Religion and mythology are what provide 
the larger stories within which individual stories make sense, and without 
which they cannot. 
I have already indicated that, to the extent that external, objective 
events do not occur in story form, narratives are, from a paradigmatic 
point of view, always fabrications and, to that extent, are always 
fictional. Stories may include actual events, of course, or fail to do so, 
and there is a facticity that constrains truth-telling in stories. But a story 
can be true to the facts and still fail to mean much, not be very 
memorable, and not in that sense, be true to meaning. Narrative theorists, 
clinical psychologists, and, for that matter, literary critics, share a view 
that stories are not a record of facts (though they may also record facts), 
that they are less about facts than about meaning, and that a past, from a 
particular point of view, is always constructed in the telling. As a result, 
we do not judge stories by their adherence to empirical fact, but by 
narrative criteria: e.g. coherence, openness, credibility, or integration. 
Donald Spence (1982) distinguishes between narrative truth and 
historical truth, where narrative truth is not the truth of logic, science, 
and empirical demonstration, but something more like verisimilitude. 
Despite the necessary attention to facticity of a good historian, i f what I 
am saying is right, that the historical sciences (to say nothing of history 
itself) cannot make sense of the behavior of complex adaptive systems in 
general and of human action in particular without attention to narrative, 
then perhaps it would be safer to use the distinction made by the novelist 
Tim O'Brien, in a collection of stories about the war in Vietnam (1990), 
who distinguishes between story truth and happening truth. 
O'Brien's (1990) largely first person accounts of a soldier coping 
with combat in Vietnam are moving, and effective, so much so that many 
veterans reading his stories find them to be "healing," as reported by a 
psychiatrist treating post-traumatic stress in Vietnam veterans (Shay 
1994). But at the end of the book O'Brien confesses that while he was 
there, walking through the jungles, everything else is invented. One of 
the most fascinating stories is one called "The Man I Ki l led ," and the 
story is full of guilt, obsessive reverie, adrenaline-induced time dilation, 
and the incoherence of fragmentary impressions as the narrator tries to 
make sense out of a fresh corpse as he sits on the side of the trail. 
O'Brien tells the reader that he is inventing himself, and while he didn't 
actually kil l the man, he was there, could form a vivid image of a face of 
a man with a jaw in his throat, and he also shared the guilt, because of his 
presence. Then he confesses that even that is invented. "I want you to 
feel what I felt. I want you to know why story truth is truer sometimes 
than happening truth," (p 203). The happening truth was that he was 
young, was in a world of many dead bodies with many faces, but he was 
afraid to look, and was left twenty years later with "faceless 
responsibility and faceless grief." His stories make things present, both 
for himself and for his readers, and allow him, and them, to look at 
things, to attach faces to "grief and love and pity and God," and be able 
to feel again. So when his daughter asks him if he ever killed anyone in 
the war he can say, honestly "of course not." Or, honestly, "Yes." 
Story truth is not about providing external descriptions of the world 
to be judged by their veridicality. As Bruno Bettelheim says in his 
analysis of the psychological power of fairy tales (1977), they can help us 
deal with grief, loss, fear by giving us models of how to make sense of 
them. Robert Coles (1989), in his work on the moral imagination, 
highlights the integrative functions of stories, in healing what is sick or 
broken, bringing together what is shattered, helping us cope with stress, 
and moving us toward fulfillment and maturity, functions for which 
paradigmatic, happening truth is woefully inadequate. I think that 
mythology and religion can be far better understood by viewing them in 
terms of narrative truth, as products of the imagination, as symbolic 
(though we too easily forget this), as ways of organizing the cold hard 
facts of the world into meaningful and symbolic narratives, rather than 
operating as i f the cold hard facts are all that existence is about. They can 
be all there is (though it is remarkably arrogant, even strange, given the 
history of science, to presume that there isn't still a lot we do not know 
about) without being what they mean. Nobody argues with the claim that 
not everything can be expressed scientifically. This is not to say that we 
cannot or should not provide scientific, causal accounts of art, music, 
poetry, literature, and religious experiences; they need not involve 
magical or mysterious powers. But what they express is not expressed 
scientifically. "The arts work our imaginations with all the playful tricks 
of language, allegory, metaphor, and metonymy that science, for its 
purposes, doesn't much care for" (Flanagan 2001: 23). 
Finally I think we are also, truly and really, as much constituted by 
what we imagine ourselves to be, whether prospective or fictional. I 
agree with Ted Laurenson that it is in their imaginative projections that 
the religions or mythological systems of the world, make it possible to 
address our "perceptions of separateness," and "the brute facts of 
individual desire, suffering and death" (Laurenson 2007: 813). "Why find 
an end in the narrative self i f there is no point to the narrative?" (814). 
We cannot learn what ends to project merely by looking at the happening 
truth of science. Possibilities are constrained by facts, and the more we 
know about the facts, the more realistic our projection of possibilities 
might be, but it takes imagination, not science, to invent those 
possibilities. "Religion is part of our dream of possibilities; its study 
provides a lens for the observation of many aspects of what the human 
enterprise is and can be about, of explorations of what it might mean to 
have different notions of ourselves, and why it might matter i f we did" 
(814). As long as we are alive, our stories are not complete, their 
meanings always and necessarily other peoples stories, as they are ours, 
all parts of a larger story in prospective; when we shuffle off this mortal 
coil, they are finally no longer ours to tell, but parts of which, as only 
faith teaches us, our lives will have meant something, which is finally not 
ours to determine. 
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The Inexpressible Meaning in Narratives 
René Rosfort 
Introduction 
For more than a decade John Teske has worked hard and patiently 'to 
help reduce the tension between scientific, philosophical, and religious 
understanding of human nature and spirit by demonstrating how the latter 
may be generated by, nested within, or supervenient to the former' 
(Teske 2006, 170). I deeply admire his careful attempt to integrate 
different, often antagonistic, academic disciplines into an ecumenical 
synthesis that enhances dialogue and cooperation instead of rejection and 
hermetically closed doors among the different academic disciplines. 
Furthermore, I share his suspicion with regard to the use of evolutionary 
or neuroscientific research to substantiate or even verify theological 
claims, as is commonly the procedure in the interdisciplinary research 
programme termed neurotheology. Teske's alternative label 
neuromythology avoids the problematic scientific aspirations of 
neurotheology by downplaying the obsessive crusade for empirical 
verification of ontological questions that remain empirically 
unanswerable. Neuromythology is concerned with the value of religious 
symbols in our quest for meaning in a natural world, and thus 'allows us 
to direct our attention explicitly to the investment of these symbols with 
passion and authority, which is what our deepest meanings are about' 
(Teske 2006, 171). Despite his warranted mistrust about the scientific 
colonization of theology and religious phenomena, Teske's project 
retains an interdisciplinary verve in the attempt to combine scientific, 
philosophical, and religious understanding into a coherent picture of the 
human spirit. The frustration with such attempts to build broad systems 
has always been that the critics try hard to find a basic flaw in the 
construction to poke until the whole system crumbles down. I wil l not do 
that. It is irrelevant and often counterproductive to criticise the whole by 
isolating one of the parts and using that for a pars pro toto argument. On 
the contrary, I wi l l comment on some of the individual arguments and 
ideas without questioning the admirable attempt to integrate science, 
philosophy and religion. M y response wil l mainly be a philosophical one 
concerning the use of narratives with regard to science and the question 
of meaning in human existence. 
So without further ado, I shall go straight to my comments. I have 
singled out three interrelated issues that I find problematic: 1) Meaning 
and Objectivity, 2) Identity and Selfhood in the Light of Narratives, 3) 
Narratives and Inexpressible Meaning. 
Meaning and Objectivity 
Implicit and Explicit Narratives 
One of Teske's central theses appears to be that the paradigmatic method 
of science cannot provide the multifarious meanings that we as humans 
seek in our lives. I fully agree with this, and I would venture that so do 
most serious empirical scientists. 
Uncompromising scientific attempts to explain what makes life 
interesting and important to us in our existence often seem far-fetched 
and artificial. To reduce love, tenderness, jealousy, resentment, hate, and 
other human feelings and concerns to causal operations such as synaptic 
interactions, evolutionary development and 'selfish genes' is so 
counterintuitive that it prompts more questions than it answers. I believe 
that most people are neither appeased nor alarmed by learning that our 
care for and interest in our children and friends is only an unconscious 
part of a larger scheme to preserve our genes or promote the welfare of 
our species. The distance between our personal stance and our scientific 
endeavours seems unbridgeable. Our everyday words and deeds are 
imbued with personal meanings that are incompatible with scientific 
practice. The meanings we, as humans, live by are drastically different 
from the meanings we use to scientifically explain human life. 
Nevertheless, we cannot simply ignore the growing bulk of 
scientific insight and theoretical clarification of human life. We need 
scientific methods in order to ratify and sober up some of the meanings 
that we live by. Contrary to earlier ages, western culture today (and an 
increasing number of non-western cultures) has a strong faith in science 
to tell us when we go astray in our opinions and the values we attach to 
things and persons around us. This is an indisputable development of our 
understanding of objectivity. What is more interesting, though, is how we 
relate this impersonal and objective stance to the personal or subjective 
attitudes we live by in our everyday lives. 
Teske's approach to this difficult problem, as I see it, takes the 
objective paradigmatic stance to be insufficient, even incomprehensible, 
without 'a wider framework of narrative meaning, in which those 
accounts can be said to have any meaning or sense for our lives' (Teske 
2010, 3). Here I disagree with the emphasis on 'any meaning or sense'. 
The meaning produced by scientific research in general, and 
neuroscience in particular, is not at all detached from our personal 
attitudes. Science springs from our personal engagement with life. We 
want to know more about ourselves and the world that we live in, and in 
order to attain such knowledge we must turn away from the subjective 
colouring of experience and action and adopt another, more detached 
look on the world and ourselves. This impersonal and objective inquiry 
yields a meaning relevant to personal existence without being explicitly 
put into a storied form, a narrative. 
In this context, it is crucial to distinguish between implicit and 
explicit when we employ the concept of a narrative. If a neuroscientist 
wants to understand the interaction between the primary motor cortex 
and the subcortical working of the amygdala or the hippocampus, she 
focuses on the local causal relations between clusters of synaptic 
activation and inhibition in accordance with the experimental data that 
we know in regard to the physiology and anatomy of the brain. The 
meaning that she obtains from her research is always embedded in an 
implicit narrative, or as Wittgenstein calls it, a specific language-game 
with specific rules and connected by family resemblance. In short, it is 
meaningful in terms of cause and effect. When I jump back from a 
hissing sound before I cognitively affirm that there is a snake, 
neurophysiology can ascertain that my instinctive reaction is due to 'the 
quick and dirty' impulses which the amygdala activates without first 
interacting with the frontal cortex (Ledoux 1996, 157-169). But this kind 
of narrative is drastically different from the explicit kind of narrative that 
Teske argues for. The explicit narrative is a cognitive effort to put the 
paradigmatic claim about cause and effect into the wider context of 
human existence. 
I believe that Teske is both right and wrong when he writes that 
'external, objective events do not occur in story form' (Teske 2010, 22; 
11). They do not occur in the form of explicit stories, since these are 
expressions of our personal processing of something that is often largely 
impersonal. However, objective events always tell an implicit story about 
something in the sense that the paradigmatic disclosure of the physical 
universe is always meaningful within the conditions established by the 
advancement of the science itself. And these conditions always originate 
in our interest in the meaning of our human life in an often cruelly 
disinterested environment. A famous and deeply influential example of 
how the natural sciences make use of implicit narratives in their 
explanation of natural phenomena is the Darwinian revolution in biology 
in the second half of the nineteenth century. As Philip Kitcher has 
convincingly shown (Kitcher 1993, 11-56), a major part of Darwin's 
success was due to the ability of his theory to provide our explanations of 
the origin and reproduction of species with a general narrative 
framework. In the first half of the nineteenth century, before the 
triumphant emergence of the Darwinian solution, several biological 
explanations of the history of the earth and of life existed simultaneously. 
British natural theologians sought for evidence to confirm the 
existence of the Creator as an engineer extraordinaire who had made all 
species fit perfectly to their given environment, whereas the German 
Naturphilosophen, inspired by Goethe's morphology, tried to identify 
various original archetypes from which the diversity of the species could 
be derived. Comparative biology did not look for the origin of organic 
structures or the relation of their intrinsic evolution to the well-being of 
their bearers, but concentrated on finding underlying similarities of 
structures in various species. In other words, natural theology and 
Naturphilosophie could exist in relative peace alongside one another, 
because the origin and evolution of structures were secondary to the 
actual structures that could be verified empirically in the species living at 
the time. Without a plausible history about how the anatomical structures 
had developed there was no way of verifying one and simultaneously 
rejecting the other. Darwin's famous book changed this way of doing 
biology. In fact, Darwin did not bring anything essentially new to 
biology, but he provided several histories that could explain and organise 
the variegated results of contemporary theories. As Kitcher points out, a 
Darwinian history works: 
as a narrative which traces the successive modifications of a line-
age of organisms from generation to generation in terms of various 
factors, most notably that of natural selection. The main claim of 
the Origin is that we can understand numerous biological phenom-
ena in terms of the Darwinian histories of the organisms involved 
[...] Darwinian histories provide the bases for acts of explanation' 
(Kitcher 1993, 20-21) 
I bring in Kitcher's account of the Darwinian revolution in biology in 
order to show that the relationship between objectivity and meaning is 
more complex than the picture drawn by Teske. According to Teske, the 
meaning of scientific results for human existence must be produced by an 
explicit narrative that conforms the otherwise, humanly speaking, 
meaningless scientific results to what is explicitly relevant to human 
significance and interest. By insisting on such a sharp distinction between 
scientific endeavour and explanation on the one hand and human 
meaning and interest on the other, Teske thrusts an unwarranted barrier 
in between the scientific meaning (objectivity) and the human meaning 
(subjectivity) that does not do justice to the actual nature of both 
approaches to the world. As John Hedley Brooke writes: 
To affirm a clear separation between science and values may rep-
resent a philosophical ideal, but it flies in the face of a history of 
science sensitive to the manifold ways in which scientific knowl-
edge has been value-laden (Brooke 1991, 338) 
What we can learn from the example of Darwinian histories is that the 
objective explanations of natural science are also tightly bound to the 
quintessentially human need for explanatory narratives, although these 
narratives may lose their human flavour and end up as ossified and 
hidebound scientific paradigms. The meaning disclosed in scientific 
paradigms is an implicit narrative about what is not explicitly human in 
our being humans. In other words, scientific explanations of human life 
might just reveal that what we understand as human meaning in our 
explicit narratives about human life is dubious or even plain wrong when 
measured by the objective standards of science. On the other hand, given 
the narrative structure and value-laden nature of scientific explanations, 
our explicitly human or personal narratives might point to imperialistic 
tendencies and other weaknesses in many contemporary scientific 
agendas. There are more meanings in and around human existence than 
are revealed in both the implicit narratives of scientific paradigms and the 
explicit narrative form of personal explanations. However, an 
appreciation of meanings disclosed by both kinds of approach to human 
life may bring us closer to a picture of the human spirit which is more in 
accordance with the human and nonhuman aspects of being a human 
person. The issue of human personhood, which I see as one of the main 
concerns of Teske's approach, brings me to the next point in my 
response, namely about identity and selfhood in the light of narratives. 
Identity and Selfhood in the Light of Narratives 
In the present article, and in more detail in his seminal work over the last 
decade (e.g. Teske 1999, 2000, 2006), Teske has contributed to the 
widespread thesis of a narrative (and basically social) construction of the 
human self. He argues that by telling stories we infuse meaning and 
purpose into our lives, and furthermore, he joins the conglomerate of 
narrative theories in the conjecture that 'consciousness may well begin 
with the power to tell a story with words, and taking the position of a 
narrator' (Teske 2010, 21-22; see also Teske 2000, 201-203). This is a 
very strong cognitive stance on human consciousness, which I do not 
agree with. I believe that there are several phenomenological and 
psychopathological arguments against this thesis. Our sense of ownership 
and self-awareness (that it is my experience, my thought, my action) with 
regard to conscious experience and action is present on a pre-reflective 
and pre-linguistic level. I am a self before I am able to articulate and 
explain this self in an explicit 'storied form' (Teske 2010, 11). When, for 
example, I notice a car turning fast around the corner and, instinctively, 
jump back onto the pavement, I apprehend this as something that means 
something to me before I am able to cognitively understand what is 
actually going on. In other words, I sense a potential danger that I do not 
understand. The experiential dimension of phenomena involves an 
intentionality that reveals both an object and a subject in the structure of 
experience before any reflective or linguistic articulation. In fact, the 
linguistic articulation is only possible because of this duality in the 
structure of experience. Something is experienced by someone, and this 
someone, this me, is inherent to the experiential structure of every 
phenomenon in consciousness. I always experience myself in an 
experience of something. Phenomenologists call this the first-personal 
givenness of the experiential phenomena, minimal self-awareness or core 
self: 
On the phenomenological view, the experiential core self is not a 
product of our narrative practices. It is an integral part of the struc-
ture of phenomenal consciousness and must be regarded as a pre-
linguistic presupposition for any narrative practices [...] We should 
recognize the existence of a primitive, pre-conceptual self(-
experience) from early ontogenesis. Furthermore, experiences and 
actions must already be given as mine if I am to worry about how 
they hang together or make up a coherent life story. Only a being 
with a first-person perspective could consider her own aims, ideals, 
and aspirations as her own and tell a story about them (Gallagher 
and Zahavi 2008, 205; see also Zahavi 2005, 146) 
The difference between this primordial minimal self-awareness and a 
narrative (i.e. cognitive) reconstruction of selfhood is perhaps most 
manifest in emotional experience. 
When I experience something, this thing, person or event always 
touches me in a certain way. The feeling aspect of an experience clearly 
involves a sense of self that is sometimes cognitively impenetrable. Why 
do I feel so embarrassed and at odds with myself when in the company of 
a certain person? I might try to explain this to myself in terms of all kinds 
of stories about my history of interactions with this person. But I can 
only do this after having had the feeling, or rather, the feeling prompts a 
need to explain why I feel so in the first place. However, the affective 
experience is there before the cognitive explanation in the form of 
narratives. I insist on this primordial sense of self because it is crucial to 
the way we understand personal identity. 
As Teske emphasises, the narrative concept of identity always runs 
the risk of admitting unwarranted fabrications or even confabulations 
about ourselves and the meaning of our lives. And I believe that this is a 
problem not only from the stance of a paradigmatic view of meaning as 
we find it in the natural sciences, but also in relation to the multifarious 
meanings that saturate our personal life. If narratives are to function as a 
way to ingrain our lives with meaning and purpose, we need a concept of 
the self that is not itself contingent with respect to the stories that we tell 
about ourselves, or others tell about us. Fact and truth are not only 
essential concepts in paradigmatic sciences. They are just as essential to 
the way we cope with the fragility of personal identity in everyday life. 
We can tell wrong stories about ourselves or be victims of wrong stories 
told about us (Dennett 1991, 418-430). The question who am I? surely 
involves narratives in order to be satisfactorily answered. However, these 
narratives work around what I actually am in terms of physical 
constitution, social background and context, character, habits, 
inclinations, dreams, desires, and so on. This what is part of my selfhood, 
and as such it determines and shapes my pre-linguistic experience of the 
world, other people, and myself. When I articulate an understanding of 
myself, this understanding must always relate itself to the part of my 
identity that I cannot change no matter which stories I tell about myself, 
namely the implicit self-knowledge expressed in the way I pre-
linguistically cope with my existence. I can choose to tell an arbitrary 
story about myself, but not without facing the implicit, and often diffuse, 
self-knowledge expressed in my bodily movements, feelings, memories, 
desires, habits, inclinations, and unconscious actions. 
Simply put, one can say that my existence as a whole tells a story 
about my personal identity despite myself. This is not to say that I cannot 
change or improve myself. I can indeed become a better person, find my 
orientation in the 'moral space' of involvement with other people, but 
this how I can be can only be realised in relation to what I already am. 
One of the heralded champions of narrative theories, Paul Ricoeur, 
emphasises the importance of staying aware of such non-narrative 
aspects of personal identity. The stories that I tell about myself and my 
life are always anchored in my embodied existence as a physical body 
with a certain history and as a person in the eyes of other people. In other 
words, my stories are necessarily bound to my specific body, which 
imbues my life with meanings that often I cannot make any sense of, and 
they are furthermore interconnected with the existence of other people 
who have a voice in my personal tales. Thus, my bodily existence and my 
life with other people reveal an otherness that transcends my own stories 
about myself. With respect to my body, the otherness is expressed in the 
sedimentation of my life in my character with all the involuntary 
impulses, feelings, desires, thoughts and dreams that make up a 
significant part of a human life. M y body is mine in the sense that I can 
control and to a certain degree shape my body, but at the same time my 
body is out of my hands, so to speak, since it is part of the anonymous 
workings of nature that know nothing of my concerns and interests. 
Ricoeur formulates this fundamental ambivalence in the following way: 
To the extent that the body as my own body constitutes one of the 
components of mineness, the most radical confrontation must 
place face-to-face two perspectives on the body - the body as 
mine, and the body as one body among others (Ricoeur 1992,132) 
M y existence with other people discloses another, but by no means less 
significant, kind of otherness. Other people respond to my stories about 
myself. The meanings that I make of the events of my life are often 
different from, and sometimes even conflicting with, the meanings other 
people make of them. For example, what for me is a road to fulfilment 
and happiness, can for others be seen as an uncompromising, selfish 
pursuit of a career with no regard to the well-being and happiness of 
those around me. Or what I understand as a meaningless and odious 
waste of time, e.g. my daughter's countless hours in front of the T V or 
senseless dedication to pedicure, may be meaningful and valuable to 
another person's sense of self. In Ricoeur's own words: 'The story of a 
life includes interaction with others [...] in the test of confronting others, 
whether an individual or a collective, narrative identity reveals its 
fragility' (Ricoeur 2005, 103-104). 
The fragility of our narrative reconstructions of meaning is rooted in 
the inherent otherness of personal identity. We are not a person on our 
own account, neither is our identity something that we ourselves bestow 
on our life. Of course, we have something to say about ourselves in the 
story of our life, but our voice must always find its tune in orchestration 
with the voices of other people and the inarticulate workings of an 
anonymous physical nature. The meanings of human life spring both 
from personal freedom to enhance or impede humanity and from the 
involuntary facticity of being part of a natural, non-human world. Hence, 
the fragility of personal identity lies, for a substantial part, in the tension 
between how I can be reconstructed in my own and other people's stories 
about myself and what I actually am. This brings me to my final 
comment, namely the problem about inexpressible meaning in narratives. 
Narratives and Inexpressible Meaning 
In general, I have two interrelated concerns with regard to narrative 
reconstructions of selfhood and personal identity. 
The first one is eloquently expressed in the book of Ecclesiastes, 
where the author, in chapter eight, sternly asks: 'Who is the wise man? 
And who knows the interpretation of a thing? A man's wisdom makes his 
face shine, and the boldness of his face shall be changed' (Eccl. 8,1). If 
we build our understanding of personhood on the stories told by the 
person herself or those told by others or even those embedded in and 
transmitted through the social and cultural body of human interaction, we 
risk violating the nature of human personhood. Who is able to decide 
when a narrative construction of a person is correct, and when it is not? 
Who should we trust when we are in doubt about a person - the person 
herself, the sociocultural conventions and habits that make up that 
person, or the physical constitution of the person? 
Human personhood is fragile, and being a person is difficult, exactly 
because there are no easy solutions to such questions. Some narrative 
constructions are easy to verify or dismiss as deceptive or miserable 
fabrications. If I tell my wife that I live in a happy marriage, and she 
starts to laugh and walks out of the door, perhaps I should reconsider my 
idea of a happy marriage. Or i f I tell my lifelong friend that I have always 
enjoyed working in the bank, and he notices that I have been complaining 
about my job for over ten years now, it does not help that I try to 
convince him that it was just something I said at that time. Perhaps I have 
to accept that in some respects he knows me better than I do. The same 
goes for many other aspects of my identity and sense of self. In this 
sense, there is an imperceptible and yet distinct line between what I want 
to be, and thus sometimes tell myself, and what I am. I would love to be 
taller than I am, to have read more books, to know more about 
palaeontology, to stop cheating on my wife, to spend more time with my 
children, and so on. But my stories about myself are conditioned and, to 
some extent, dependent on my physical constitution and the people with 
whom I live my life. In other words, the mythological aspects of my 
narratives are always balanced against the solid facts that I am embodied 
and thus bound to my biological constitution, that I am embedded in a 
certain sociocultural context, and that I spend my days with people who 
know my life intimately, or at least have an opinion about the person I 
am. This grounding of my narratives in the (f)actual world poses a 
problem for Teske's distinction between 'story truth' and 'happening 
truth', where the former is what constitutes our narratives and thus our 
construction of a personal identity, and the latter is concerned with the 
factual veridicality of the 'objective' world (Teske 2010, 23-24). Teske 
concludes that 'I think we are also, truly and really, as much constituted 
by what we imagine ourselves to be, whether prospective or fictional' 
(Teske 2010, 25), and although he is perfectly aware that '[p]ossibilities 
are constrained by facts, and the more we know about the facts, the more 
realistic our projection of possibilities might be' (ibid), his emphasis on 
our reflective construction of selfhood and personal identity misses the 
problematic relation between fact and possibility at the heart of the 
human self. The philosopher Arne Grøn poignantly explains the complex 
relationship between identity and narrative constructions: 
[O]ur identity is not simply what comes out of the narratives we tell 
about ourselves. Identity is also how we relate to our narratives or 
to ourselves in telling these narratives [...] the identity of the self 
depends on how one understands oneself: how one takes oneself 
in taking what happens to oneself. Thus, how one relates bodily -
in movements, gestures, seeing - to others is also to place oneself 
in a position to others. But this is not an identity that is developed 
in a narrative, but rather what narratives would relate to. In trying 
to understand what I experience by "constructing" some sort of 
narrative, I relate to myself as the one having experienced what I 
try to understand. Self-relation is not first to be established in a re-
flection or in a narrative, but is implicit in relating to others and a 
shared world (Grøn 2004,147) 
When a person relates to herself, to what she is or what she wants to 
become, this self-relation is not effectuated merely in the form of 
conscious narratives. Narratives are only a part of how a person 
understands the world and her role in it, other people, and herself. 
Narratives can be considered as reflective attempts to cope with 
fundamental aspects of what it means to be a human person, but as such, 
narratives are constructed 'after the fact', so to say. And like every 
human construction, they come wrapped in all the flaws of human nature, 
i.e., in every shade of ambition, envy, jealousy, self-deception, anger, 
greed, and so on. And to complicate the picture even more, the narratives 
of different persons (of political parties and even of different societies) 
very often clash because of their different points of view. The possibility 
of narrative reconstructions of self and personal identity is muddled by 
the difficult balance of individuality and coexistence of those with 
different and, sometimes, opposing characters. A n d hence the question of 
Ecclesiastes, 'Who is the wise man?' In other words, who can we rely on 
in the interpretation of our life? Rather than being a solution to the 
perplexities of human personhood, narratives (the personal ones as well 
as those we find in novels) are important exactly because they make 
evident the difficulty of being a human person. Thus, in one sense I fully 
agree with Teske that narratives are essential to our understanding of 
human life. Without narratives, human sorrow and despair would linger 
cruelly barren deep in our hearts, and our cry for meaning in a seemingly 
inhuman universe would remain inarticulate. However, narratives do not 
create meaning and understanding ex nihilo, and neither do they 
necessarily solve our perplexities about life. They may help us to cope 
with life and promote our search for meaning, but only in so far as we 
understand how they originate in and work on a pre-reflective, and often 
inexpressible, sense of being a person in coexistence with other persons. 
This brings me to my second concern, and conclusive remark, about 
narrative reconstructions of selfhood and personal identity. 
If we let the meaning of being a self originate, develop and be 
completed in the cognitive elaboration of narratives, then we neglect the 
cognitively impenetrable aspects of being human, mostly expressed in 
our feelings. Our capacity for language is indeed one of the essential 
characteristics that separate us humans from other animals. However, the 
strange thing about being human is that often what we care for most, our 
most intimate concerns, our love and our sorrows, cannot be expressed 
by language or put into an intelligible narrative. We somehow know that 
someone or something means literally everything to us, but we cannot 
articulate why or how they do so. Narratives are surely an invaluable help 
in sorting out the complexities of meaning in human existence, but, just 
like the natural sciences, they can never exhaust the meaning of human 
existence. The human heart or our inmost self only seldom finds its way 
past our lips, or as Cordelia says when her father, the elderly King Lear, 
asks her how much she cares about him: 'Unhappy that I am, I cannot 
heave my heart into my mouth' (Act 1, sc. 1). Moments before in the 
same scene, when she hears the flowery proclamations of filial love and 
endless praise from her two calculating sisters, she asks herself, 'What 
shall Cordelia do? Love and be silent'. Her question is not an expression 
of despair or perplexity about finding the right words to grease her 
father's goodwill towards her. On the contrary, she is certain of the love 
she feels for her father, and she wi l l not taint this love with poor 
approximations in the shape of swollen words. Her confidence does not 
rely on the understanding of others, her father, her two sisters, and the 
rest of the court, but rests on the certainty of her love itself: 'Then poor 
Cordelia! And yet not so; since I am sure my love's more richer than my 
tongue'. 
Cordelia's feelings for her father disclose an important aspect of 
human life and existence, namely that our lives are saturated with 
feelings and emotions that we cannot articulate or understand, but which 
nevertheless affect our actions and self-understanding. Feelings and 
emotions are, perhaps, the most embodied phenomena of our mind (de 
Sousa 1987, 46-51). As such, some of our feelings tend to remain 
inexplicable to ourselves. And other people often do not fare well when 
they attempt to explain our own feelings to us. Attempts to explain and 
evaluate the emotional life of another person have often led to strained or 
broken relationships, whether of lovers, friends, or even parent and child. 
To have another person telling you what you should or should not feel is 
not a very pleasant experience, even i f the other person is actually right. 
Who is another person to tell me what I should or should not feel? Most 
people would agree that whereas we may judge and even correct a person 
with regard to how he or she should behave, things become more 
complicated and require a more subtle approach when it comes to another 
person's emotional life. And this is due, among other things, to the fact 
that a person often does not understand his or her own emotional life. 
A person may be a victim of his emotions in the sense that the 
autonomy of human existence becomes very fragile when it comes to 
feelings. Why do I keep on loving her despite the fact that I do not want 
to love her anymore? Why do I envy her, even though I do not like or 
even recognise myself in my envy? One reason for the inexplicable 
nature of many human feelings is the biological nature of human 
affectivity. Whereas our reflective thoughts are capable of abstracting 
from our biological constitution, our feelings are too immersed in the 
anonymous and cognitively impenetrable workings of our mammalian 
bodily functions. I may be irritated or sad simply because of lack of 
sleep, food, or comfort. In this way, many of our feelings are out of our 
conscious control. Another reason is that our feelings often involve the 
existence of other people whom we do not know or fully understand. The 
character of my love (happy, unfulfilled, strained, disappointed, etc.) 
depends as much on the person that I love as it depends on me. 
Friendships are bound and shaped by mutual feelings, as is every other 
interpersonal relationship that is saturated with a plethora of feelings 
such as happiness, anger, care, sadness, joy, satisfaction, and so on. 
Conclusion 
These concluding remarks on the affective nature of human life are only 
to emphasise what I have been arguing for all along. Human meaning and 
personhood are not things that can be constructed as narratives by sheer 
wil l or disciplined effort. It may indeed include such human factors, but, 
to invert a saying by Teske (Teske 2010, 5), narratives do not exhaust 
human meaning. Personal and social narratives should not shroud the 
cold facts of natural science in a human form in order to make these facts 
meaningful to human life. On the contrary, narratives and natural science 
are two different ways of making sense of our human nature, and they 
must retain their own right to correct and refine the explanations of the 
other. Thus, the impersonal paradigmatic explanations of natural science 
may very well disclose features of human life and existence that despite 
their clinical expression and meaning help us better understand our 
human, and, at times, all too human, nature. 
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The Role of Understanding in Human 
Nature 
Peter Gärdenfors 
Introduction 
Why is understanding so important in the life of humans? We can easily 
imagine a life where we follow a set of rules without understanding why 
these rules are there. However, achieving understanding is a strong 
motivational factor for many of our endeavours. 
Understanding is a central concept in cognitive science since it 
concerns the coherence of a cognitive system and how the system 
evaluates its own coherence. Despite the enormous progress during the 
last centuries there are surprising lacunae in our scientific knowledge. 
The very concept of understanding has often been overlooked in 
educational, philosophical and psychological research. In the early stages 
of cognitive science the functioning of the brain was seen as similar to 
that of a computer. Bruner notes in his book Acts of Meaning (1990) that 
i f thinking is seen as information processing, questions about meaning 
and understanding disappear. But a theory about human nature cannot be 
based on "information," "processing" and "behaviour" only - it must 
contain some account of what it means to understand. Among other 
things, this involves putting the acts of humans in a social and cultural 
context. 
Understanding is nothing mysterious, but very little is known about 
how understanding arises. Within the humanities one finds the 
hermeneutic tradition concerning "Verstehen". However, this tradition 
focuses on the possibilities of interpreting cultural products - books, 
paintings, symphonies, etc. Research is still in its nascent stage as regards 
the role of quotidian insights, for example in ordinary students' learning 
- what happens when you discover a connection you have not sensed 
before. A new insight is often connected with an aha-experience. 
However, when it comes to describing what happens in our heads when 
we understand, science has little to say. 
In this article I wi l l focus on the role of understanding in culture, 
education and science, and more specifically, on how to use abstract 
theories to make sense of the world. However, first of all I must provide 
a general background to how I understand understanding. As a working 
hypothesis, I shall propose that understanding consists in seeing a 
pattern (Gärdenfors 2007, Gärdenfors and Lindström 2008). I shall begin 
by discussing how this idea, which derives from Gestalt psychology, is 
interpreted in modern cognitive science in terms of "hidden variables". In 
particular I wi l l show that the minds of humans are tuned to seeking 
causes and to reading the minds of others. As a first application of the 
ideas, I argue that what patterns are seen is to some extent dependent on 
the culture one lives in. The second application concerns education. It 
seems obvious that the goal of education should be that students 
understand the material they study. I propose that this is achieved by 
helping them to discover patterns that they cannot find on their own. I 
present some educational techniques such as visualizations, simultations 
and virtual agents that can be used to make students see the relevant 
patterns in a knowledge domain. Finally, I discuss the role of 
understanding in science. I argue that current proposals can be subsumed 
under the idea that understanding is seeing a pattern. 
Understanding is seeing a pattern 
We find more or less abstract patterns at all levels of thinking, from 
seeing the stripes on a cat, to identifying the musical structure of a fugue 
by Bach or understanding the role of microorganisms in diseases. Some 
of the patterns we perceive are given by our biological constitution, some 
are learned during our childhood and our continued education, some are 
given by the culture we live in and some are provided by science. As I 
shall argue, perception of patterns is one of the most central cognitive 
processes. However, while relying on patterns increases our capacity to 
solve new problems, it can also hamper our ability to approach situations 
with an open mind. 
Above all, we perceive patterns visually. However, it should be 
noted that the idea of understanding by experiencing a pattern is viable in 
all sensory modalities. For example a sommelier can distinguish a fine 
wine by identifying acidity, sweetness, etc.; a bilingual child has learned 
fluently different phonemes from two languages; a perfume maker can 
create new scents by altering combinations of oils and flower extracts; 
and a sculptor can capture all the aspects of an ageing body with stiffened 
joints, muscles and wrinkled skin. A l l these are examples of experiencing 
a pattern that results in a better understanding of a knowledge domain. 
After attending a concert or visiting an art exhibition we say we are full 
of impressions. But it is a myth that our sensory experiences are 
"impressions", in the sense that there is something that is pressed into our 
brains. Our brain is not a passive receiver of images and sounds from the 
surrounding world. It actively seeks patterns and it interprets what it 
receives. This continuously running process is the basis for all 
understanding. Our brain's search for patterns, whether we are aware of it 
or not, takes place at a variety of levels. At the bottom of our 
understanding, there are biologically determined mechanisms that 
strongly control the way we perceive the surrounding world. At the top, 
one finds the cultural patterns that are required in order to interpret works 
of art, poetry, music, dance, etc. However, when we master the patterns, 
they also influence our perception of the cultural products. As a 
consequence, we don't all see and hear the same things - there is no 
"objective" description of the world (Gärdenfors 2007). As Goethe 
writes: "Es hört doch jeder nur, was er versteht." To illustrate that the 
search for patterns is ubiquitous, let us begin with an example of a 
biologically controlled mechanism from the visual modality. 
Figure 1 : (From Marroquin 1976) 
At an early stage of the visual process, the brain tries to find patterns 
among all the dots. We perceive circles of different sizes in the figure. 
An interesting aspect is that one circle is soon replaced by another that 
suppresses the first, etc. The figure "lives" even though not a single dot is 
moving. You may even discover Maltese crosses in the figure. If you do, 
the crosses wil l block the perception of the circles - and vice versa. The 
figure has no global meaning, but our visual system searches incessantly 
for patterns. There is therefore no unequivocal answer to how one 
"perceives" the figure. 
The brain is full of mechanisms that fill in what falls on the retina, 
the eardrum or the other sensors. The experienced result is often a pattern 
in the form of a Gestalt. These processes were studied by the Gestalt 
psychologists in the first half of the twentieth century, but they have 
received a renewed interest since we are now beginning to understand the 
brain mechanisms behind this form of filling in. For example, consider 
Figure 2. We immediately perceive figure A as a circle and a rectangle, 
that is, we decompose it as in figure B , although there is no logical 
reason why it should not be decomposed as in figure C or D. 
Figure 2: Perception of Gestalts 
The mechanisms that fill in are important from an evolutionary 
perspective: Bad lighting conditions or occluding objects do not prevent 
us from discovering danger or food, which clearly increases our fitness. 
If one sees the tail of a tiger, one wi l l surely understand that there is a 
whole tiger in the vicinity. Therefore, we wil l have a better chance of 
surviving in our environment. Our brains have constructed a large 
repertoire of patterns. We are often not aware of them, but they can be 
elicited by various tricks. For example, look at the two pictures in figure 
3. What do they depict? 
Figure 3: Incomplete depictions of objects. 
It may not be difficult to see that the left is a picture of a violin, but for 
many observers a clue is needed for the picture to the right - a salient 
feature that deciphers the content. It is an elephant (with its head to the 
left). Suddenly the pieces fall into their places and one can interpret the 
picture - it becomes a Gestalt. The different parts become meaningful. 
For instance, one of the black blotches suddenly becomes the tip of the 
trunk. A n interesting feature of such Gestalt experiences is that once you 
have seen the pattern, you cannot let it go away again. 
For some category systems, the effects of a categorization are 
amplified by the perceptual systems so that distances within a category 
are perceived as being smaller and distances between categories are 
perceived as larger than they "really" are. This phenomenon is called 
categorical perception (see, for example, the articles in Harnad 1987). 
This finding implies that a reality where there are no sharp borders is 
sorted into distinct slots by our cognitive mechanisms. The categories can 
be seen as a kind of pattern. They are normally a product of learning, 
most of which is implicit. 
A simple but illustrative example of categorical perception is 
provided by figure 4: 
A B C 
12 13 14 
Figure 4: A n example of categorical perception. 
If you focus on the upper row, the sign in the middle is seen as a B, while 
if you focus on the lower row, the very same sign is seen as 13. The 
example illustrates that the context determines how we understand the 
information that our senses receive. This mechanism makes our 
processing more efficient, but it also locks us into certain interpretations. 
The patterns above are culturally transferred since they form part of 
basic Western education that uses Latin letters and (adapted) Arabic 
numerals. 
The mechanism of categorical perception has been found in many 
domains, but has been studied in particular for phonetic systems (see, for 
example, Petitot 1989). Understanding a language presumes that one can 
correctly categorize the sounds of the language and group them into units 
we call words. Even though a set of sounds may be produced by an 
articulatory parameter that varies continuously (output variable), the 
auditory system perceives this variable in a categorical way so that when 
the articulatory parameter is varied along its scale, the perceived sound 
(input variable) seems to remain constant for a large interval and then 
suddenly jumps to a new sound that is relatively stable too. 
The Causal Drive 
Humans have a more or less innate drive to seek patterns in their 
experiences. Above all, we have a strong tendency to seek causes in the 
happenings of the world. In a previous book (Gärdenfors 2006), I called 
this tendency our causal drive. There are good evolutionary reasons why 
we should look for casual connections since they help us understand how 
the world hangs together. By reasoning about causes and effects we 
become much better at predicting the future. A n d human beings are, 
more than any other animal, dependent on their prospective thinking 
(Gärdenfors 2003). 
As a matter of fact, there is a very strong connection between seeing 
patterns and understanding causes. A causal variable is a kind of pattern 
that connects causes and effects. Conversely, seeing new patterns means 
that one sees new connections between phenomena in the world. A 
pattern thereby functions as a way of creating new causal explanations 
and offers new ways of solving problems. For example, i f a parent 
discovers a connection between a grumpy child and that the child has not 
eaten for some hours, the parent can help the child by feeding it. If the 
parent then learns the variable "low blood sugar level" as a causal 
variable behind the whimpering and understands what kind of food 
quickly raises the blood sugar level of the child, the problem-solving 
capacity of the parent becomes even better. 
Humans have a unique talent for extracting the hidden variables of 
the world. These variables often form the backbone of the patterns that 
we discover. Within philosophy of science they are called theoretical 
variables. A prime example is the forces we use to interpret and 
categorize the events and actions that are presented to us by our 
perception. On a more abstract level, various physical, social and other 
variables can help us understand a phenomenon that initially was a 
disconnected blur. The hidden variables that are used to perceive causal 
relations are fundamental examples of the patterns that humans are 
particularly apt at discovering. 
In support of my notion of a causal drive, Leslie (1987) argues that 
infants not only can follow objects with their gaze, but they also have a 
special mechanism or module in the brain that calculates the forces 
influencing an object. Such a system, i f it exists, would be a paramount 
example of how the human brain can exploit the hidden variables that 
govern the world around us. 
M y interpretation of the difference between humans and other 
species is that our inner worlds are much more efficient in exploiting 
hidden variables to make predictions about the future. The causes are not 
given to us by our senses, but our brains fill them in. White (1995) even 
claims that that we literally perceive the forces, just as we perceive the 
contours of objects even i f they are not contained in the visual 
information that reaches the eyes. 
The great advantage of the causal drive is therefore that it improves 
our ability to forecast the future. But sometimes it becomes excessive. 
Even pure chance events, such as lottery prizes, are seen as a result of 
luck. But "luck" does not exist - it is a pure figment of our minds. The 
fact that we talk about luck is just a sign that our brains are obsessed with 
finding causes for everything that happens. If there is no cause, we must 
invent one. The causal drive is therefore a strong factor behind the 
creation of myths and magical thinking. Magical thinking is particularly 
strong in children's thinking. Piaget (1930, 174) writes: 
The child fills the world with spontaneous movements and living 
"forces"; the heavenly bodies may rest or move as they please, the clouds 
make wind of themselves, waves "raise" themselves, trees swing their 
branches spontaneously to make a breeze. 
This idea can be extended to adult thinking: one can interpret 
magical or animistic thinking as just an application of psychological 
causality to physical phenomena - agents are seen everywhere as causes 
of events. Magical thinking does not only occur in children but is 
common, in different forms, at all stages of life and in all cultures. If you 
have once had an accident after seeing a black cat running across the road 
from left to right, you become worried next time you see a black cat. And 
you should not walk under ladders or open umbrellas indoors, and so on, 
ad nauseam. 
I submit that the human understanding of physical forces has 
developed via animism and anthropomorphism. Presumably, we have 
long interpreted the physical events with the aid of social variables such 
as power and eventually understood how to think in terms of impersonal 
physical forces. This accords with Collingwood (1972), who writes: 
"Causal propositions [...] are descriptions of relations between natural 
events in anthropomorphic terms." It should be noted that it is only 
during the last few centuries that we have created a purely mechanistic 
description of the world. 
Reading the Minds of Others 
The causal drive of humans does not only concern the physical world but 
also the mental one. Apart from physical forces, we can perceive the 
mental forces that govern the behaviour of others. Perceiving these forces 
forms the basis for intersubjectivity. In this context, intersubjectivity 
means the sharing and understanding of others' mentality. The term 
"mentality" is taken here to involve not only beliefs and other 
proposition-like entities, but also all sorts of forms of consciousness such 
as emotions, desires, attentional foci and intentions. In the philosophical 
debate, intersubjectivity is commonly called having a "theory of mind" 
(Premack and Woodruff 1978, Mitchell 1997). (I avoid this term because 
it often presumes that one can understand the beliefs of others, something 
which, on the account presented here, is but one aspect of 
intersubjectivity.) 
Along with becoming better at imagining the inner worlds of others, 
we have become more skilled at creating hidden variables that can 
explain the thoughts of others (and of ourselves). First of all we must 
understand the actions of others, since we generally derive the mental 
states of others from their behaviour (including their speech). This 
mechanism can be seen as a variant of the one that allows us to derive 
physical forces from the movements of objects. The intentions we ascribe 
to others are the hidden forces that make other agents behave as they do. 
Because we can imagine what others know and do not know, we become 
good at cooperation, something that has fostered the evolution of human 
language, culture and societies (Gärdenfors, to appear). A downside of 
this is that our knowledge about the knowledge of others also makes us 
more skilled at deception and counterdeception. If I can imagine what 
others know about what I know, it wil l be possible for me to foresee the 
potentially deceptive moves of others. 
In previous works (Gärdenfors 2003, 2008), I have distinguished 
different levels of intersubjectivity in order to understand the cognitive 
capacities of animals and children at different ages. 
(1) Understanding the emotions of others. At this level one can, for 
example, understand that someone else is in pain. This is what is 
usually meant by empathy. Even though one can understand 
others' emotions, it does not mean that one understands what they 
believe or want. 
(2) Understanding the desires of others. This capacity involves 
understanding, for example, that others don't like the same things 
as you do. 
(3) Understanding the attention of others. This means that one can 
understand, for example, what someone else is looking at. 
However, this ability does not presuppose any conception of other 
parts of their inner world. 
(4) Understanding the intentions of others. This capacity means, above 
all, being able to understand the objective that may lie behind 
another individual's behaviour. 
(5) Understanding the beliefs and knowledge of others. This ability 
involves, among other things, understanding that others don't 
know the same things as you do. 
A final step in the development of intersubjectivity is small but crucial 
for self-consciousness in its proper sense: I must realize that the inner 
world of my opponent does not only contain a representation of me as a 
bodily agent, but as an agent with inner representations as well. I believe 
that it is only after this insight that the agent can become self-conscious 
in the sense that it can form representations of its own representations. 
Some support for this point can also be obtained from results in 
developmental psychology (see e.g. Wimmer and Haiti 1991, Gopnik 
1993, Carruthers, to appear). Along the same lines, Dilthey, one of the 
forerunners of the hermeneutic tradition, writes that to understand is to 
connect an expression with an experience to learn to know a Geist. 
According to him, all understanding involves a "rediscovery of the I in 
the Thou." Anticipating the modern debate he explains: "The 
understanding of self requires me to approach myself as others do, that is, 
from the outside to the inside." In other words, self-consciousness can 
develop as a shortcut in the representations involved in higher forms of 
intersubjectivity: in my inner world I can have a representation of my 
own inner world. 
Understanding other Cultures 
A culture is not just people in an environment, but, more importantly, a 
particular way of understanding the world. Each culture brings with it a 
different set of patterns of interpretation. One problem is that it may be 
difficult to perceive the patterns of other cultures. Since they do not fit 
with those of our own culture, we often experience them as "strange", 
"odd" or simply foreign. 
Musical scales are clear examples of how cultural patterns can 
actually influence perception itself. When Westerners listen to Arabic or 
Indian music, they perceive many of the tones as being out of tune. The 
reason is that the Western music scale is based on twelve tones, while in 
Arabic music the scale can contain seventeen tones and in the Indian 
scale twenty-one. Western ears fail to sort the tones from an Indian raga 
or an Arabic love song into the twelve slots given by the standard scale. 
They do not fit with the categorical pattern of Western music. A n 
alternative pattern in the form of a different scale must be picked up 
before the music can be fully appreciated. 
Cultural educational programs have a tendency to focus too much 
on teaching facts about other cultures and too little on understanding the 
basic patterns underlying cultural practices or belief systems. For this 
reason, education that strives to bridge cultures should focus on 
conveying the relevant patterns rather than facts about other cultures. In 
section 8, I shall discuss possible educational techniques to guide 
students in the recognition and comprehension of the relevant patterns of 
other cultures. 
There are strong ties between the patterns we perceive and the 
language we use. Patterns give meaning to the concepts we use when 
structuring the world. Language then names the patterns, not the single 
sensory experiences. Linguistic differences in cultural patterns often 
create mismatched expectations. For example, "breakfast" is translated 
into "prima colazione" in Italian. Yet the concept stands for radically 
different phenomena. I believe that an Italian seeing a full English (or 
American) breakfast for the first time wil l be as taken aback as an 
Englishman is disappointed when encountering the minuscule prima 
colazione at an Italian hotel. Examples like this are ubiquitous in 
translations between any two languages and they can even occur within a 
language when it is used in two culturally different regions. 
Cultural patterns can be subtle. A striking example of hidden 
categorical perception comes from the way in which a pharmaceutical 
company attempted to sell headache medicine to a new market. This 
company wanted to globalize its business and launched an advertising 
campaign in North Africa. Because a large proportion of the inhabitants 
were illiterate, the message was presented in the form of a cartoon (see 
figure 5). 
Figure 5. An advertisement for a headache medicine 
The campaign was a failure. Those who could read, read Arabic, which is 
read from right to left and would only conclude that the medicine caused 
the headache. The intended meaning of the cartoon was thus interpreted 
in the opposite way. Those who could not read interpreted the cartoon as 
three separate figures and they could not understand the intended causal 
connection between the pictures. In Western cultures, people are so used 
to reading a cartoon from left to right and adding causal connections 
between the pictures that it does not occur to them that this could be a 
culturally induced pattern. 
The role of Understanding in Education 
It is a miracle that curiosity survives formal education 
(Albert Einstein). 
Providing students with facts is a superficial form of education. Helping 
them create knowledge by teaching them how to interpret and evaluate 
the information is a much better form. However, human understanding 
goes beyond knowledge. The best form of education results in the 
students understanding the material they study. In our opinion, this is 
achieved by helping them to see patterns that they cannot discover on 
their own. 
What kind of understanding is relevant in learning is of course 
dependent on the goals of education. In some contexts, learning practical 
procedures is in focus; in others, facts about the world; in still others, 
learning abstract theories. A n encompassing goal of education would be 
to understand how theories make sense of the world and provide 
explanations for practical procedures. 
Selz (1924/1981) proposed that insight occurs when a problem 
solver fills in a gap in the structural complex. For example, a child who 
realizes that the letters in a text correspond to separate speech sounds has 
cracked the reading code. The child has seen the pattern of language as 
formed by different phonemes and how they are connected to each other 
to make meaningful utterances. The rest is practice. Or a music student 
who suddenly understands how a Bach fugue is composed wil l be able to 
improve her performance by expressing more subtle variations. 
Every student recognizes the joy of suddenly understanding a 
difficult problem or suddenly seeing a pattern in a complicated domain. 
A n elementary example is to understand that a negative slope in a graph 
represents a decrease of a variable. An experienced teacher can easily 
perceive when a student has understood. The experience of insight is 
subjectively experienced as: "Aha, now I get it!" The emotional aha-
insight occurs when the pieces fall into place in the pattern, and the 
insight means that the student has achieved a more refined understanding 
of the domain. 
From the cognitive neuroscience perspective one would also be 
interested in understanding what happens in the brain when, for example, 
a student experiences an aha-insight and what emotional and 
motivational responses correlate with such an insight. As a side remark, it 
can be noted that Land (1982) defined insight as "the sudden cessation of 
stupidity". There are some recent exceptions (see for example Jung-
Beeman et al. 2004), but, by and large, these processes have not been 
investigated. Although I lack the empirical data to support my position, I 
am convinced that the more often one experiences true understanding, the 
more motivated one wil l be to pursue one's studies. In brief, I submit that 
understanding is a key motivational factor in education. 
A n aha-experience is a strong scaffold in the process of meaning 
making, as it provides the student with an affective receipt attesting to an 
understanding of the salient features of a pattern. This internal 
information is useful for the student as a success feedback to her 
learning. It may also be useful as external communication to a tutor who 
may draw attention to the factors that generate the student's aha-insight. 
A skilled teacher can analyse the learning situation and pinpoint personal, 
environmental and emotional factors leading to the understanding of the 
pattern. 
There is a saying that education is what is left when you have 
forgotten what you have learnt. This seems paradoxical because it is 
difficult to fathom how there can be any knowledge left when one has 
forgotten it. The paradox arises from the way we generally appreciate the 
concepts information and knowledge. M y solution to the paradox is that 
education consists of the patterns you have assimilated during your life. 
To assimilate knowledge is to incorporate new knowledge in a form that 
is understandable to oneself. A pattern can remain even i f the facts used 
to discover it are forgotten. The patterns are more important than facts 
since the former can be used for solving new problems that go beyond 
the training set. The deeper you understand, the more you can generalize 
your knowledge. And when you have understood, it is also much easier 
to explain your knowledge area to others. In other words, the one who 
understands can teach. 
Understanding and Transfer 
Achieving understanding within a knowledge domain leads to an 
increased ability to solve new problems and to answer new types of 
questions relating to the domain. This is essentially what is called 
"transfer" in educational research. In this section I wi l l use the survey 
article by Bransford and Schwartz (1999) as a point of departure to 
describe the connections between understanding and transfer. 
Bransford and Schwartz (1999) reconsider some of the traditional 
ideas about what constitutes a demonstration of transfer. Instead of 
focusing on the ability to answer new questions within a knowledge 
domain, they want to emphasize how the ability to pose relevant 
questions within the domain has developed. For example when fifth 
graders and college students were asked to provide a plan for protecting 
Bald Eagles from extinction, the proposed plans of both groups failed on 
several accounts. However, when considering the questions asked by the 
two groups, there were decisive differences. The fifth graders tended to 
focus on individual eagles (What do they eat?) while the college students 
focused more on interdependencies between the eagles and their habitats 
(What about the predators of eagles?) By this view of transfer, it seems 
that the college students had learned general biological principles that 
they could now transfer to generate more relevant questions. By 
exhibiting a greater repertoire of patterns they could apply to it, they 
demonstrated a better understanding of the problem. In brief, learning 
with understanding is important for enhancing performance on 
subsequent transfer tasks. 
As an alternative, Bransford and Schwartz (1999) want to broaden 
the notion of transfer by focusing on the students' "preparation for future 
learning" (PFL). They write: 
So, rather than evaluate whether people can generate a finished 
product, the focus shifts to whether they are prepared to learn to 
solve new problems. For example, one determinant of the course 
of future learning is the questions people ask about a topic, be-
cause these questions shape their learning goals. [...] [T]he ideal as-
sessment from a PFL perspective is to directly explore people's 
abilities to learn new information and relate their learning to previ-
ous experiences. 
In my terminology, P F L involves extracting the relevant patterns so that 
the understanding they provide can be applied to future problem 
situations. 
Bransford and Schwartz (1999) also argue that contrasting cases are 
important as guides to seeing patterns and thus to understanding. They 
describe an experiment as follows: 
The goal of our studies was to explore ways to help college stu-
dents understand memory concepts (e.g., a schema). [...] Our ex-
periments compared the effects of reading about memory experi-
ments and theories versus actively analyzing sets of contrasting 
cases relevant to memory. Students in the contrasting cases condi-
tion worked with simplified data sets from original experiments. 
[...] Their task was to "discover" the important patterns in the data. 
Students in the other condition wrote a multipage summary of a 
textbook chapter. [...] [W]e assumed that the use of contrasting 
cases would better prepare students to learn new information than 
would the activity of summarizing the text. As a means of examin-
ing this assumption, the new learning experience took the form of 
a lecture on memory theories and experiments. [...]. Students re-
ceived a final prediction task that presented them with a new 
memory experiment and asked them to make predictions about 
the likely outcomes. Students in the "summarize plus lecture" 
group did not do nearly as well as students in the "contrasting 
cases plus lecture" condition. 
They also argue that the PFL perspective highlights the importance of 
learners actively interacting with their environments. When learners have 
opportunities to get involved with reality and receive feedback, their 
learning improves quite dramatically and the importance of their previous 
experiences is revealed. Furthermore, studies show that information pre-
sented in the context of solving problems is more likely to be spontane-
ously utilized than information presented in the form of simple facts. 
Finally, Bransford and Schwartz point to the role of intersubjectivity 
in PFL: " A n especially important aspect of active transfer involves peo-
ple's willingness to seek others' ideas and perspectives. Helping people 
seek multiple viewpoints about issues may be one of the most important 
ways to prepare them for future learning." 
Educational Techniques for Understanding 
I now turn to the challenge of how education should be organized in 
order to boost the students' understanding by making them discover the 
relevant patterns within a knowledge domain. If we follow Piaget's 
constructivist view on education, students should not be taught the 
patterns, but they should discover them themselves. They should only be 
scaffolded with the right kind of material for the process. However, 
practical educational experience shows that this method is far from 
optimal. A n orthodox constructivist viewpoint puts too high demands on 
the students: They are supposed to discover the patterns that it has taken 
scientists and professionals centuries to uncover. 
A teacher who introduces the theoretical structure within a 
knowledge domain wi l l thereby present abstract patterns to the students. 
The pattern can, for example be a grammatical rule or a method of 
composing music. The pattern is often constructed from theoretical 
variables that are not given by experience. 
In education, merely introducing theories is not sufficient to achieve 
understanding. In high school and at college, scientific knowledge is 
presented via abstract theories, often in the form of equations or other 
symbolic notations. Yet, many students do not understand the theoretical 
elements beyond mechanically manipulating the formulas. For example, 
they pass their exams in physics by putting in the right numbers in the 
equations, without understanding the pattern expressed by the equation. 
In this way, students hardly achieve any deeper knowledge, let alone any 
understanding of the underlying patterns in physics. 
I believe that certain educational information technology (IT) tools, 
in the hands of an experienced teacher/supervisor, can be effective in 
promoting understanding In particular, I want to point to tools for 
visualizing abstract data and correlations, that is, visualizing the patterns, 
and to programs for simulating various processes relevant for grasping 
the patterns. 
When a teacher wants to convey patterns in abstract theories, 
visualization is an excellent method for promoting understanding, 
because it can pinpoint salient features in the pattern. In mathematics a 
third-degree equation suddenly becomes comprehensible when drawn as 
a graph, the connection between demand and supply in economics 
becomes graspable when drawn as curves in a diagram, and the 
development of a historical battle is easier to remember i f presented by 
blocks and arrows on a map. Presenting theoretical patterns visually 
makes it easier for the students to connect to their own experiences and 
thereby their understanding will be considerably enhanced. 
If we consider the problem of conveying cultural patterns, I would 
point out that visualizations could be excellent tools in language 
education. In traditional dictionaries, words are explained by other 
words. But there are also "pictionaries" where some words are explained 
with the aid of pictures. For example the differences between the English 
"breakfast" and the Italian "prima colazione" could quite easily be 
expressed using pictures. 
A simulation replaces a real course of events by a dynamic model 
where the most important variables are accounted for. Simulation 
programs can be said to be a form of visualizations - namely 
visualizations of dynamic systems. In the computer game SimCity the 
player can construct a complex virtual city with water supply, electricity, 
streets, schools, industries, etc. The goal is not to conquer anything, but 
to keep the dynamic system representing the city in balance so that the 
city can develop in a harmonic manner. There must not be a shortage of 
electricity or too expensive streets. The simulations do not give you real 
experiences of city planning, but they provide virtual experiences. When 
it comes to understanding a process, such experiences are valuable 
substitutes. Because the student can interactively control a number of 
variables, she may acquire a rather rich experience of different causal 
connections in the system and thereby achieve a better understanding of 
it. When involved in a simulation, a student will be more likely to 
understand how different variables interact and affect other variables. 
The virtual world of a simulator can complement the real one by 
providing situations that a student, for various reasons - ethical, 
economic, physical or temporal - cannot be allowed to experience 
directly, for example crisis management, stressful events such as a 
complicated surgical operation, and dangerous chemical experiments. 
Such virtual experiences become much more embodied and they stick to 
memory much more strongly than i f the student just studies a text or 
abstract equations. On the other hand, the theories that are presented in 
textbooks can be supportive when interpreting the experiences. 
Understanding a knowledge domain builds on the interplay between 
theory and experience. 
Different kinds of media can be exploited to bring out patterns. 
When I want to learn about a knowledge domain, I already rely on books, 
television, movies, recordings, etc. These media give us substitute 
experiences. Role-playing offers simulations of social interactions that 
can also provide students with valuable "virtual" experiences that they 
can later exploit in real life. If the students enact situations involving 
people from other cultures, the clashes between the cultures may become 
tangible without being embarrassing and without causing real problems. 
And then analyses of the clashes, together with a teacher or a supervisor, 
wil l be a very efficient method for understanding the underlying cultural 
patterns. If the teacher can act out the seemingly "odd" sides of the 
knowledge domain in a way that brings out a pattern, the students wi l l be 
assisted to see its rationale. Because role-playing involves interactivity, it 
is much more emotionally engaging than using traditional media. 
Today, teachers are accustomed to use various IT tools as a 
complement to their teaching and for providing a richer learning 
environment for their students. Intelligent tutoring systems are computer 
programs that function as a virtual tutor, albeit in a rather limited form. 
By using such a system, a student can practice a task at their own pace, 
repeat it as often as they like, and at the same time be given support by 
the systems at various points in the task. 
Along the same lines, virtual pedagogical agents can provide useful 
tools (Gulz 2004). A virtual pedagogical agent can be thought of as an 
embodied intelligent tutoring system or a visual representation of the 
system. Such agents can serve as a virtual tutor in a tutoring system. For 
example, suppose a student is working with social problems in society. 
By encountering virtual tutors representing different perspectives, the 
student can be made to see that a problem can be approached in different 
ways that partly contradict and partly complement each other. 
Understanding in Science 
As a final topic I shall compare the proposal that understanding is seeing 
a pattern with the debate concerning the role of understanding in science. 
This is currently a much discussed topic (e.g. Trout 2002, de Regt 2004, 
de Regt and Dieks 2005, Kvanvig to appear, Mulder no date, 
Kischenmann 2008; see also the review article by Ke i l 2006). 
In contrast to the early accounts of explanation and understanding 
(e.g. Hempel 1965, von Wright 1971) it is now widely agreed that 
understanding and what counts as an explanation is relative to the 
epistemic situation of the scientist, not anything universal (van Fraassen 
1980, Gärdenfors 1980, de Regt 2004, 103). This means that scientific 
understanding is pragmatic and context-dependent. For example, in the 
heyday of classical mechanics, Lord Kelvin is famous for having said 
that "the test of 'Do I or not understand a particular subject in physics?' 
is 'Can I make a mechanical model of it?'", but this ideal of 
understanding in physics has nowadays lost its appeal (de Regt and Dieks 
2005, 138). It should also be remembered that for Newton's 
contemporary colleagues his notion of forces that operate at a distance 
was mysterious, while today hardly anybody with a scientific background 
will find it unintelligible. 
One can divide the contemporary theories of understanding in 
science in two broad classes: causal and unificationist (de Regt and Dieks 
2005). As an example of the causal theories, let us take Salmon's 1984 
book Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World. 
According to Salmon, "underlying causal mechanisms hold the key to 
our understanding of the world" (Salmon 1984, 260) because "causal 
processes, causal interactions, and causal laws provide the mechanisms 
by which the world works; to understand why certain things happen, I 
need to see how they are produced by these mechanisms" (Salmon 1984, 
132). In my view, this account of understanding does not conflict with 
the one presented here. On the contrary, as I argued in section 3, causal 
structures are special cases of patterns that can be discovered via the 
scientific process or via more mundane experiences. 
The alternative approach to scientific understanding, the 
unificationist conception, has been defended by Friedman (1974) and 
further developed by Kitcher (1981, 1989) and others. Friedman writes 
that science unifies our knowledge since it "increases our understanding 
of the world by reducing the total number of independent phenomena that 
I have to accept as ultimate or given. A world with fewer independent 
phenomena is other things equal, more comprehensible than one with 
more" (Friedman 1974, 15). Later, Kitcher argued for the fundamental 
role of patterns in this unificatory process: "Understanding the 
phenomena is not simply a matter of reducing the 'fundamental 
incomprehensibilities' but of seeing connections, common patterns, in 
what initially appeared to be different situations. [...] Science advances 
our understanding of nature by showing us how to derive descriptions of 
many phenomena, using the same patterns of derivation again and again, 
and, in demonstrating this, it teaches us how to reduce the number of 
types of facts we have to accept as ultimate (or brute)" (Kitcher 1989, 
482). Again, it should be clear that the unificationist approach to 
scientific understanding, in particular in Kitcher's version, could be 
subsumed under the idea that understanding is seeing patterns. 
After reviewing the causal and unificationist approaches to 
understanding in science, de Regt and Dieks (2005, 151) propose their 
"Criterion for Intelligibility of Theories": " A theory T is intelligible for 
scientists (in context C) i f they can recognise qualitatively characteristic 
consequences of T without performing exact calculations." De Regt and 
Dieks attribute the general idea behind this criterion to Heisenberg. As 
examples of intelligible theories they mention the molecular theory of 
gases, "potential vorticity" in meteorology and "field lines" in 
electrostatics with the aid of which scientists can make purely qualitative 
predictions. However, it is clear from their descriptions of the examples 
that scientists use the theories to visualize the qualitative properties (de 
Regt and Dieks (2005) emphasize this themselves on p. 155). In other 
words, the scientists can see the patterns that are relevant for making the 
predictions. Once again, I conclude that also their Criterion for 
Intelligibility of Theories falls under the general idea of understanding as 
seeing a pattern. It should be noted however, that their criteria make 
understanding relative to the scientist who see the patterns - there is no 
thing as an absolute understanding within a scientific theory (a similar 
point is made by Mulder no date). 
Conclusion 
In this article, I have focused on the role of understanding in human 
nature. The central hypothesis has been that understanding is 
experiencing a pattern. I have shown how this general idea can be applied 
when we look at understanding different cultures, understanding in 
education and understanding in science. However, there is a great need 
for research in order to obtain a deeper understanding of the cognitive 
and motivational processes involved in various forms of understanding. 
Among other things, there is a lack of psychological tests for when 
understanding occurs during a learning process. We also need to find out 
much more about how understanding generates motivation for further 
learning. 
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Meaning of Patterns - Patterns of Meaning 
Christine Tind Johannessen-Henry 
Abstract 
In this response to Peter Gärdenfors, I bring a theological perspective to 
Gärdenfors' cognitive scientific approach on the role of understanding. In 
relation to Gärdenfors' main point that understanding means seeing a 
pattern, I argue that the complexity in our perception of life patterns is 
open to theological interpretation of reality as a whole, which includes a 
scientific-philosophical approach to the human quest for meaning. 
Keywords: pattern, religious belief, meaning, understanding, 
worldviews, view-of-life, experience. 
Introduction 
First of all I would like to thank Professor Peter Gärdenfors for his 
interesting paper on the role of understanding, in which he presents some 
reflections from his very elucidating book The Meaning-Seeking Human 
(Gärdenfors 2006). According to Gärdenfors, our perceptions can be 
strongly influenced by patterns built on earlier experience, a phenomenon 
also recognized in science. In a veiled reference to Bourdieu's concept of 
"habitus" (Bourdieu 1996, 112) Gärdenfors states that what we 
experience we interpret in the exact framework which we already know 
(Gärdenfors 2006, 53). I respond to Gärdenfors's lecture as a theologian 
in so far as my response implies some theological reflections on 
Gärdenfors' hypothesis that "understanding is seeing a pattern", an 
assertion which is almost self-evidently central to theological 
interpretation. In his paper Gärdenfors applies this idea to culture, 
education and science; here I wi l l apply the idea to existential life views. 
Building Bridges 
Gärdenfors' interdisciplinary project is situated between the disciplines 
of cognitive science and philosophy with the purpose of building a bridge 
between biological and humanistic views on human beings. Gärdenfors' 
bridge building project is of paramount interest. It confronts the striking 
gap between the humanities on the one hand, which usually take meaning 
as given and do not take into consideration analysis of the emergence of 
this meaning, and the sciences of nature on the other hand, which 
actively avoid speaking of meaning, being incapable of explaining what 
meaning is (Gärdenfors 2006:44). This is the reason we should not let the 
single disciplines speak only for themselves: interdisciplinarity forces us 
to see the dependence of the context in understanding. Provided that 
scientific knowledge and academic research are not totally separated 
from our everyday life, it is necessary to connect the understanding from 
different disciplines on account of, and despite, the paradigmatic points 
of distinction which in practice are experienced as combined. A n 
example drawn from the context of my own research area involving 
theology and health science is the medical treatment of life threatening 
diseases. In this live situation we are not able to understand the patient's 
situation from either a biological or a humanistic point of view alone; we 
are only capable of understanding the patient's situation and needs in the 
context of physical survival and the situations related to coping with the 
issue of significance (Pargament 1997, 21-67). 
According to Gärdenfors, our brains are searching for patterns, as 
this is simply the way we are able to understand. We have the faculty for 
filling in empty holes so that the patterns make sense. Scientifically we 
know very little about how meaning emerges (Gärdenfors 2006, 44), that 
is, the emergence of a sense of coherence. Yet we are able to extract 
hidden causes, by which new patterns emerge; thus we understand things, 
which at first were unintelligible. By virtue of linking things with words 
and narratives we seek to understand what other people say. From this 
perspective of the quest for meaning in everyday life arise further 
reflections on the perspective of totality. Understanding and meaning aim 
to include the whole meaning of life. Our ability to understand through 
patterns is thus applied as metaphor or metonymy, that is to compare, 
link or exchange an idea with another, on the whole meaning of reality. 
Through this application we enter the boundaries between philosophy 
and theology. 
Gärdenfors' exploration of our understanding through patterns may 
raise the following concerns for theological reflection: How are we to 
understand Gärdenfors' approach to the meanings of patterns compared 
with religious quests for meaning? And how may our cognition of 
patterns be interpreted when reflecting on meaning in the interplay 
between order and disorder? 
The Quest for a Fundamental Pattern 
According to Gärdenfors, abstract patterns are found at every level of 
human thinking; we perceive patterns visually, and at the same time we 
interpret the patterns we see. Similarly the understanding of reality 
through patterns manifests itself in the question of meaning of life and 
metaphysical reflections. Let me here refer to a discussion about 
"fundamental patterns" between the Swedish theologian Anders Jeffner 
and his compatriot, philosopher Mats Furberg, on this matter. The 
discussion is part of a larger interest in Sweden in the area of "Empirical 
Research of Life Views" which has been a part of the Swedish debate on 
belief, philosophy and religion since the 1930's (Jeffner 1973, 8; Lindfelt 
2003, 15). The more important question raised is whether it makes sense 
to apply the concept of a pattern to an interpretation of the whole of 
reality; in other words, do we perceive our experiences in life as based on 
certain "fundamental patterns" which reflect a total or comprehensive 
reality? Or is the idea of a fundamental pattern an illusion? 
The concept of fundamental patterns as an idea of reality as a whole 
may be compared not only with patterns in cognitive science but also in 
genetics. In the latter a "fundamental pattern" of life is included in all 
living beings capable of growth and development. The principle lies in 
the ability of genes to copy, to transfer information, and to fulfil the 
manufacturing needs of the living organism. The fundamental pattern of 
genetics recurs in bacteria, vegetation, animals and humans, and ensures 
a large biological diversity (Bråkenhielm & Hansson 1995, 12). In this 
manner it is biologically possible to trace fundamental patterns in living 
systems. 
When Jeffner applies the concept of "fundamental pattern" in 
relation to terms like "worldviews" and "meaning of life", it should not 
be understood literally, since the connection cannot be scientifically 
proven. Biological concepts of pattern-formation can be understood as 
analogous to certain religious texts, myths and narratives, in so far as 
they are grasping a certain perspective of life and existence. A 
description using fundamental patterns is thus an attempt to interpret an 
experience of totality by using inadequate images (Jeffner 1975, 79; 
1966, 240-256). 
To illustrate the idea of fundamental patterns and in order to 
maintain the integrity of the scientific and religious worldviews without 
reducing the one to the other, Jeffner, in his later writings, utilises a part 
of Furberg's analysis on the influence of words and images on human 
perception (Jeffner 1975, 68-81. Anderson & Furberg 1972, 44-57). 
Furberg's analysis is inspired by Wittgenstein's (1953, 165e-185e) 
reflection of the term "see", using Jastow's duck-rabbit-head-drawing. 
This type of picture in cognitive therapy goes under the term "object 
recognition". (Eysenck & Keane 1998, 55) 
The figure used by both Furberg and Jeffner shows at the same time the 
head of an antelope and that of a pelican. Hence, it is ambiguous. A 
person who knows of pelicans and not antelopes will spontaneously 
perceive the figure as the upper part of a pelican - but the empirical facts 
are the same. Despite the fact that we agree on all provable facts, we can 
disagree on the object as a whole regarding what really is - the truth of 
the object (Jeffner 1966, 243; 1975, 70). 
Thereby Jeffner wants to illustrate that both non-religious and 
religious worldviews refer to the same reality even though we understand 
it differently. But through our perceptions of such different patterns we 
are able to explain why people who believe in God, without disagreeing 
with the non-believer about scientific facts, at the same time contradict 
statements which deny the existence of God. This cannot be exclusively 
explained as a contradiction in attitude, and yet it implies a contradiction 
of gestalt. A pattern of transcendence can keep religious experiences as 
something real and does not need to consider them as illusory (Jeffner 
1975,78). 
Part of Furberg's objection to Jeffner's theory of a fundamental 
pattern and the drawing-illustration of it is as follows: The figure appears 
as i f the pelican-head and the antelope-head are compatible - but they are 
not (Anderson & Furberg 1972, 48). They are irreconcilable - essentially 
different; heads and bodies are placed in different directions - horn and 
bill are in the same location. They push out and replace each other - there 
is no room for both gestalts. The shift happens when the eye changes 
from one aspect to the other. The pelican-antelope allows this change of 
aspect. However this is not the case in relation to the religious worldview 
and belief in God. The concept of God lies on another level. There is no 
change in aspect. To Furberg, the analogy between the pelican-antelope 
and Jeffner's notion of fundamental patterns is false. 
If we are to visualize a fundamental pattern at all, the figurative 
drawing must be replaced by a non-figurative one, such as an ink spot 
(Furberg 1975,38). 
Furberg's replacement is to be understood as a hidden reference to the 
Rorschach-Test (Weiner & Greene 2008), where the purpose is to 
describe the whole personality of a person through a test of the person's 
perception of ink spots, identifying it as resembling, in this case, a pair of 
fly's eyes, or a rabbit with talons, etc. But in itself the ink spot represents 
nothing. It is neither unambiguous, nor ambiguous, and lacks any 
conventional interpretation. How we perceive it is all about the 
imagination of the perceiver - not about a given pattern. What Furberg is 
pointing out is that it is not possible to stay visual in this matter; the 
figure cannot literally be the totality containing every experience a 
person has had in his life. To the believer in God the concept of God is 
distinctive from anything that can be presented in drawings or sculptures, 
and can never be complete, empirically or visually. Considering these 
points, Furberg's stumbling block in this matter is the concept of "the 
whole" meaning. Through an empirical example and in the light of his 
own experience, Furberg indirectly asks: How can anyone claim the 
existence of a "total meaning" unless this person has had an extremely 
long life without suffering and grief and without experiencing or 
witnessing a serious disease, as in Furberg's example? (Furberg 1975, 
33-34) 
The discussion between Jeffner and Furberg illustrates the schism 
between a religious and a secular worldview and testifies to the meanings 
of different life views on the question of the meaning of the whole of 
reality; but the discussion also shows how many different levels of 
patterns emerge, and the impossibility of including all variations of 
patterns in one human idea of totality. Thus our understanding of 
metaphysical patterns fossilizes our understanding i f we remain only in 
the visual domain. 
To attempt an explanation of what it means to understand and view 
a fundamental pattern, that is a religious view, I wi l l draw a tentative 
parallel to Gärdenfors' notion with the cartoon made by western people 
for a campaign in North Africa, where people were not able to 
understand the intended causal connection between the pictures. The 
people who could read, read Arabic, which reads in the opposite direction 
from western writing, and people who could not read interpreted the 
pictures as separate. We may be able to express the outsiders' missing 
link as lacking a key of interpretation, comparable to the situation of the 
un-initiate in the interpretation of an emblem. A n illustration of such 
religious image-interpretation is also to be found in the philosophy of the 
French theologian Jean-Luc Marion who rejects metaphysics, while 
iconographically naming the religious visual key of interpretation as 
seeing reality through a cross (Marion 1995, 70). 
A Vague Element of Above and Beyond 
If theology is to progress with interpretations of reality as a whole, it may 
have to include critical points such as those pointed out by Furberg. I see 
Gärdenfors as being predominantly in agreement with Furberg's 
argument (Gärdenfors 2006). 
The German theologian Wolfhart Pannenberg gives the following 
theory of meaning of the whole of reality, a theory which to a certain 
extent counters the critics. In all realms of reality more complete forms of 
meaning appear. Contexts of meanings exist everywhere, even beyond 
the realm of the phenomena of organic and psychic life (Pannenberg 
1990, 160). We have no specific consciousness of the whole of our own 
life in ordinary life, but in specific moments of experience the whole 
reality itself is present to us in feeling. On the other hand the whole of 
reality is not fully contained in our individual experience, but "there 
remains a vague element of above and beyond, which forms the 
framework in which the individual experience can first become what it 
is." (Pannenberg 1990, 161). The pattern in our life is drawn as we go on 
living, as it is poetically described by the Danish writer and storyteller 
Karen Blixen (Blixen 1937, 273-276). But whereas the whole pattern of 
the individual life is sceptically fulfilled in the story of Blixen (in the 
appearance of a stork!) the pattern is not fulfilled within an individual's 
life according to the theory of Pannenberg. The point that the individual 
will never be able to understand the whole meaning - a completed pattern 
- becomes especially clear and obvious in the context of disease, as when 
a person dies prematurely from cancer. Rather, meaning emerges in a 
larger context than the individual person as an analogy of the universe, 
the whole meaning, that is, as infinite contexts of meaning. From this 
point of view, the "whole", life-as-a-whole, is the history of the universe, 
which we cannot see as long as we are a part of it, as long as the history 
of the universe exists. The whole meaning, life-as-a-whole, is only given 
to us in glimpses. 
Hidden Variables 
A Human Created or Given Meaning 
"Humans have a unique talent for extracting the hidden variables of the 
world," Gärdenfors states, and argues that the patterns we see are to some 
extent dependent on the culture in which we live. But the question 
remains how we are to interpret the fact that altogether we have the 
capability of understanding and extracting meanings from the hidden 
variables and thus reading the minds of others with respect to emotions, 
desires, attention, intentions, beliefs and knowledge. One single word can 
mean widely different things. Depending on the context it is possible to 
speak of the particular "meaning" of a sentence within a discourse. 
According to Pannenberg, a human being does not create this meaning 
even though it is the human being speaking the sentences. Language 
itself represents a truth of reality, patterns, that is already given; 
otherwise it would not be possible to call some assertions "true", or 
"approximately true". Also the many layers of linguistic utterances 
indicate that there is always something "above and beyond" the meaning 
as cited. This shows itself in the way expressions can be expressed 
imprecisely. Furthermore meaning does not depend only on the writer, 
speaker or interpreter. The point is that semantic structures in a speech or 
text appear to be an independent entity, in which the element of suitable 
interpretation must be judged in relation to it. It seems that our grasp of 
this semantic content is an activity, but is not an action of our own 
(Pannenberg 1990, 156-8). Hence when Gärdenfors claims 
"understanding is nothing mysterious", I wi l l add that to find meanings in 
this way is in itself a mystery. 
These few theological reflections open up a greater question on 
understanding patterns in a larger perspective. Is the experience of 
meaning a matter of creating meaning, as in a secular interpretation, or is 
it a matter of an already given meaning re-enacted in specific situations, 
as in a religious interpretation? (Pannenberg 1990, 154) 
Gärdenfors states that the purpose of science is not to reduce 
religion. The sciences of nature can explain by and large how the system 
of the eye functions, but the explanation does not take away the beauty in 
what we see (2006, 142). I would like to add that neither does the 
explanation take away the religious belief, that is, the religious 
experience of the pattern of reality. 
Conclusion 
I wi l l conclude my response to Gärdenfors by commenting that even 
though a scientific understanding of patterns may seem to collide with a 
religious understanding due to crucial different points and conclusions, 
yet both views can be integrated into the concept of patterns. 
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